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PREFACE

Political parties and democracy comprise the interwoven strands of this
book. Their coupling exists on three levels: personal, empirical, and
theoretical.
Least important to the reader is the personal connection, but it does exist.
Political parties and democracy have stirred both my intellectual interests
and my emotional passions since I first became aware of the larger world
of politics. Tammany Hall bordered my New York elementary school,
which also served as the local voting precinct. The connection between
political parties and democracy was overtly physical to me, even before it
became theoretical.
On the empirical level, history and political science draw a more scientific connection. From James Madison's creation of the first popular-based
political party to yesterday's newspaper, we see the relationship. The
growth of political parties and the extension of democracy proceed along
parallel tracks. Competitive political parties facilitate, although they do not
guarantee, a considerable measure of popular involvement, control, and
policy determination. Without them, government is more likely to evidence
authoritarianism, violence , and repression. Rajiv Gandhi once said that
India's greatest political need was a strong opposition party; his subsequent
assassination underlined the point in blood.
Most important is the theoretical connection, and this book is intended
to bridge two areas within the discipline of political science: the study of
political philosophy and the study of parties. Perhaps that bridge cannot be
built or is poorly constructed here, and I will only cause dissatisfaction
among two diverse groups of academic specialists. But I hope that the ideas
here will be useful for both theorists and empiricists.
Exploring the relationship between political parties and democracy can
enrich each of these subjects . Such a relationship has been the focus of
some of the most insightful works in political science, beginning with the
classic books of Michels and Ostrogorski, but it has been neglected for
most of the second half of the twentieth century. Alan Ware suggests some
explanations for the decline: "There was a fragmenting of research from
about the 1950s onwards, so that those scholars who were concerned with
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the nature of the concept of democracy . .. were no longer the same people
who had great expertise in the working of political institutions. Moreover,
interest in the empirical study of politics moved sharply away from institutions like parties to focus on other aspects of the political process." 1
As the troubled twentieth century nears its end, democracy and competitive parties are receiving renewed attention, and I believe this is an
appropriate time to again consider their relationship. This volume is my
contribution to that major task.
In writing this book, I have received much help. I am particularly
indebted intellectually to two colleagues: Wilson Carey McWilliams has
continued to teach me about politics and political theory; and Carolyn Nestor has been an insightful and diligent research assistant. My work has been
greatly improved by volunteers reading chapter drafts, particularly Diana
Owen as well as Debra Dodson, John Hart, Kenneth Janda, John Kessel,
Maureen Moakley, Benjamin Radcliff, Gordon Schochet, and Patricia
Sykes.
Over the years I have also gained much from the scholarship and personal supportofM. J. Aronoff, Ross Baker, Vernon Bogdanor, Bill Crotty,
Peter Gay, James Gibson, Stanley Kelley, Richard L. McCormick, Richard
P. McConnick, Jerome Mileur, Austin Ranney, Alan Rosenthal , Stephen
Salrnore, Marian Simms, David Truman, and John White. The concepts
in this book were first developed in my graduate teaching at Rutgers University. There, I learned a<; much as I taught , particularly from Joseph
Cammarano, Kenneth Dautrich, John Dedrick, Patrick Deneen, Kim
Downing, Stephen Dworetz, Cliff Fox., LeeAundra Preuss, Joseph Romance, Jens Runge, and Loretta Semekos. I have previously published a
version of chapter 1 in the Journal of Theoretical Politics and appreciate
the courtesy of Sage Publications in allowing the material to be included in
this book.
I completed this manuscript while enjoying a sabbatical semester at Australian National University, which provided a superb position as visiting
professor and the efficient services of Thelma Williams and Joanna Phillips. I also appreciate the warm hospitality of new and old friends in Australia-Robert Dowse, Bruce Headey, Rick Kuhn , Elaine and Charles
McCoy, and Bruce and Edna Smith .
As it has for decades, Rutgers University generously supported my research
through an academic study leave and grants from its Research Council and
Graduate School of Education. The Eagleton Institute of Politics has been a
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continuing source of personal and logistical help. Edith Sales, as always, merits
particular thanks for her devotion and efficiency. Fred Woodward, director of
the University Press of Kansas, provided regular encouragement, and Claire
Sutton copy-edited the manuscript sympathetically.
Scholarship, like all of life, requires love to flourish. If there is merit in
this work, it has been nourished most of all by three family generations:
my parents, Moe and Celia Pomper, and my second parents, Emanuel and
Lillian Michels; my wife, Marlene, and my brother, Isidor; my sons,
David, Marc, and Miles, and my new daughters, Rayna and Erika. Their
love, I confidently hope, will nurture our continuing family. I dedicate this
book to the passions and interests of the next generation.

G.M.P.
Canberra, 1991
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ONE
CONCEPTS OF POLITICAL PARTIES

After all these years, we do not know how democracy works .
-A Romanian protester, 1989'

From 1989 to 1991 , the world was transformed by the political revolutions
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the surge of democratic government in Latin America, and the repressed expression of popular protest in
Beijing's Tiananmen Square. Central to these epochal events was a yearning for competitive political parties.
The rallying cry in these historic mass demonstrations, particularly in
Eastern Europe, was neither Republican France's idealistic call for "liberty, equality, fraternity" nor Bolshevik Russia's substantive claim for
"peace, bread, and land ." Instead, there was a basic, if sometimes
inchoate, understanding that freedom requires multiple political parties
seeking power in fair and open elections. Soon after these historic events,
the major nations of the world formally committed themselves to "the fundamental principles of multiparty democracy." 2 Empirical reality had validated E. E. Schattschneider's theoretical assertion "that the political
parties created democracy and that modem democracy is unthinkable save
in terms of the parties." 3
In this book I accept, and explore, that premised relationship between
political parties and democracy. My major task is to examine different conceptual models of political parties , primarily in the United States . In analyzing these concepts, I attempt to answer three questions: What are the
meanings attributed to parties? Empirically, to what extent do American
parties fit these conceptions? and How well do the different conceptions of
parties serve democratic interests?
My focus is on theories of what parties can and should be rather than on
theories of actual party behavior. Good theories surely should be tested
against reality and appropriately revised to account for those realities. As I
explore the different concepts of party, I attempt to match them to empirical
research findings ; these explorations may contribute to more general theories of parties and party systems.
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My purpose, however, is not to construct an empirical theory of party
behavior, because other scholars have significantly pursued that considerable task. 4 My aim here is more limited: to clarify and examine some important abstract concepts of parties. This work is important in itself. Ideas can
have their own impact, leading to new interpretations of and even to
changes in "the facts ." We will understand parties better if we first understand their conceptual foundations.
In this chapter, I will explore these conceptual foundations and develop
a framework for the theoretical and empirical analyses that follow. This
initial material is admittedly abstract; a brief outline may help the reader
follow my argument. In this chapter, I will
1. consider alternative definitions of political parties;
2. develop three analytic and dichotomous dimensions of parties,
termed focus, goals, and modes;
3. combine these dimensions into eight ideal-type party concepts;
4. develop three analytic and dichotomous dimensions of democratic
theory, congruent with the party dimensions, termed accessibility
of leadership, goals, and participation;
5. speculate on the relationship between the party concepts and alternative political systems.
After readers have followed-or endured-this abstract argument, I will
summarize the following chapters. These comprise substantive discussions
of the party concepts and their relationship to democracy.

IDENTIFYING POLITICAL PARTIES

What is a political party? Academic convention requires that we begin with
Edmund Burke's definition: "Party is a body of men united, for promoting
by their joint endeavors the national interest, upon some particular principle
in which they are all agreed." 5 Burke's criterion does present a normative
standard for one kind of party; however, it is not a general definition of all
parties but a particular defense of the Whig party of his day.
Burke presents a normative concept, what a party can or should be, in
place of a descriptive definition, what parties are or do. The same difficulty
exists in a major modem scholar's labors over etymology:
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If it is wrong to neglect the association between part and party, it
would also be quite wrong, on the other hand, to consider the party
as a part that is unrelated to the whole. If a party is not a part capable
of governing for the sake of the whole, that is, in view of a general
interest, then it does not differ from a faction. Although a party only
represents a part, this part must take a non-partial approach to the
whole. 6
James Madison was halfway closer to a useful definition when he characterized a faction (which in his time was not distinguished from a party)
as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of
the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. " 7 As Albert Hirschman has
shown, Madison expressed the philosophic effort of his era to employ interests to control passions. 8
Apart from his normative criticism, Madison does provide a useful initial
description of the meaning of party-a unified effort to affect government,
deriving its force from group interests and popular passions. Parties may
certainly be " adverse" to other groups, or they may govern in the general
interest, as Sartori insists, but these effects must be determined by the parties' actions, not assumed in advance. In his life, rather than in his theory,
Madison apparently accepted the distinction. Without apology for his party's passions and interests, he led in the creation of the first American
political party, the Republicans who elected President Thomas Jefferson in
1800.
As Madison's career suggests, parties are a distinctive political group.
As the combinations of interests and passions defined by Madison, parties
are unique in that they are particularly oriented toward elections. Epstein
includes this critical element in the most useful descriptive definition of
parties: "any group, however loosely organized, seeking to elect governmental officeholders under a given label. " 9
Crucially, Epstein calls attention to the collective character of a political
party, established by its common label, a characteristic that distinguishes
parties from other power-seeking groups included in other formulations.
These alternatives have defined a party as a group that "presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public
office" 10 or as an agency "for forging links between citizens and policy-

4

C HAPTER ON E

makers." 11 Parties certainly want to place candidates in public office, but
so do interest groups and financial contributors; although parties clearly
promote linkage, so do individual candidates and opinion pollsters. Parties
are unique in their nominal unity and in their electoral focus. This definition
largely excludes from our consideration the ruling organizations in oneparty states , such as the dominant Communist parties of the erstwhile
Soviet bloc. Where a legitimate even if limited opposition exists, as in
Mexico (or the old Democratic one-party South in the United States), the
definition will still serve because elections remain important in legitimizing
the dominant party's continuance in office.
Where party power cannot be challenged legitimately, elections become
only a ritual. In these systems , parties obviously are important, indeed more
important than their democratic counterparts, as agencies of government
and social mobilization, but they are very different organizations. Although
they still bear some family resemblance to democratic parties, they are too
different to be considered even as part of the same genus.
A definition is not sufficient in itself but marks the beginning of fuller
concepts that would delineate the expected organization, goals, and appeals
of political parties. The most common conceptual framework in the study
of political parties, derived from V. 0 . Key, distinguishes among "party
as an organization," "party as an electorate, " and "party in government." 12 This framework is certainly useful in describing the activities of
parties; however, it incorrectly implies distinctions that are not empirically
valid and neglects critical theoretical issues.
The United States does not have three different kinds of parties, each
fitting a concept of a separate party engaged in organizing, electioneering,
and governing. Instead, a large amount of mixing exists among these three
presumably distinct entities. The " party as an organization" might be
expected to choose its own leaders, but in reality they are selected, through
primaries, by the voters, the "party as an electorate ." Similarly, a large
share of campaigning is done by officeholders, the "party in government,"
not by the formal organization. Nor is the party electorate a distinct group,
for it is defined to a considerable extent by party organizational rules and
statutes , such as registration, as well as by its responses to the actions of
officeholders bearing the party label.
American parties are a jumble of these three conventional forms, which
cannot readily be separated , as the presidential nomination illustrates. The
nomination designates the choice of the party's leader, and it is formally
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determined in a convention of party activists. Yet, in reality, the choice is
made primarily by the "party as an electorate," with some lesser influence
by the "party as an organization" and the "party in government." The
combination is formally acknowledged in the Democratic party, whose
convention delegates include representatives of the organization (the Democratic National Committee), officeholders ("super-delegates"), and the
electorate (primary election winners) . Any concept of an American political party must recognize this blending.
Furthermore, the common tripartite division of political parties is conceptually defective. At best, it describes the separate activities of three
kinds of people. A concept of a political party, however, must present some
model of the party's total activities, of the intended ifnot actual interactions
and linkages among organizers, voters, and governors. These linkages are
particularly important in the study of democracy.
The tripartite framework impedes analysis of these vital democratic connections. As two critics argue , it gives attention only to "truncated" parties
but "defines away the normative problem posed by traditional party
thought, " the proper relationship of leaders and led . Instead, the concept
of party becomes an empty abstraction, "a superficial model ... in which
the elite and mass distinction is erased." 13
Useful concepts of political parties must emphasize, not neglect, how
parties connect mass electorates with elite officials. For this purpose, it is
best to distinguish parties , which are groups that contest elections, from the
electorate itself. To capture the reality of party, as Schlesinger puts it, "We
must exclude the voter. Voters are choosers among parties, not components
of them." 14 In this book, I examine parties essentially as groups of people
who seek power through the ballot box, not as voters who grant power
through their ballots. Parties, then, are "working politicians supported by
partisan voters." 15

D IMEN SION S OF PARTY CONCEPTS

Concepts of political parties are more than descriptions of their activities;
they are more comprehensive and deal more generally with normative
expectations and empirical features. As conceptual models, furthermore,
they are not intended simply to reflect reality but to illuminate and even
change reality. In this book, I examine eight such concepts.
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CHAPTER ONE

Figure I . I . Concepts of Political Parties: Focus

The concepts applied to political parties can be classified by three ana1ytic dimensions. First, concepts of parties differ in the breadth of their
focus, dealing either with the active elite of the parties or with their larger
mass clientele. Second, parties are seen as having different goals, stressing
either collective or coalitional objectives. Third, concepts of parties differ
in the understanding of the parties' modes, portraying them either as
instrumental to other objectives or as directly expressive of affective
sentiments. 16
These are analytic dimensions, intended to describe ideal party types,
not to predict their behavior. As polar opposites, these dichotomous categories allow us to probe more fully into the abstract concepts of parties. In
reality, the divisions are not so neat and clear. An actual political party
includes both elite and mass elements, pursues both collective and coalitional goals, and acts both instrumentally and expressively. Empirically,
these dimensions differentiating party concepts are better represented as
continua rather than as dichotomies, with any particular party emphasizing
one or another side of each continuum.
Focus is the first dimension (see Figure 1. 1). 17 Parties, by the definition
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Coalitional

Figure 1.2 . Concepts of Political Parties: Goals

used here, are always involved in contesting elections. This characteristic
remains in both the elite and the mass foci, even when different aspects of
the party are stressed. Illustratively, when we take an elite focus, we can
examine the organizational bureaucracy of the party that prepares for these
elections; when we take a mass focus, we can examine the party as a team
of office seekers.
When alternative party concepts evidence a mass focus, they emphasize
the parties' relationship to and activities in the larger political world. Attention centers on the party's relationships with important external audiences,
including the media, financial contributors, and most important, the voters. 18 Political scientists' extensive studies of voting behavior examine the
effect of these external activities, although they are not actual studies of
parties.
A second dimension concerns the goals of parties (see Figure 1.2) . We
can assume that all parties have a general goal of winning elections. The
more specific goals, however, can vary from collective to coalitional, e.g.,
from the achievement of a common policy program to the distribution of
the spoils of office.
Collective goals are those that require united action for their achievement
and, once achieved, provide benefits for the entire group, with only limited
distribution to specific individuals. Concepts of political parties that focus on
collective goals typically emphasize broad political programs and ideologies,
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dealing with public goods. Woodrow Wilson, himself a political scientist, provided a particularly eloquent expression of the collective purpose of a political
party as he was inaugurated as president of the United States:
No one can mistake the purpose for which the Nation now seeks to
use the Democratic Party. It seeks to use it to interpret a change in its
own plans and point of view .. .. Our duty is to cleanse, to reconsider,
to restore, to correct the evil without impairing the good, to purify
and humanize every aspect of our common life without weakening or
sentimentalizing it. 19
Coalition goals are more modest. They will also usually require concerted action for their achievement, but the achieved rewards typically will
then be divided among the members of the coalition for their individual
satisfaction. Public policies may constitute some of these rewards, not as a
total and coherent ideological program but as a collection of particular programs benefiting distinct groups. An American party platform is illustrative , providing an assortment of promises, some material (tax cuts) and
some philosophical (abortion), each important to some element in the party
coalition , each of differing importance to the distinct members of the
coalition.
Direct material gain is another type of coalitional goal. American parties
have often been conceptualized as primarily concerned with such material
goals as patronage, contracts, graft, office, and subsidies. These coalitional, rather than collective, goals were stressed in the concept of party
advanced by another Democrat of Wilson's time:
In two Presidential campaigns, the leaders talked themselves red in
the face about silver bein' the best money and gold bein' no good ,
and they tried to prove it out of books. Do you think the people cared
for all that guff? No. They heartily indorsed what Richard Crocker
said: " What's the use of discussin' what's the best kind of money?"
said Crocker. " I'm in favor of all kinds of money-the more the
better." See how a real Tammany statesman can settle in twenty-five
words a problem that monopolized two campaigns! 20
The third element composing concepts of parties is the mode employed
by parties (see Figure 1.3). Mode involves a combination of the style,
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Expressive

Figure 1.3. Concepts of Political Parties: Mode

incentives, and system of membership compensation of the party. Concepts
of parties stress different modes, depending on whether the party is seen as
either an instrumental means to other, more important goals or as a central
expression of the members' political life. It is the difference between party
as a tool and party as a faith. 21
The instrumental party is calculating and rational - it provides direct
compensation to its workers and makes appeals to the interests of voters.
Modem campaign consultants serve as almost a pure example; in their
emphasis on the technical arts of campaigning, they see emotion and public
policies as a means to win office, not as inherently valuable. 22 Anthony
Downs provides a good example of the instrumental mode in party theory.
Parties have no principled core in his model but are axiomatically defined
as a "team" of politicians who seek "to control the governing apparatus
by gaining office in a duly constituted election." Assuming the parties to
be concerned only with the rewards of office, Downs builds his impressive
theory on one basic hypothesis: "Parties formulate policies in order to win
elections, rather than win elections in order to formulate policies. " 23
In the expressive mode, parties are more essential to their adherents'
emotional life than to their material well-being. With their affective roots,
these parties are likely to evidence strong internal solidarity, personal and
group loyalties, and broad ideologies. More than a political entity, the
expressive party is a community, "a spiritual proximity, a kind of consan-
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guinity of minds, which discover a certain nearness and resemblance
between themselves." 24 The expressive party is impassioned-it provides
intangible rewards to its workers and makes affective appeals to voters. Its
programs will not emphasize calculating appeals to particularistic groups,
e.g., an increase in social security pensions, but emotional entreaties, e.g.,
a call for the unity of the devout or of the working class. The rewards of
politics are found primarily in purposive incentives, sometimes with the
added attraction of social, but still collective, benefits .25
The expressive mode of politics has been evident occasionally in American parties, especially when they have been the instrument of broad social
movements, or at times among minor parties. The fullest model of an
expressive party, however, comes not from America but from Russia's
Lenin.
To Lenin, party organization required dedicated, professional revolutionaries. When competing for power within liberal democracies, an
expressive party becomes increasingly necessary, for "the more widely the
masses are drawn into the struggle and form the basis of the movement, the
more necessary it is to have such an organization and the more stable must
it be. " 26 Despite its recent failures, the Leninist concept has inspired parties
worldwide.

PARTY CONCEPTS

A full concept of a political party combines these three dimensions, resulting in a particular viewpoint on party focus, goals, and mode. Eight concepts of political parties result from the combination of these three
dimensions. For an illustration of the combinations and an abstract type of
political party that would exemplify each combination, see Figure 1.4 and
Table 1.1.
The party as bureaucratic organization is a common concept, highlighting
the party's hierarchical structure, professionalism, and orientation toward the
goal of electoral victory. Michels, the founding father of modern organizational
theory, 27 is foremost in the elaboration of the concept, but practicing politicians
such as Martin Van Buren have also developed this party model. The concept
seems increasingly applicable as the parties develop professional staffs, large
financial resources, and technical expertise.
The party as governing caucus is the party of Burke and Wilson and a
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Table I . I . Political Party Concepts
Collective Goals
Mode
Instrumental

Expressive

Coalitional Goals
Mode
Instrumental

Ex pressive

Elite focus

Governing
caucus

Ideological
community

Bureaucratic
organization

Urban
machine

Mass focus

Cause
advocate

Social
movement

Rational t eam of
office seekers

Personal
faction

favored model of party reformers, such as a famous committee of the
American Political Science Association . 28 These parties are elite groups,
which seek collective goals and employ the instrumental mode. Alternatively, with a mass focus, this party has a counterpart in the concept of party
as cause advocate. Ostrogorski urges this model most forcefully, in his
argument for single-issue parties. 29
Two concepts deal with parties seeking collective goals and employing the
expressive mode. When focused on its elite, this party is an ideological community, a "gemeinschaft," a party that encompasses strong interpersonal
bonds among its adherents as it seeks broad social transformation. This is the
ideal that Lenin elaborated and that Michels later sought among Italian Fascists.
As this party turns to mass action, it seeks to create a social movement, in
which politics is expressive of an encompassing ideology beyond the immediate interests of the partisans. In the United States, its character is evident
among the Populists, Progressives, and other third parties.
The urban machine is a different kind of party. In the extensive studies of
this form, analysts usually emphasize its material reward structure. Yet the
success and regular reappearance of the machine form of party cannot be
explained by emphasizing material rewards, particularly in an era when such
rewards have been sharply diminished. Rather, the more basic appeal of the
machine is expressive, the emotional ties it creates resting on the bases of ethnic
loyalties, personal friendships, and neighborhood solidarity.
The model of party as a rational team of officeseekers employs the utilitarian
theories of Jeremy Bentham and Anthony Downs. Adopting Bentham's
assumptions of a calculating, utility-maximizing citizenry, Downs then elaborates the party's instrumental interactions with the electorate. In the expressive
mode, the match of the rational team is the party as personal faction. In contemporary times, most typically, the loyalty in this mass-focused party will be
to an individual candidate and his or her campaign organization.
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FOCUS

GOALS

Coalitional

Elite

□

Elite Focus
(Not: Mass)

Mass

f==l Collective Goals
'====1 (Not: Coalitional)

[Ilil]

Instrumental Mode
(Not: Expressive)

Figure 1.4. Concepts of Political Parties
PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY

Parties contribute to democracy, and party concepts can contribute to democratic theory. Theories of democracy are alike only in their premise that
legitimate government must rest on a mass base. Beyond this common
premise, the most diverse forms of politics have grasped the mantle of
democracy. Authoritarian rulers claim to speak in the name of the people
and to interpret their "true" democratic will. Advocates of "participatory
democracy'' look to an extension of traditional town meetings , just as sponsors of referendums promote "direct democracy."
These ambiguities are even more pointed when we consider the modern
nation-state. In contemporary times, the large size of the polity necessitates
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Table 1.2. Party Concepts and Democracy
Collective Goals
Participation

Coalitional Goals
Participation

Limited

Extensive

Limited

Extens ive

A utonomous
leadership

Governing
caucus

Ideological
commun ity

Bureaucratic
organization

Urban
machine

Accessible
leadership

Cause
advocate

Social
movement

Rational team of
office seekers

Personal
faction

representative, rather than direct, democracy. Since government "of the
people" cannot be an unmediated government "by the people, " how do
we make possible government "for the people" ? To what extent should we
promote and to what extent limit the connection between the representatives and their constituents?
Three dimensions of democratic theory are particularly relevant: the
accessibility of leadership, voter goals, and the character of participation.
These dimensions parallel those used in classifying the concepts of political
parties. The particular party concepts already defined reflect not only
angles of vision on political parties but also views of democratic philosophies on the appropriate relationship of voters to party leaders , goals, and
appeals. The congruence is depicted in Table 1.2 and Figure 1.5.
A critical element in democratic theory is the accessibility of leadership ,
as Kornhauser suggests . 30 Leaders may be considerably autonomous from
the citizenry, or the rank and file may have ready means to select, remove,
and control the party chieftains. The distinction is not absolute, but there
certainly is a difference, for example, between a party in which party activists choose their own leaders (nineteenth-century presidential conventions)
and a party in which a mass electorate makes the selection (contemporary
presidential primaries).
The distinction is also evident today in the different ways in which election campaigns are conducted . Among different parties, popular attitudes
may be more or less effective and legitimate in shaping campaign appeals .
When the party is led by a team of office seekers, the electorate has ready
access to the leadership because that leadership worries only about its possible electoral defeat. When a party becomes an organizational bureaucracy, however, party leadership takes on the autonomy of all bureaucracies.
Its own interests receive increased attention, and the mass citizenry is confined to the role of a passive electorate.
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Voter goals, the second dimension, parallel those of parties and can also
be categorized as either collective or coalitional. We can ask whether voters
do, or should, seek to promote their particular interests, joining coalitions
with others when necessary, or whether they emphasize collective goals.
Like our other categories, this is only a relative distinction. Surely voters
give some attention to their particular interests-if they don't, who will?but a society cannot exist if its members pursue only self-interests. To
examine the distinction, we could study the appeals made to voters in elections. When voters are seen as an ideological community, the appeals will
be phrased in broad visions of the public good. When voters are seen more
narrowly, as utility maximizers, electoral programs will be collections of
appeals to distinct interests .

CONCEPTS OF POLITICAL PARTIES

I5

A third major distinction among theories of democracy emerges in their
emphasis on popular participation. Even though some mass involvement is
basic to democracy, the extent, character, and asserted desirability of that
participation can vary greatly. Indeed, Schumpeter's prominent definition
sees democracy as simply a competition between elites. 31 Alternative concepts promote broader mass involvement, whether in nominating primaries, policy referenda, or even worker participation in industry. Party
attitudes toward its membership illustrate the distinction . A governing caucus is inherently restrictive in membership; it sees voters as a resource to
be used or courted to advance the interests and programs of the caucus but
not as an integral element within the party. In contrast, the urban machine,
when functioning well , enthusiastically recruits new membership and
encourages wide participation (although not necessarily a wide sharing of
power).
Different attitudes on the extent of popular participation also involve
different attitudes on the character of that participation. When limited,
involvement typically is restricted to the interests or policy preferences of
the voters; when extensive, involvement will reach deeper emotional loyalties. The categories of this dimension thereby parallel the earlier distinction between the instrumental and expressive modes of the parties.

PARTIES AND POLITIC AL SYSTEMS

We may go one tentative step further. The party concepts developed here
have a potentially broader significance. Particular kinds of parties also fit
with particular kinds of government and different concepts of democracy.
Analyzing these relationships would require a major investigation of a different sort, but we can still speculate on the association between particular
parties and particular polities.
This theoretical possibility is sketched in Table 1.3 and Figure 1.6. For
example, the first (upper-left) cell of the table and the corresponding segment of the circular graph suggest that a governing caucus party would
probably be most evident in a democracy considered as a trusteeship, in
which its leaders are permitted to pursue their rational vision of the public
good without close popular control. Significantly, Burke is the most prominent advocate of both the governing caucus model of parties and of the
trusteeship theory of government. 32
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Table 1.3 . Party Concepts and Political Systems
Collective Goals
Participation
Limited

Extensive

Coalitional Goals
Participation
Limited

Extensive

Autonomous
leadership

Trusteeship

Vanguard
guidance

Elite
competit ion

Patronage,
consociation

Accessible
leadership

Plebiscitary
ru le

Progressivism,
direct
democracy

Utilitarian
individualism

Fascism

Alternative understandings of democracy are cited in the other cells of
the table, each consistent with the corresponding party concept in the preceding tables. Thus, in some polities, elites employ mass arousal to legitimize their policy goals even while limiting broader popular participation.
These systems can be characterized as examples of plebiscitary rule.
More extensive popular participation is expected in the two other models
of democratic politics emphasizing collective goods . " Vanguard guidance" is an awkward term used to encompass justifications for authority
by such diverse groups as the single-party systems of the developing world
and the Communist parties in former "people's republics." Progressivism
or direct democracy, in contrast, provides for direct popular involvement
in the search for collective goods; its institutional expression comes in such
devices as the initiative, referendum, and direct primary.
The more common forms of democracy, found on the right-hand side of
the table, pursue coalitional goals . Schumpeter, expecting limited involvement from the electorate, presents a model of democracy as elite competition. Closer connections are expected in the Bentharnite and Downsian
theories of utilitarian individualism, with voters expected to be rational
calculators of their personal advantages.
The ethnic and particularistic loyalties that sustain the urban machine
are best reflected in governments that recognize these distinct social groupings. One variety, more common in developing nations , is politics conducted through powerful patrons . Another common democratic variety is
consociation , with direct representation of religious and ethnic
associations. 33
Democratic legitimacy is also claimed , although falsely , by personalistic
leaders, who arouse mass support to validate their claims as individual
embodiments of the people's will. The twentieth century has seen too many
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examples of such fascism, typified by Italy's Mussolini , Argentina's Peron,
and Germany 's Hitler.

ANALYZ ING PASSIONS AND IN TERESTS

In the following chapters, I analyze the eight party models, compare them
to American political experience, and discuss their implications for democratic theory and practice. I will consider the models separately and in each
case raise problems for democracy that are inherent in these particular party
models.
The concept of party as bureaucratic organization is examined in the
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next chapter. Bureaucracies can mobilize popular electorates, but they also
are likely to limit the electorate to the role of spectator. This effect raises
the vital theoretical issue of democratic participation.
The party as governing caucus is the principal subject of chapter 3, in
which the party as cause advocate is also considered. In these parties, leadership is likely to become separated from its mass support, and citizen
participation is stilted. Sustaining popular involvement is a continuing
problem of democratic theory.
In chapter 4, I examine parties with collective goals that employ the
expressive mode, the party as ideological community and as social movement. Although these parties are often seen as pristinely democratic, their
ideological emphasis presents a potential problem of intolerant orthodoxy,
unsuitable in democracy.
The urban machine is the subject of chapter 5. The machine's stimulation of mass attachment can promote democracy; however, its limited
vision makes achieving important social goals difficult, and its emphasis
on personal gain obstructs the tme citizenship that is necessary for a full
democracy.
In chapter 6 , the final two concepts are considered, the party as a rational
team of office seekers and the party as personal faction. These parties do
devote considerable attention to mass demands, but in their individualistic
assumptions they are prone to undermine the social responsibility necessary
for effective democracy.
Having analyzed the eight party concepts, I then apply them to two
aspects of American politics. In chapter 7, the theoretical expectations of
voter behavior implicit in each of the party concepts are developed and then
compared to the historical record and to empirical research on American
voting behavior. For this purpose, the degree of mobilization , partisanship,
issue orientation, and candidate appeals among the electorate are reviewed.
In chapter 8, I examine different programs for the reform of American
parties, alternatives that are closely related to the basic party concepts.
Depending on their initial assumptions, proposed reforms are directed
toward very different goals, including progressive individualism, nonpartisanship, party government, and party efficiency.
In chapter 9, the conclusion, I restate the basic theme of the connection
between political parties and modem democracy and examine the contribution of parties to democratic values as well as their place in the alternative
theoretical traditions of liberal and communitarian democracy. I conclude
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with speculations on the future role of political parties in the United States
and with proposals to strengthen the parties as institutions of American
democracy.
Analyses of parties and of democracy inevitably overlap . Historically,
and as recently as the peaceful revolutions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union, parties and democracy have been associated both in logic and in the
world of events. We cannot divorce this intellectual pair; this book instead
celebrates their continued union .

TWO
INTERESTS WITHOUT PASSIONS:
PARTY AS BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION

It has been those who ... refrained the most from suffering their personal
behavior from being inflamed by their political rivalries and were most willing
to leave the question of their individual advancement to the quiet and friendly
arbitrament of their political associates [who] have in the end been the most
successful .
- Martin Van Buren'
The fundamental sociological law of political parties may be formulated in the
following terms: " It is organization which gives birth to the dominion of the
elected over the electors , of the mandatories over the mandators, of the
delegates over the delegators. "
- Robert Miche/s 2

The eighth president of the United States and the first major theorist of
political parties lived a century apart and shared no common political culture. Still, they agreed in their theoretical concept of political parties . To
both men, a party would inevitably be a bureaucratic organization with an
elite focus, seeking coalitional goals and relying on instrumental appeals
by the party leadership. But they differed completely in their normative
assessments of the effect of such parties on democracy. Yan Buren hailed
the bureaucratic party as necessary to effect popular government; Michels
saw it as fundamentally subversive of democracy.
These two writers came to their conclusions from very different perspectives. Van Buren developed his theories in reaction to the factionalized, personalized politics of the early nineteenth-century one-party "era
of good feelings." He saw party organization as necessary to achieve both
victory for his colleagues and appropriate public policies. Putting his theories into practice, he accomplished much: the creation of the Democratic
party, the election of Andrew Jackson, its first candidate for president, and
then his own elevation to the White House. 3
Robert Michels reflected a different place and time, imperial Germany
before World War I. A Marxian and a Socialist, Michels became disillusioned with his party's failure to win power and with its apparent abandonment of its radical program and egalitarian character. To explain these

INTERE STS WITHOUT PASS ION S

21

failures, he developed his theory of the " iron law of oligarchy," the inevitable tendency of any organization-even one ideologically committed to
socialist equality- to come under the control of a closed and conservative
leadership. His pessimism deepened with the war, as Europe's working
classes exuberantly marched to their mutual slaughter. Despairing of any
possibility of true democracy, he eventually became a supporter of fascism
in Mussolini 's Italy.

PARTY AS BURE AUCRACY

The party as bureaucratic organization emphasizes coalitional goals. These
typically include not only the power of office but also policy objectives,
such as Van Buren's beliefs, derived from Jefferson , in states' rights rather
than in strong national government or the German Socialist party's original
Marxian ideology of proletarian revolution. Accomplishing these goals,
however, first requires electoral victory.
In time , victory-meant to be a means to policy goals-replaces policy
objectives as the primary objective of the party. Thus , Van Buren's party,
"even though founded on Republican principles, became an anti-ideological force. " 4 Similarly, among Michels 's Socialists, there was "a continued
increase in the prudence, the timidity even, which inspires its policy. The
party doctrines are, whenever requisite , attenuated and deformed in accordance with the external needs of the organization." 5
Pursuing the goal of victory, parties develop the characteristic features
of bureaucracy. To wage successful combat against their electoral enemies,
they must become hierarchical , obedient organizations. "The modem
party is a fighting organization in the political sense of the term, " Michels
argues, "and must as such conform to the laws of tactics . . . . In a party,
and above all in a fighting political party, democracy .. . is utterly incompatible with strategic promptness, and the forces of democracy do not lend
themselves to the rapid opening of a campaign. " 6
With this emphasis on combat, political parties are often described in
military language-not only in Germany but also in nineteenth-century
America. Parties were "organized, officered, drilled, manipulated , fitted
to work consistently for power with inconsistent principles.' ' 7 And Richard
Jensen depicts post-Civil War politics:
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Parties were like annies fighting at the polls for the spoils of victory.
Politicians were like generals-many had been generals or colonels
in the war-whose strategy was to whip up enthusiasm among the
rank and file. Parades, speechfests, all-day picnics, and continuous
door-to-door solicitation maximized interest and minimized the risks
of defections. 8
The bureaucratic party shares with a military bureaucracy an emphasis
on internal discipline; orders are given and must be obeyed in pursuit of
victory. As Van Buren's associate commanded his partisan leaders, "Tell
them they are safe if they fear the enemy, but that the first man we see step
to the rear, we cut down ... they must not falter, or they perish." 9 Van
Buren's party developed a centralized command, the Albany Regency,
which would implement its decisions through local councils of the party
and mass mobilization. "After the dominant clique of the party arrived at
a decision, the information was ultimately transmitted to the legislators,
newspapers, and politicians. Rallies and public meetings were sponsored
to popularize the policy.'' 10
To assure discipline, the bureaucratic party relies on individual, material
rewards. The most conspicuous in American politics has been patronage,
the filling of public offices on the basis of party service. William Marcy
defended his allies in the Van Buren organization: "They boldly preach
what they practice. When they are contending for victory, they avow their
intention of enjoying the fruits of it. ... If they are successful, they claim,
as a matter of right, the advantages of success. They see nothing wrong in
the rule, that to the victor belong the spoils of the enemy." 11
Appointments to party positions, as well as to public office, are also
important, in Michels 's view, in strengthening leaders within the party
bureaucracy. These leaders recruit new talent into the party, as "the influence which they exercise and the financial security of their position become
more and more fascinating to the masses, stimulating the ambition of all
the more talented elements to enter the privileged bureaucracy of the labor
movement." Patronage can also be used to placate potential foes within the
party: "The leaders of the opposition receive high office and honors in the
party, and are thus rendered innocuous-all the more so seeing that they
are not admitted to the supreme offices.'' 12
In later years, patronage would come into disrepute, restricted by civil
service laws, self-protective administrative agencies, and the courts. Even
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in modem times, however, it could still find a few champions, such as
Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell. Dissenting in a case restricting
patronage appointments, he echoed earlier endorsements of the bureaucratic party's individualistic rewards: "Patronage appointments help build
stable political parties by offering rewards to persons who assume the tasks
necessary to the continued functioning of political organizations.'' 13 (We
will return to this discussion in chapter 8.)
Although these parties use personal patronage, the important feature of
any bureaucracy is its emphasis on coalitional victory, not individual
rewards. Its campaign is directed toward the success of the entire party, not
any individual's or even any combination of individuals. When personal
interests become predominant, the pattern Michels criticized among the
German Socialists, the party has been perverted, becoming more of a personal coalition than a party bureaucracy.
More in keeping with the model was Van Buren's behavior, subordinating individual claims to party goals. In place of the personal factions of
individual leaders typical in his day, he saw a political party as the agency
of broader interests. Thus, the New Yorker organized Jackson's successful
presidential bid in 1828, not principally for personal gain but "because he
could use the General to reform the party, eliminate Federalist principles
from the national government, and oust [John Quincy] Adams from
office." 14
When Van Buren himselflaterran for president, his candidacy was based
on his party leadership, not on his individual characteristics. The emphasis
was evident in the Democrats' protoplatform in 1836: It mentioned Van
Buren's name only once, cited other party leaders thirty-two times, and
referred to the party itself most frequently, in thirty-four instances. 15
Bureaucracies, including parties, have two different aspects. 16 They
ostensibly exist to perform a particular task-in the case of parties, to
achieve electoral victory. They are also social systems, however, involving
affective and psychological relationships both among their members and
between the bureaucracy and its external world. Michels understood this
second relationship and saw psychological influences as major causes of
inevitable oligarchy within parties. They included "the tendency of the
leaders to organize themselves and to consolidate their interests, .. . the
gratitude of the led towards the leaders , and the general immobility and
passivity of the masses [all reinforcing] the technical indispensability of
leadership." 17
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Affective relationships, inevitable in any bureaucracy, can also have
beneficial effects. In Van Buren's party, democratic relationships were fostered among the leadership, who made decisions jointly. By insisting on a
united front, participants subordinated their individual interests to the perceived general interest of the party. 18
On the federal level, Van Buren's party was able to overcome sectional
rivalries, develop the most truly national coalition yet evident in America,
and stimulate a competitive party system that was balanced and competitive
on the state, regional, and national levels. 19 On the individual level, Van
Buren's party democracy taught an important "moral discipline, putting a
high premium upon loyalty, fidelity, patriotism, and self-restraint." 20 By
extending its organization at the local level, it taught its partisans also to be
citizens. Their heritage is the model of party as bureaucratic organization.

THE CON TEMPORARY PARTY BUREAUCRACY
Abstract concepts differ from empirical reality, and thus a comparison of
the model of party as a bureaucratic organization to contemporary American parties is in order. These parties increasingly evidence the character of
bureaucracies, but basic environmental factors of American politics limit
their bureaucratic character.
A bureaucracy manifests such features as specialization of labor, professional expertise, hierarchical organization, objective and internal recruitment of leadership, and the availability of resources. These features are
directed toward particular objectives, most importantly the achievement of
designated tasks and the maintenance of the bureaucracy itself. Bureaucracies exist both in government and in the private world-the civil service
and the modern corporation are similar organizations; even their purposes
may be as similar as providing social security benefits or selling retirement
annuities.
On both the state and the national levels, American parties have become
more bureaucratic. Reviewing the development of state party organizations
over two decades, the authors of a major study argue that "party organizational change in a period of profound concern for the future of parties has
been in the direction of strengthening the organizational attributes of individual party units, and the patterns of relationships among the units." 21 To
test the character of state parties, the authors use a series of indicators of
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strength for the party bureaucracy. These include a permanent headquarters; autonomous powers of state chairpersons; large full-time and longterm staffs with specialized divisions of labor; a variety of institutional
support activities (e.g., voter mobilization and publication of a newsletter);
a variety of activities in support of candidates (e.g., campaign seminars and
polling); and significant party spending. Some of these indicators certainly
show an increase in the capacity of state parties as bureaucratic organizations. Illustratively, in the early 1960s only half of the Democratic state
parties had even a single full-time , professional employee, and only onethird conducted a state voter-mobilization campaign. By 1980, 85 percent
of the Democratic state parties had some full-time staff, and two-thirds
conducted voter campaigns.
Republicans were more fully organized in both time periods. Even in
the 1960s more than two-thirds of their state parties had some full-time
staff, and six out of ten had voter programs. By 1980 party bureaucratization had progressed so that virtually every Republican state organization
had professional staff, and eight of ten conducted voter mobilization. 22
These changes , however, still leave the state parties as only limited bureaucracies. The average number of full-time staff, for example, was only
4.5 for Democratic organizations, and 7 .0 for Republicans-scarcely
measures of elaborate bureaucracies. Moreover, party organizational
development appears to have slowed or reversed in more recent years, particularly among Democrats . Even over the longer period, there is some
reason to doubt bureaucratic growth if we examine party spending, perhaps
the most reliable indicator because it is measured in hard coin. Party budgets actually decreased during this period, once inflation is taken into
account. 23
The national parties have become extensive bureaucracies in their own
right and are more impressive than the state organizations. "Contemporary
national party organizations are larger, better financed, more stable, and
more internally diversified than ever before. In a word , they have become
institutionalized." 24 Among them, the six leading bureaucracies of the
major parties (national, senatorial, and congressional committees of each
of the two parties) spent total budgets of $209 million in the nonpresidential
period of 1989-1990. In direct campaign spending, this amount represented more than a fourfold increase over the previous twelve years. 25
These national organizations now bear all the marks of a true bureaucracy. Their staffs are relatively long-term, professional , and large, num-
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bered in the hundreds, and housed in permanent party buildings in
Washington . They engage in general party activity, such as issues research;
provide financial and administrative help to state and local organizations,
in the process reversing the traditional subordination of the national parties;
furnish extensive help to individual candidates, including recruitment,
training, polling, and media production; and provide both direct funds and
financial brokerage between contributors and candidates.
This bureaucratic development is probably the most significant change
in contemporary American politics. Moreover, these are national bureaucracies that may well diminish the traditional decentralization of U.S. parties. This change was probably inevitable as the nation itself became
centralized. "Strong national party organizations," Epstein concludes,
"are new American phenomena. Now that they have finally begun to be
substantial, it is easy to believe that they are here to stay and their previous
absence was an anomaly in a political and social system already predominantly national in so many other respects. " 26 The new national parties
reflect basic changes in American life, such as the shift to a cash economy
in politics and the parallel dependence on campaigning through the mass
media. The nature of American politics, however, imposes inherent limits
on the bureaucratization of the parties .

THE LIMITS OF BURE A UCRA CY

Leadership is the most vital aspect of any organization. Typically, bureaucracies seek internal control of the selection of leadership by imposing
professional standards of expertise for recruitment and ultimately for the
choice of top managers . To illustrate, an educational bureaucracy will insist
that only experienced teachers can be school principals or superintendents.
The claims of expertise can also be raised in a party bureaucracy, as Michels
observed: "In proportion as the profession of politician becomes a more
complicated one, and in proportion as the rules of social legislation become
more numerous , it is necessary for one who would understand politics to
possess wider experience and more extensive knowledge. " 27
Party bureaucracies in the United States, however, ultimately cannot
select their own leadership. The real head of an American party bureaucracy is the elected executive of the constituency- the governor for a state
party, the president for a national party. The formal chairs of these organ-
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izations are in effect not only named by the elected politician but dependent
for their power on his or her favor. 28 If party bureaucracies controlled the
selection of public officials, this dependency would be only a formal relationship, equivalent to the formal power of the British king to name the
prime minister. In reality, the bureaucracies lack this control , for they neither nominate nor elect officials bearing the party label. Since virtually all
party nominations are made in primaries, candidates can-and do-win
the party designation without support from the party bureaucracy. Indeed,
running against the "party bosses" is a common and often successful
practice.
The freedom of candidates from party control is even more dramatically
evident on the national level. With the extension of primaries, presidential
campaigns are conducted entirely by individual candidates , who bypass
state organizations to make direct appeals to interest groups, contributors,
and individual voters. The national committees do not participate in these
contests-they only set the rules or provide services impartially to all candidates (even shared opinion polls) . They do not enter the arena of the
struggle but passively await capture as secondary prizes of victory.
Nor, once candidates are nominated, do party bureaucracies control their
election. Although party committees are increasingly active in services to
candidates, the dominant role is held by the candidates themselves. Technology, particularly television and computerized campaigning, has permanently established "the ability of politicians to affect their own destinies.
Parties thus can be only as important as candidates permit them to be." 29
Even when parties are important initially, once candidates are elected they
develop their own strengths as incumbents and become increasingly selfsufficient.
Money, the crucial resource of contemporary politics , precisely measures the relationship. Although the parties have increased their financial
role, it is still quite limited since the overwhelming proportion of campaign
contributions , particularly for incumbents, comes from individual donors
or from political action committees. For example, in 1989- 1990, total
spending for the congressional elections was $445 million, of which only
5 percent came directly from the six nationwide party committees . 30
The role of the party bureaucracies is further limited inherently by the
structure of American elections . Elections are extraordinarily diffuse, comprising some ten thousand partisan offices just on the state and national
levels and hundreds of thousands of local offices; moreover, for most of
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these positions there are nominating primaries. Both primaries and general
elections are easily entered by candidates and easily influenced by voters
uncommitted to the party. A bureaucracy seeking to control these multitudinous elections is likely to suffer from overload or breakdown.
Still another complication is that these elections are considerably distinct
from one another in time and space. The contests for separate offices may
be held at different times of the year and on different cycles so that a typical
community may have spring elections for municipal offices, summer primaries, and fall general elections, with terms of office encompassing different periods of one, two, or four years. Furthermore, the geographical
constituencies are distinct- the boundaries of a congressional district do
not necessarily coincide with those of state legislative districts or even with
those of local towns and cities. Conducting elections in these conditions is
a daunting task for a party bureaucracy, akin to General Motors trying to
convince the same customer to buy a Chevrolet and a Pontiac and an
Oldsmobile and to buy them at different times in the same year.
A bureaucracy also seeks permanence and regula...rity, but the electoral
calendar undermines these goals. Political activity in the United States has
a troublesome periodic ebb and flow . Like a seasonal business, a party
bureaucracy will have its busy and slack periods; in a party, however, the
temporal cycles of activity are more difficult to manage than in a seasonal
business. Because elections occur at fixed periods (unlike parliamentary
parties, which may face an election at any time), the party has no need to
maintain its staff continually, limiting its efficiency. Moreover, the twoyear and four-year cycles between the major contests for state and national
offices are so long that the party bureaucracy will suffer repeated expansions and contractions in size, activity, and opportunities to sharpen skills.
It is as if baseball players had pennant races only every other year; would
such teams be cohesive and disciplined?
Party bureaucracies, like others, require resources , especially skilled
personnel and money-money that can also buy skills. In the more traditional party bureaucracy of Van Buren, the most important resources were
individual local campaigners with strong interpersonal skills . The party
secured this resource through patronage, which amounted to a hidden public subsidy to the parties . In contemporary times, patronage is less respected
and less common; even where it remains, studies have shown that in practice patronage employees are not hired, rewarded, or punished on the basis
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of their contributions to the party. 31 Patronage is no longer used effectively
by the parties to promote bureaucratic goals.
For reasons to be considered in chapter 5, patronage always had severe
limitations. In contemporary politics, it is even less useful , as the nation
has shifted from labor-intensive to capital-intensive politics. The skills now
required-such as media or polling expertise-are of a different order and
must be purchased through direct and substantial cash payments rather than
through low-paying jobs with indirect benefits of friendship or graft. Parties, however, have no assured sources of cash nor any substantial public
subsidies; their bureaucratic development is consequently always
uncertain .
In the end, parties cannot be full-scale bureaucracies because they lack
a bureaucratic environment. The ideal bureaucracy lives in a closed world,
where it controls its internal life, operates by fixed and impersonal rules ,
and relates to outsiders as uncontrolling clients. In its beneficial aspect, a
bureaucracy behaves like an impartial judiciary; in its pathological aspect,
it becomes the rule-bound tribunal depicted in Franz Kafka's novel, The
Trial .
Parties, however, are ultimately dependent on different, external controls . They must meet the tests of elections and are subject to the wishes or
whims of the voters. They operate in a political marketplace, not in a closed
bureaucratic environment. To this extent, they are more similar to economic competitors such as corporations .32 Like corporations, they must be
assessed by their results, not by their bureaucratic neatness. As the corporation judges its success ultimately by the market test of profits, the party
must judge its success by the market test of votes. On these grounds,
bureaucratic development is not always beneficial to parties. State parties
that are stronger by bureaucratic standards, for example, show hardly any
greater ability to win elections. 33 lt may be that hierarchical, self-contained
bureaucracies are ill-adapted to the dispersed nature of the American electoral system.

BURE A UCRACY A ND DEMOCRAC Y

The critical issue, however, is not the organizational effectiveness of party
bureaucracies but their possible contribution to effective democracy. In
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their most evident features , bureaucracy and democracy would seem to be
incompatible.
Bureaucracy emphasizes the specialized knowledge of the expert;
democracy assumes that all men and women are sufficiently knowledgeable to share in decisionmaking. The first is characteristically hierarchical;
the second stresses equality among persons. Bureaucracy focuses on limited, organizational tasks, but democracy concerns the general and common political interests of the populace. A bureaucratic organization relies
on paid labor, but a democratic organization assumes its members will
volunteer time and effort.
Political parties that follow the model of a bureaucratic organization may
merit democratic suspicion, as Michels argues. Leadership in a bureaucratic party typically differs from the rank and file in perspective. For followers, the party is a means to such ends as public policies or group
satisfactions; leaders tend to see the maintenance and success of the party
as itself the primary goal . "From a means, organization becomes an end.
To the institutions and qualities which at the outset were destined simply to
ensure the good working of the party machine . . . greater importance
comes ultimately to be attached than to the productivity of the machine .
. . . As the party's need for tranquillity increases, its revolutionary talons
atrophy." 34
Party bureaucrats also may have somewhat different interests from their
followers or the voters . As experts in politics, they come to share a craft
and a professional technical specialization across parties that can become
more important than their ostensible ideological differences. For example,
at postelection conferences sponsored by Harvard's Kennedy School of
Government, rival campaign managers meet to evaluate strategies, slogans, and advertisements for their electoral impact, ignoring party programs and philosophies. 35 For these leading party bureaucrats, the art of
politics replaces its substance.
There also are more immediate interests. A party bureaucrat ''lives 'off
politics as a vocation," and "strives to make politics a permanent source
of income." 36 Party bureaucrats are always, even if not always primarily,
jobholders. Even if they are ideologically committed to the party cause,
they need to protect their jobs, promoting their particular economic interests, such as higher pay or career mobility, that may not parallel the party's
more general goals.
In a political organization, moreover, power itself becomes an individual
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psychological reward apart from the party 's interests. Michels's observation of the German working class may be true of all party careerists: "For
them, the loss of their positions would be a financial disaster, and in most
cases it would be impossible for them to return to their old way of life. They
have been spoiled for any other work than that of propaganda. Their hands
have lost the callosities of the manual toiler, and are likely to suffer only
from writer's cramp." 37
Party bureaucrats are also likely to be inaccessible to control by the rank
and file. Possessed of skills necessary to the party, bureaucrats cannot be
easily dismissed; unelected, they cannot be voted out of office. Control
depends greatly on the bureaucrats' own devotion to their party. Self-interested, they cannot be trusted always to further the party's goals. Even when
conscientiously seeking victory for the party, they may subvert its program.
A more general problem with party bureaucracy is its potential effect on
democratic participation. In the bureaucratic model, the electorate is a
resource to be mined for votes, not an integral element within the party
itself. Carried to its logical conclusion, this perspective legitimizes the
manipulation of voters in order to win elections . Contrasting their own
political expertise and commitment to the voters' limited knowledge and
sporadic involvement, bureaucrats can easily come to disparage voters and
then to exploit their alleged "weakness for everything which appeals to
their eyes and for such spectacles as will always attract a gaping crowd." 38
Even when more gentle, however, party bureaucracy is likely to limit
citizens' involvement. With its emphasis on efficiency, bureaucracy is
prone to centralize authority, lessening the opportunities for individual and
local activity. Because of its internal focus, voters are placed outside the
party as spectators of the political struggle, not as participants, as audiences
of political debate, not as debaters. A bureaucratic model, as Mc Williams
observes, defines "the party as a species of private property and voters as
political consumers" and restricts the public to "an interest in the product
but not in the process." For the citizenry, party becomes relevant only as a
guide to periodic voting decisions but marginal to community life. 39
Despite these many problems, bureaucratic parties may contribute to
democracy. At its root, democracy means that ordinary people can affect
government, but ordinary people must join together to be effective. Those
people who have individual wealth, status, and power can sometimes take
care of themselves, but "organization, based as it is upon the principle of
least effort . . . is the weapon of the weak in their struggle with the
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strong ." 40 Parties, led by bureaucracies, can be the expression of political
mobilization.
To achieve mobilization, a bureaucracy must be not simply an agency
of technicians but a group with some commitments of its own. With such
commitments, party bureaucrats can act as the vital links between mass
opinion and public policy. Increasingly, in fact, the leaders of American
parties are assuming this role, even as they become more electorally
efficient. 4 1
The contribution of party bureaucracy to democracy is still more basic
in its stimulation of electoral participation. Voting turnout depends on many
factors , including registration laws and demographic characteristics . Turnout is closely related to party efforts also; where parties are active, voting
participation increases, particularly among groups of lower socioeconomic
status . Party mobilization thus promotes democratic equality of access
among the population. Historically, the close relationship can be seen in
the United States: When parties were stronger, voting turnout was high; as
the parties have weakened, turnout has declined, The same relationship is
evident today, not only within the country but in international comparisons
as well . Among the major democracies of the world, the United States has
the lowest level of voter participation even though its citizens show relatively high levels of political sophistication and interest. One significant
element in explaining this discrepancy is the limited degree of party
mobilization .42
Party bureaucracies not only can stimulate voting; they can also make
that voting more meaningful. Van Buren's party bureaucracy was important because it made parties more than the personal followings of a dominant leader and more than closed caucuses of the self-interested. Although
self-interest was certainly a motive, the New Yorker exemplified how a
party bureaucracy could broaden the popular base of politics, bringing new
voters to the polls and new meaning to the vote. As Van Buren's partybuilding efforts illustrate, a bureaucracy can democratize politics on an
individual level through the opportunities it creates . In their ideal form,
bureaucracies recruit talent on the basis of merit, not ascribed or inherited
status. Even Michels acknowledged that the Socialist party had provided
new, although wasted, opportunities for political leadership by the German
working class .
In Van Buren 's America, the Democratic party became a vehicle for
social mobility among new classes. One critic grudgingly acknowledged
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that party politics ' ' provided a ladder for the 'new men' who had not enough
influence and, perhaps, merit to climb up of themselves ." 4 3 In place of the
traditional landed aristocrats, there emerged more democratic, "modem
political professionals who loved the bonhomie of political gatherings, a
coterie of more-or-less equals who relied for success not on the authority
of a brilliant charismatic leader but on their solidarity, patience and
discipline. " 44
Party bureaucracy also can promote democracy more generally. Even at
a minimal level of participation, it serves democracy by making political
opposition legitimate. Given its many social divisions, the United States
has been particularly wary of political conflict and apt to agree with George
Washington that parties serve but to " render alien to each other those who
ought to be bound together by fraternal affection." 4 5 Yet professional politicians like Van Buren take a different attitude toward parties, urging the
nation "to recognize their necessity, to give them the credit they deserve,
and to devote ourselves to improve and to elevate the principles and objects
of our own and to support it ingenuously and faithfully. " 4 6 Because it has a
self-interest in promoting conflict, a party bureaucracy renders opposition
as acceptable to the society and thereby provides even a passive electorate
with a choice of contenders for power.
A party organization 's contributions can go still further by enlisting persons into more active participation in politics. One means is through party
principles , which give citizens an understanding of public issues , even
when they are distorted by campaign rhetoric. To both Michels and Van
Buren, the ultimate purpose of a party is to promote its ideological principles. Only a program can give direction to a party, they agreed, but only a
party can mobilize majorities in support of a program.
Withal, party bureaucracies are still limited in their contributions to
democracy because of their doubtful ability to arouse passions. In its more
extensive forms, a party engages not only voters' heads but their hearts. It
provides a source of allegiance deeper than programmatic conviction,
forged in conflicts with the common enemy, able to withstand division and
defeat. These affective loyalties are difficult for party bureaucracies; emotions seem to conflict with their rationalist task orientations .
In any organization, to be sure , affective loyalties do develop, but they
are likely to be directed inwardly toward preserving the social relations
within the group and to exclude those not regularly engaged on the job.
Extending these emotional bounds will occur only when entrance to the
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group is open and participation is simple . Organizations do not often evidence these characteristics, but they can exist. The extensive local committee structure of the Van Buren party promoted affective bonds in its day,
just as the decentralized and participatory Japanese factory does today; in
both cases, significantly, affection has promoted organizational success.
Contemporary centralized bureaucracies may also be successful, but they
will not be loved.
The ultimate problem for a party bureaucracy is that it will be only a
bureaucracy, that it will develop the characteristic pathologies and lose the
compensating advantages of organization. Its opportunity for social
advancement may become a closed door, its task orientation a soulless
striving for success, and its affective support a resource for emotional
manipulation.
To achieve the good and avoid the evils of party bureaucracy, we must
remember Michels's fatalistic yet hopeful admonition: "The democratic
currents of history resemble successive waves. They break ever on the same
shoal. They are ever renewed. This enduring spectacle is simultaneously
encouraging and depressing. " 47

THREE
COMMON INTERESTS: PARTY AS
GOVERNING CAUCUS AND CAUSE ADVOCATE

As he took the presidential oath of office in 1913, Woodrow Wilson felt
partisan pride in his Democratic party's newly won control of power in both
houses of Congress and in the executive branch. To him, the election results
meant "a change in government ... much more than the mere success of a
party." Indeed, Wilson declared, Democratic victory at the polls "means
little except when the Nation is using that party for a large and definite
purpose. " '
Over fifty years later, in 1965 , Lyndon Johnson spoke before Congress
as a newly elected president. Having asked the electorate to approve his
party program, he now asked a Democratic Congress to fulfill the presumed
popular mandate for action toward a "Great Society." By 1981, another
president, Ronald Reagan, spoke in parallel language to another Congress
in favor of an opposite ideology. Invoking the election returns, he urged a
legislature of divided party control to enact a Republican program of
reduced taxation and more limited government.
Each of these presidents succeeded in changing the course of American
public policy. Each argued, at least implicitly, from a conception of the
political party as a governing caucus. To each, a political party was predominantly an elite grouping of professional politicians who pursued a
broad, collective program and won support by its instrumental appeals.
Their common conception of democracy was that of autonomous leadership, controlled by an electorate whose participation was limited to judgments on the leaders' collective programs .
The theory is attractive, its appeal demonstrated by its recurrence in
American politics, including legislative programs by presidents and academic arguments by political scientists favoring " a more responsible twoparty system." Despite this appeal, problems associated with the concept
are also recurrent; only infrequently do American political parties empirically behave as governing caucuses. That empirical record suggests limitations to this concept, found both in its underlying theory of democracy
and in the environment of American politics.
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A RECURRING MODEL

Party as governing caucus is evident in Burke's famous definition of the
party as "a body of men united ... upon some particular principle." The
English statesman and philosopher argued against the dominant eighteenthcentury belief that parties were selfish and even unpatriotic. Burke
described parties more nobly. Instead of their intrigue, he portrayed their
unity; instead of a search for personal reward, he saw an effort to achieve
programs of public benefit. Burke's intellectual descendants have included
many Americans; like him, they praised their party instead of apologizing
for their partisanship.
In 1944, commemorating the founding of the Republican party, Wendell
Willkie declared,
One of the major functions of a political party is to give men of conviction a platform from which to argue their cause both within the
party and outside it. ... These leaders must convince the people, not
that the party has been right in the past, but that it can be right, that it
will be right in the future. A political party is an indispensable vehicle
for men who offer themselves for office. Yet it is an equally indispensable vehicle for ideas and for the advocacy of principles. 2
A later Republican, Ronald Reagan , would agree, in his description of
the 1984 presidential campaign: "America is presented with the clearest
political choice of half a century. The distinctions between our two parties
and the different philosophy of our political opponents are at the heart of
this campaign and America's future." 3
Wilson's inaugural address is particularly noteworthy for its partisan
character. The typical speech at this civic ritual emphasizes the unity of the
nation, as in Jefferson's hopeful declaration, "We are all Federalists , we
are all Republicans." Wilson, in contrast, began his masterful speech with
a recitation of Democratic election victories and justified them with a new
moral "vision of our life as a whole" :
With this vision we approach new affairs . . . . The scales of heedlessness have fallen from our eyes. We have made up our minds to
square every process of our national life again with the standards we
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so proudly set up at the beginning and have always carried at our
hearts. Our work is a work of restoration. 4
A former professor of political science, Wilson was most precise in articulating the concept of party as a governing caucus. To Wilson, a political
party drew its social purpose from its policy program. It should create
appropriate institutions to achieve that program-in the American context,
a programmatic caucus in Congress led by a populist president. It should
draw the legitimacy for this program from election mandates, and it should
be rejected when it strayed from these policy goals .
Wilson saw the political party as a means of achieving collective responsibility in a democracy. This collective character.went far beyond the view
of party as a "team ofoffice seekers." Indeed, Wilson was rather disdainful
of professional politicians, a trait that would cause him trouble in his career.
"I am not interested in men ," he admitted, even while campaigning for his
own election as president. " I must frankly say, without apologies, that I
am not interested in the candidates of the other parties, and I find it difficult
to get interested in the candidate of my own party because the thing to be
done is so much bigger than men ." 5
Individual politicians could be disregarded because as individuals they
could never effect a national program, even if each legislator slavishly
followed his local constituency. Similarly, disaggregated elections could
never achieve true popular control: " There are so many cooks mixing their
ingredients in the national broth that it seems hopeless, this theory of changing one cook at a time .'' 6 Meaning more than just elections, democracy to
Wilson "consists essentially in the popular choice of and control over alternate groups of collectively responsible public officials, " 7 and more pointedly, " representative government is government by majorities, and
government by majorities is party government, which up to the present date
is the only known means of self-government. " 8
Wilson sought means to institutionalize party government and turned
first to Congress, in his day the dominant institution in the national government. Legislation there was controlled by the multiple and distinct subcommittees, unified only by the caucus of the party, convened " whenever, in
critical seasons of doubt, it is necessary to assure itself of its own unity of
purpose."
To make Congress the vehicle of party government, he proposed to use
the caucus, even though it was " a very ugly beast, and a very unmanage-
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able one." Strong leadership was needed, for this caucus "will obey only
the strong hand, and heed only the whip. To rail against him is no good.
He must be taken sternly in hand, and be harnessed, whether he will or not
in our service. Our search must be for the bit that will curb and subdue
him."9
Few people, and even fewer political scientists, have the opportunity to
put their speculative proposals into practice. Wilson used his opportunity
to institutionalize the concept of party as governing caucus. In the first two
years of his administration, the congressional Democratic caucus was
transformed from an ugly beast to a docile carrier of legislative burdens,
enacting major programs such as the Clayton Anti-Trust Act and the lowered Underwood-Simons tariff.
Wilson not only used the caucus but also acted as the leader of his party.
Presidential leadership became for Wilson the means to overcome the institutional separation of powers. To focus public and political attention on his
program, Wilson used innovative techniques such as press conferences and
personal delivery of the State of the Union address, previously submitted
in writing. To strengthen his claim to leadership, he called for nomination
of the president through direct popular primaries.
In later years, Wilson turned from Congress to the presidency to provide
party government. The president "cannot escape being the leader of his
party except by incapacity and lack of personal force, because he is at once
the choice of the party and of the nation," Wilson had written as a professor,
foreshadowing both his own leadership and his own disability. Though
disdainful of personalities, he argued for the force of the person of the
president: "He can dominate his party by being spokesman for the real
sentiment and purpose of the country, by giving direction to opinion, by
giving the country at once the information and the statements of policy
which will enable it to form its judgments alike of parties and of men." 10
Through his actions and his rhetoric, the professor-cum-politician spurred
a transformation of the presidency. 11
Wilson's efforts have inspired other advocates of the model of party as
governing caucus. In academic literature, the most notable has been the
report of a Committee on Political Parties, presented to the American Political Science Association in 1950. Its program still constitutes the basic
components of this model, requiring "first, that the parties are able to bring
forth programs to which they commit themselves and, second, that the
parties possess sufficient internal cohesion to carry out these programs." 12
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THE MODEL IN PRACTICE

I shall use this report, despite its age, to analyze the governing caucus
model. Parties do affect government, yet they do not meet the full requirements of party as a governing caucus. To validate the governing caucus
model , three conditions are necessary: Parties develop programs , they win
election on the basis of these programs, and they then act to implement
their promised programs.
Empirically, none of these three conditions is fully met in the United
States. First, party leaders are not necessarily motivated to seek election
primarily on the basis of policy programs. There is a basic conflict of goals
between office seekers, who employ policy programs in their quest for
power, and benefit seekers, who try to persuade these office seekers in their
quest for particular programs. To the first group , policies are the instruments of electoral success; to the second they are the purpose of politics. 13
Congress provides a good example. National legislators have three
goals: winning election , gaining influence in the Senate or House of Representatives, and achieving good public policy. Of these goals, the most
important to most legislators is winning election. Given such practices as
committee specialization and individual perquisites, Congress is designed
to serve these electoral interests rather than policy goals. Contrary to the
expectations of the governing caucus model , "the enactment of party programs is electorally not very important to members .... What is important
to each congressman , and vitally so, is that he be free to take positions that
serve his interests." 14
This electoral focus does not mean that legislators are simply unprincipled, selfish feeders at the public trough . It is only a recognition of the
reality that election comes first in time-and therefore first in priority. A
legislator cannot achieve any policy goals unless he or she first gets elected
and stays in office long enough to accumulate influence within the legislature. Congress obviously does deal with policy but not as a party governing caucus. Rather, policy questions become relevant as part of the broader
electoral needs of the representatives.
Policy programs are tied to elections in two different ways. First, politicians respond retrospectively. They interpret election results, often seeing
their success as endorsements of their own programs and rejections of their
opponents' programs. 15 They also try to read the tea leaves from other
elections, interpreting the results, for example, as a mandate for lower taxes
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or evidence of a "new mood" among the public. Presidential popularity is
particularly important since it has a direct effect on congressional elections;
consequently, support for the president's program correlates closely with
his standing among the electorate. 16
Furthermore, politicians act prospectively, trying to anticipate the reactions and intentions of the electorate. Office seekers are often risk-taking
entrepreneurs, attempting to find new "products" that will attract "buyers" in the electoral marketplace. 17 Enterprising legislators have developed
such programs as Medicare, tax simplification, and abortion restrictions,
achieving both policy change and electoral success.
Policy, then, is important to politicians, but this importance does not
validate the governing caucus model. Rather than constituting a collective
and coherent program, these policy initiatives are typically unconnected
and distinct from one another. Politicians react to election returns individualistically, even idiosyncratically. The innovations they propose reflect
their own interests and their particular election strategies, not a common
party program. To recall Wilson's metaphor, the result is not a national
broth but a stew whose ingredients follow no fixed recipe nor assure any
nutritional balance.
The achievement of a common party program will depend on the parties'
electoral situation. When their candidates face widespread competition,
they may have an incentive for mutual aid and cooperation; by "hanging
together," candidates may avoid the electoral death of "hanging separately." By achieving a common legislative program, they may be able to
present a better record to their constituents. By sharing funds and services,
they may be able to wage better campaigns.
The spread of party competition in the United States has promoted some
increased cooperation within the parties. Among state parties, there is some
tendency for party organizations to become more developed as they become
more competitive. 18 On both the state and the national level, as legislators
have felt more insecure, they have fostered collective electoral
organizations.
Groups such as the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee,
the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee, and political action committees run by legislative leaders have now become major sources of money
and technical resources for their fellow partisans. Increased party cohesion
on programs is also evident in Congress, where roll-call voting shows a
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higher degree of partisan unity than at any time since the end of World War
II. The degree of party unity, however, is inherently limited by the basic
electoral reality that congressional elections are held is disaggregated districts, where campaigns are centered on individual candidates, not on
national parties.
Even when a party might develop a common program, the caucus model
may not apply. To effect popular democratic control over policy, this model
requires that the programs developed by the parties be distinct from one
another, providing a choice for the electorate. Parties that are electorally
sensitive, however, will not necessarily develop different programs, only
popular programs. Indeed, when the wishes of the electorate are clear, party
programs will be indentical rather than conflicting if the parties act rationally in their own self-interest. 19 Party differences will probably be the most
distinct when there is no discernible popular preference for one or another
policy. Paradoxically, the model therefore will be most evident when it is
least relevant to democratic control.
These relationships between parties and the voters point to another set
of problems in the caucus model: its unspoken assumptions about electoral
behavior. For a governing caucus to achieve democratic legitimacy, it
requires voter endorsement for its collective program. The extensive studies of voting (discussed further in chapter 7), however, show that a popular
mandate is highly unlikely to exist.
A mandate first requires that voters make their choices on the basis of
the programs advanced by parties. To be sure, there is considerable issue
content to the popular vote, much more than was once believed . Although
some votes are based only on traditional, issue-less loyalties and some are
based on judgments of individual candidates, a substantial proportion is
related to judgments of past and future programs advanced by the parties
and their candidates . These judgments may not be specific in content, but
they are still meaningful. As Fiorina puts it in discussing the issue basis of
party loyalty, "By forming a long-term judgment about relatively stable
leadership cadres that periodically compete for their votes, citizens appear
to behave in a perfectly reasonable way." 20
A mandate, however, implies not only voter concern for issues but a
concern for the same issues and a majority endorsement of one party's
position on these dominant issues. These conditions rarely if ever apply,
for even when voters are concerned with issues, they are concerned with
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different issues. In 1988, for example, when asked to name the most important issue before the nation, only 12 percent agreed on the priority, the
budget deficit, and even smaller proportions focused on other concerns. 21
At other times, there has been more agreement on the priority issues,
but still less than a majority. The most notable case of agreement among
voters came in 1968, when public attention focused on the Vietnam War.
Yet even in this time of national agony, only 43 percent, less than a majority,
named the war as the priority issue of the election. In more normal times,
an issue mandate is still less likely. Analyzing these patterns, Kelley concludes that even recent landslide presidential elections, except that of 1964,
cannot be considered policy mandates. 22
Mandates do not usually come from the voters but are defined by those
voted into office. Yet definitions may vary, as those elected read the election returns differently. One representative may see her success as voter
opposition to increased taxation while another interprets his victory as
approval of legalized abortion. Politicans will be more likely to read the
same meaning into elections when they share a common electoral fate,
when they must hang together. Increased competition, however, does not
assure this cooperation unless it also means increased competition for each
individual candidate bearing the common party label. This condition does
not apply in the contemporary Congress; incumbents are secure in their
seats, with as many as 98 percent winning reelection.
Most of these legislators have little need either to gain support from the
party or to provide much support to the party and its program. Even when
not secure, legislators will not necessarily depend on their party but may
actually find it more expedient to display their independence. Fenno 's comment on the individualism of contemporary campaigning applies as much
to the congressional party as to the national legislature: '' Members of Congress run/or Congress by running against Congress ... . In the short run,
everybody plays and nearly everybody wins. Yet the institution bleeds from
435 separate cuts. In the long run, therefore, somebody may lose." 23

PARTIES IN GOVERNMENT

In its third operational aspect, the governing caucus model assumes that
the party will implement its common program after receiving a voter mandate. In studying the effect of parties on government policy, analysts tend
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to apply the most exacting standards of the governing caucus model. They
test whether parties take collective responsibility for a common program,
for example, by examining legislative voting, gauging parties against an
expected standard of total unanimity within each party and total difference
between the parties. A more reasonable measure, however, might be
whether parties show relative, rather than absolute, internal unity and external differences.
Judged on these criteria, parties clearly do affect legislative decisions.
In congressional roll calls, partisanship is consistently the most important
explanatory variable, and the impact of party on legislative behavior has
increased in recent years. In 1990, half of the recorded votes found a majority of Democrats opposing a majority of Republicans, and the average legislator supported his or her party on more than three out of four instances
of partisan roll calls. 24
This difference is independent of the constituency pressures on members
of Congress, as shown by an analysis of voting in both houses. Senators
from the same state, sharing the same constituency but of different parties ,
vote quite differently. In the House, similarly, a change in party control of
a seat also leads to a change in the representative's behavior. On average,
a Democrat from the same area as a Republican will be forty-two points
higher on a one hundred-point scale of liberalism. 25
Parties differ from each other, but do they make a difference? Do they
fight each other vigorously only over trivial issues , or can they actually
affect the course of government? Government, after all, cannot control
much of human life; indeed, in the modem technological and interdependent world, it can be argued that governments cannot even control their
own economies.
Examining British public policy, Richard Rose doubts that either parties
or government itself has much effect. Rather than adversarial conflict
between the parties, he found considerable consensus between them
(before the onset of the Thatcher government). Although parties did enact
their election manifestos, these pledges involved only a small portion of
the business of government. In the end, governmental action was not
decided by elected politicians-or even by bureaucrats- but was inevitably
determined by uncontrollable forces in the economy and in the world . 26 A
similar argument has been made in regard to state government in the United
States. The claim is that the level of governmental spending, a crucial index
of party influence, depends not on political factors such as party competi-
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tion but on such nonpolitical factors as the level of economic
development. 27
Parties cannot control their environment totally; still, they can have considerable effect. Party platforms provide one indicator. Although platforms
are often denigrated as only empty rhetoric, closer analysis shows that the
election manifestos of American parties are appropriate documents for a
governing caucus. Although there is a minor proportion of windy cliches,
most of the platforms either deal with the past records of the competing
parties or propose particular public policies.
In their platforms, the parties do not simply imitate one anotherorcleave
to the middle of the road, as would be expected if they followed purely
winning strategies . Parties emphasize different issues, playing to different
constituencies. Although they show bipartisan agreement on some issues,
the degree of conflict is greater. By 1980, according to Monroe, the parties
disagreed on nearly one-half of the significant issues in their platforms and
agreed on only one-seventh. 28 Even more important, the parties actually
carry through on their promises, fulfilling between two-thirds and threefourths of their specific pledges. It may be significant, however, that the
trend is toward lessened platform fulfillment, an indication of lower party
strength in the United States. 29
The more general effect of parties on government can be seen by examining patterns of governmental expenditures. In the American states,
spending for such purposes as education is largely determined by the wealth
of the state. When it comes to more politically controversial functions, such
as welfare, party competition makes a difference. As the parties bid for
votes, public spending increases. 30
Even as they compete, the parties present and effect different programs.
Among the states, a higher level of public spending in relevant policy areas
occurs when Democrats rather than Republicans predominate. 3 1 Comparing nations, when parties of the Left are in power, government policy is
directed more toward stimulating employment; governments headed by
parties of the Right emphasize the control of inflation. 32 Economic realities
restrict some choices, but politics makes a difference.
Parties also specialize, as they appeal to different constituencies. Two
researchers compared the emphasis given to different policy topics by the
two major American parties with national expenditures in these areas from
1948 to 1985. They found strong relationships, supporting a model of party
as governing caucus, and conclude, "Party government in the U.S. works
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largely as mandate theories say it should, that is, responsively to electoral
endorsements of party policy emphases ." 33
Even with their substantial impact on policy, parties cannot fully meet
the tests of the governing caucus model because of basic constitutional
features of American government. Madison correctly predicted the workings of that government when he assured his readers that the new system
of government would diminish "the influence of factious leaders" and
would guarantee that "a rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts,
for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular
member of it.'' 34 The same Constitution that prevented enactment of the
programs Madison feared also limits the ability of a party caucus to enact
other legislation, whether "improper or wicked" or necessary and good.
Federalism and the system of national checks and balances were deliberately-and successfully-designed to make it difficult to achieve a common party program. To effect basic changes in policy, a party must do more
than win a single election, whatever its program and however clear a
national mandate. It must win the presidency and both houses of Congress;
it must also carry separate elections for the governors and legislatures of
the states. Even with these victories, it cannot be certain of the endorsement
of judges or of the cooperation of administrators. Gaining control of these
branches of government would require sustained success over a long period
of time, to enable the party to place its loyalists throughout the judiciary
and the bureaucracy.
The barriers faced by a governing caucus are particularly high on questions of foreign policy, the most vital issues facing the United States or any
nation. This type of political party is legitimated by its majority support,
but that warrant is insufficient for a governing party on these issues. Vital
decisions affecting war and peace require a broader public consensus, and
the Constitution adds the institutional necessity that the Senate ratify treaties by a two-thirds vote.
Woodrow Wilson's own history illustrates the problem. When Wilson
brought the League of Nations Treaty to the Senate after World War I, he
attempted to implement the theory of party as a governing caucus. At first ,
Wilson took a nonpartisan approach, negotiating with Republican senators
and seeking public support through a nationwide speaking tour. Then, as
the issue moved to resolution, Wilson acted in keeping with his concept of
the political party. He pressed for party loyalty in the Senate vote and saw

46

CH A PT ER THREE

the forthcoming election as the opportunity to achieve a popular mandate
for himself and for his party program. Writing to the Democrats' annual
Jackson Day dinner, Wilson attempted to frame the 1920 election as "a
great and solemn referendum, a referendum on the part the United States
is to play in completing the settlements of the war."
Neither effort succeeded. The party split in the Senate and, as twenty
Democrats followed Wilson's leadership and refused to compromise, the
treaty was defeated by seven votes . The electorate, moreover, was not
offered a clear choice in the presidential contest and did not vote primarily
on the issue of the League of Nations. Wilson was faithful to his own theory
of political parties. The reality demonstrated in this critical case, however,
was that the party could not hold together, that voters would not provide a
simple mandate, and that the institutions of American government were
inhospitable to party rule. In the end, by following theory to its ultimate
conclusion, the president "spelled disaster for ratification of the Treaty in
any form. Wilson committed the supreme error of converting what had
really not been a partisan issue, except in the parliamentary sense, into a
hostage of party loyalty and politics." 35
Party as governing caucus always has been problematic in the United
States, and in contemporary times the difficulties have increased. The
two-party system, potentially an instrument of majority rule, has been
virtually transformed into a new separation of powers , as Republicans
have come to dominate presidential elections (losing convincingly only
once since the era of Franklin Roosevelt) and Democrats have come to
dominate congressional elections (losing control of the House for only
two years since 1948).
With these electoral developments, American government has become
increasingly subject to institutional deadlock. "As each party has strengthened the institutions it commands," Ginsberg and Shefter argue, "the constitutional separation of powers has been transformed into a system of dual
sovereignty." The consequences include the inability of the government to
achieve " political closure" and the weakening of the nation's administrative capabilities, making vital national issues difficult to resolve. 36 Even
when those problems are overcome, their resolution typically occurs outside of the normal political processes, through administrative and judicial
decisions or through nonpartisan or bipartisan commissions. Their mechanisms provide scant support for the model of party as governing caucus .
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PARTY AS CAUSE AD VOCATE

The governing caucus is an elite party, but it has a counterpart among mass
parties, the party as cause advocate. This party is also concerned primarily
with collective issues, and its appeal is the policy rewards it offers to its
adherents. Attention focuses on enlisting popular endorsement of these policies, however, rather than on elite programs.
Ostrogorski argues for such parties. After condemning the normal
organizations of his day, he urged parties that would have only mass , external relationships:
Party as a general contractor for the numerous and varied problems
present and to come, awaiting solution, would give place to special
organizations, limited to particular objects. It would cease to be a
medley of groups and individuals united by a fictitious agreement,
and would constitute an association, the homogeneity of which would
be ensured by its single aim . Party holding its members, once they
have joined it, in a vice-like grasp would give place to combinations
forming and reforming spontaneously, according to the changing
problems of life and the play of opinion. 37
Party as cause advocate already exists, to some extent. Even the major
American parties can sometimes be described this way, for their leaders
often define their roles as advocates of programs rather than as simply
followers of public opinion and seekers after office. 38 Splinter parties
within the major parties are also often of this variety, constituting efforts
" to win the party to more complete commitment to their views. " 39 Such
diverse dissidents as Van Buren's 1848 Free Soilers, the southern Democratic "Dixiecrats" of 1948, the "Peace and Freedom" offshoot of liberal
Democrats in the 1970s, and John Anderson's Independent movement in
1980 were attempts to influence the policy programs of their own parties,
rather than genuine efforts to build new , permanent parties.
Cause advocates face even more barriers to success than those encountered in a governing caucus party. Because of the restricted range of their
policy concerns, they are less likely to be able to build majority coalitions .
If it is difficult to obtain a mandate from the electorate on even large and
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general issues, it is still more difficult on the specific issues of concern to
cause groups.
Furthermore, the electorate's concerns change, sometimes rapidly. A
party with a more general outlook may be able to adapt to these changes,
incorporating new issues within its old framework or even shifting to new
concerns, but a party based on a particular issue always risks becoming
archaic. The Prohibition party provides an example. For fifty years, the
issue of the regulation of alcohol was of great importance in American
politics and eventually brought amendment of the Constitution. Today,
after that "great experiment" has failed, the Prohibitionists continue to
advocate their cause, but their party is completely dry. 40

THE GOVERNING CAUCUS AND DEMOCRACY

The problems of the party as governing caucus go beyond the considerable
practical hurdles it faces in the United States; it also has theoretical problems in relating party to democratic governance. The governing caucus
model attempts to provide democratic legitimacy for a political party that
involves very limited democratic participation. Essentially, the model
focuses on leadership, which invites popular participation only to approve
its program in a limited election and then expects the populace to do nothing
more than applaud that leadership.
Burke made clear the distinction between leaders and followers in his
famous speech to his electorate in Bristol. Voters could choose their representative, but they must defer to his superior judgment. Constituents
could legitimately demand attention from their legislator, "but his unbiased
opinion, his mature judgment, his enlightened conscience, he ought not to
sacrifice to you, to any man , or to any set of men living, . .. [for] government and legislation are matters of reason and judgment, and not of
inclination. " 41
Wilson similarly emphasized this central idea, consistently seeking
means "to provide for concentrated leadership and power inside the official
government structure. " 42 Effective democratic government, he argued,
requires "coordinated power for leaders" and simplification for the electorate: "We must decrease the number and complexity of the things the
voter is called upon to do; concentrate his attention upon a few men whom
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he can make responsible, a few objects upon which he can easily center his
purpose; make parties his instruments and not his masters by an utter simplification of the things he is expected to do." 43
Leaders are informed; voters are fallible. Burke aristocratically feared
that passions would distort popular judgment, as evidenced both by English
opposition to the American Revolution and French support for their revolutionary Reign of Terror. Wilson was more confident that mass opinion,
if it were properly led, could achieve "a new and cordial and easily attained
understanding between those who govern and those who are governed. " 44
To both men, the relationship was not one between equal participants in a
democratic polity; it was more akin to that of a teacher of passive but educable students. Burke engaged in political education as much as Wilson, who
indeed did lecture, to his students and to his national constituency. Their
classroom was not an example of progressive "learning by doing" but one
in which students absorbed wisdom from their instructor. If dissatisfied,
the students did not engage in argument but simply left the room to find a
more acceptable teacher.
In the democracy of the governing caucus, leadership is responsible
because it can be dismissed collectively by an electorate dissatisfied with
its programs. That accessibility is limited, however. Because responsibility
is collective, few direct ties exist between an individual leader and an individual voter; there is no person to deal directly with a voter's unique needs,
in the manner of a machine precinct leader. Relying largely on elections to
control leaders, the governing caucus model provides sparse means for
control between elections or on matters that do not arise in elections or on
the vital details of public policies that go undefined in elections.
The emphasis on leadership stilts democracy, limiting it by restricting
involvement in the development of party programs. Those in the governing
caucus develop programs-others only approve or disapprove. Such participation is shallow , but efforts to deepen popular participation create other
problems.
In its call for strengthened parties , the 1950 Committee on Political Parties advocated both strong and centralized leadership and extensive popular
participation in the writing of enforceable party programs . Adopting both
goals, however, does not resolve the tensions between them. There is no
logical assurance that leaders and other party members will share the same
programmatic goals, unless we wrongly assume that all party memberships
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are based on full knowledge and approval of leadership policies. In fact,
the evidence consistently refutes this assumption. Repeated studies have
shown that Democratic party leaders are considerably more liberal and
Republicans considerably more conservative than their rank-and-file memberships. 45 For example, in 1988, 51 percent of Democratic party convention delegates favored federal funding of abortions, but Democratic voters
opposed it by nearly a two-to-one margin; among Republican convention
delegates, 51 percent opposed the Equal Rights Amendment, but Republican voters favored the amendment by a seven-to-one margin. 46
Moreover, ordinary party loyalists, in general, tend to be like one
another, but the leaders of their parties tend to disagree. This finding
implies that if rank-and-file members participated fully in the formulation
of party programs, these programs would be more similar to each other and
would offer less choice to the general electorate. The result is a democratic
paradox: full popular involvement in developing policy would translate into
less meaningful popular choice; conversely, leadership domination over
policy development would provide more meaningful choice.
Democracy is further stilted in the governing caucus model because that
model relies heavily on programmatic appeals. Politics, after all, is a human
relationship, involving affection as well as intellect. Government depends
on the character of its leaders as well as on their arguments; voters, in
choosing leaders, properly invoke their passions as well as their interests.
In a vibrant democracy, parties will accept and channel these emotions,
recognizing that loyalties to parties, and their voter support, go beyond
reasoned appeals.
The governing caucus, however, is too much a matter of cold reasoning,
as illustrated in the lives of its most prominent advocates. When Burke
broke with his party over the French Revolution, he also felt it necessary
to deny his emotions and loyalties. Policy disagreement inevitably meant
personal estrangement: ''There was a loss of friends- he knew the price of
his conduct ... their friendship was at an end. " 47 When Wilson saw the
League of Nations repudiated by members of his party and the voters, he
became embittered and felt abandoned.
Relying too much on their intellectual appeal, these brilliant men still
lacked some essential traits of democratic leaders. As Max Weber taught,
"Politics is a strong and slow boring of hard boards. It takes both passion
and perspective .... Only he has the calling for politics who is sure that he
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shall not crumble when the world from his point of view is too stupid or too
base for what he wants to offer." 48 Democracy requires more than a governing caucus; it needs parties that recognize and foster both personal passion and ideological perspective.

FOUR
COMMON PASSIONS: PARTY AS
IDEOLOGICAL COMMUNITY AND
SOCIAL MOVEMENT

We few, we happy few , we band of brothers . . .
-William Shakespeare , Henry V
We stand at Armageddon and we battle for the Lord.
- Theodore Roosevelt, 1912
The organization must consist chiefly of persons
engaged in revolution as a profession.
- V. I . Lenin , What Is to Be Done?

A political party may have broader goals beyond electoral victory and thus
expect more of its members. As ideological communities and as social
movements, parties use the expressive mode and pursue collective goals,
but they differ in their focus . Parties as ideological communities are likely
to be relatively closed or elite groups, like the governing caucus. In contrast, social movements mobilize mass participation and are readily accessible to mass influence.
In one or the other form, these models are often seen as the ideal political
party, one that joins its members in a common effort to achieve social
reconstruction. Politics becomes a crusade for justice rather than a mean
chase for personal advantage. Robert Michels had hoped that the Socialist
party would fulfill this ideal.
Americans, too , have been inspired by this ideal, typically when they
have been involved in expressive third parties . In the United States , these
parties evidence characteristics both of the elite-oriented ideological community and of the mass-oriented social movement. Important examples
include the antislavery Free Soil party of antebellum days , the Populist
protesters against capitalist development at the end of the nineteenth century, and the fervent legions supporting Theodore Roosevelt's Progressive
campaign in 1912. These parties have been important participants in the
democratic contests of the United States .
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THE LENINIST PA RTY

To better understand the character of such parties, however, we first tum
to a different context and a different writer: Vladimir Lenin, the founder of
the nondemocratic Russian Communist party and the leader of the party's
revolutionary creation of the Soviet Union. Lenin's thought was shaped in
the context of Tsarist Russia, an authoritarian, centralized regime with little
concern for individual freedom . His model of a political party reflects these
characteristics. His Social Democratic (later Bolshevik and Communist)
party was also authoritarian and centralized and totally dominated the lives
of its members. Through this party, he sought-and achieved-a collective
program for the total replacement of the tsarist regime.
The Leninist party is an elite party, confined to a small group of selected
and dedicated members, totally committed and totally controlled . Only
through such means, Lenin argued, can the party achieve its true goal:
revolution. The party must not only lead the revolution , it must call it into
being, for insurrections are made, not born .
The party is to be the "vanguard of the revolution ," raising the workingclass above its usual, paltry concerns for limited economic improvements
in wages and hours. "This consciousness among workers," Lenin insisted ,
" could only be brought to them from without. The history of all countries
shows that the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to
develop only trade-union consciousness. " '
The vanguard party's role is important- for without it the revolution can
never take place-but it is also exacting, requiring intense training and
discipline. The party will consist of professional revolutionaries , persons
who "recognize its program and support the party both materially and by
personal participation ." 2 Seeking the overthrow of the government requires
a structured, clandestine party, for only then can success be guaranteed
against attacks by the government. Secrecy is particularly important to the
party, so much so that "all the other conditions (number and selection of
members, functions, etc.) must all be subordinated to it. ... 'Broad democracy ' in party organization, amidst the gloom of autocracy and the domination of the gendarmes, is nothing more than a useless and harmful
toy." 3
The party dominates the lives of its members . Invoking the imagery of
wartime comradeship, Lenin praises his elite:
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We are marching in a compact group along a precipitous and difficult
path, firmly holding each other by the hand. We are surrounded on
all sides by enemies, and are under their almost constant fire. We
have combined voluntarily, especially for the purpose of fighting the
enemy and not to retreat into the adjacent marsh, the inhabitants of
which, right from the very outset, have reproached us with having
separated ourselves into an exclusive group, and with having chosen
the path of struggle instead of the path of conciliation. 4
Lenin scorns the democratic principle of "freedom of criticism" as mere
self-defeating opportunism, "the freedom to convert Social-Democracy
into a democratic reformist party, the freedom to introduce bourgeois ideas
and bourgeois elements into Socialism." Instead of debate within the party,
he insists on adherence to a common revolutionary ideology, for "the role
of vanguard can be fulfilled only by a party that is guided by an advanced
theory. " 5
Beyond an encompassing theory, the Leninist party requires "iron discipline" to combat "that petty-bourgeois diffusiveness, instability, [and]
incapacity for sustained effort, unity and organized action, which, if
indulged in, must inevitably destroy every proletarian revolution." 6 Discipline is to be hierarchical and strictly enforced by a central organization,
which is to make all major decisions for the party.
Lenin unapologetically demands centralized authority: "The organization principle of revolutionary Social Democracy ... strives to proceed
from the top downwards, insisting on the extension of the rights and authority of the center over the parts. " 7 Implementation of this disciplinary code
is illustrated in factories, where every party worker "must regard himself
as an agent of the committee, obliged to subordinate himself to the orders
of the committee and to adhere to all the 'laws and customs' of that 'army
on active service' which he has joined and which in time of war he has no
right to abandon without the consent of his superior." 8
Like all parties, Lenin's elite organization seeks mass support, but it does
so through a separate popular base. "The secret apparatus of the party must be
preserved. But at the same time ... in addition to the secret apparatus it is
absolutely necessary to create many new, public and semipublic party organizations.' ' 9 These broader organizations will be guided by the elite party beyond
their immediate objectives toward support of the collective goals.
To illustrate, industrial workers must be deliberately taught to generalize
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the class struggle: "Working class consciousness cannot be genuinely political consciousness unless the workers are trained to respond to all cases of
tyranny, oppression , violence and abuse, no matter what class is affected." 10
That training comes through the actions of the inner party: "They should
go into the most common inns, penetrate into the unions, societies and
casual meetings where the common people gather, and talk to the people,
not in scientific (and not in very parliamentary) language ... but everywhere arouse the thoughts of the masses and draw them into the struggle." 11
Through these activities, the goal of the Leninist party remains a total
social transformation through the revolution of the working class. In his
only direct repudiation of Marx, Lenin insists that this transformation can
take place only through violence, even in the ostensibly democratic nations.
"Both England and America, the greatest and last representatives of AngloSaxon 'Liberty' in the sense of the absence of militarism and bureaucracy,
have today plunged headlong into the all-European, dirty, bloody morass
of military bureaucratic institutions to which everything is subordinated and
which trample everything under foot." 12

A MERICAN SOCI A L MOVEMEN T S

The Leninist party is an extreme example of the concept of the political
party as an ideological community. Some of the same characteristics are
evident among certain American party organizations, especially the recurrent social movements represented by "third," or minority, parties.
These parties are similar to the Leninist party in their emphasis on collective goals and in their expressive character, yet they are critically different in their attitude toward democracy. Leninism disparages democracy,
but American third parties have supported and attempted to extend it. This
vital difference is also evident within the parties. The Leninist party champions elite control; the American party typically will urge more membership participation within the party and fuller mass participation in politics
generally.
Particularly relevant are the Populist and the Progressive parties of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Populist party developed
in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, reacting to the economic
disadvantages imposed on small farmers, who faced a devastating combination of depressed crop prices, a tight money supply, dependence on

56

CHA PT ER FOUR

exploitative railroads and suppliers, and high prices for industrial goods
protected by high tariffs. In reaction to these conditions, aggrieved farmers
created the Agrarian Alliance, with suballiances forming in local communities throughout the Midwest and the South. To meet farmers' needs , the
alliance developed economic measures, such as marketing and credit cooperatives, and political programs, such as the use of paper money and silver
to inflate the currency.
Most important, argues the leading analyst of the movement, the alliance developed an expressive "movement culture" :
This culture involved more than just the bulking of cotton . It extended
to frequent Alliance meetings to plan the mass sales - meetings where
the whole family came, where the twilight suppers were, in the early
days , laid out for ten or twenty members of the suballiance, or for
hundreds at a county Alliance meeting, but which soon grew into vast
spectacles; long trains of wagons, emblazoned with suballiance banners, stretching literally for miles, trekking to enormous encampments where five, ten, and twenty thousand men and women listened
intently to the plans of their Alliance and talked among themselves
about these plans.
The movement culture would develop its own mechanism of
recruitment (the large-scale credit cooperative), its own theoretical
analysis (the Greenback interpretation of the American version of
finance capitalism) , its own solution (the sub-treasury land and loan
system), its own symbols of politics (the Alliance "Demands" and
the Omaha Platform) , and its own political institution (the People's
Party). Grounded in a common experience, nurtured by years of
experimentation and self-education, it produced a party, a platform,
a specific new democratic ideology, and a pathbreaking political
agenda for the American nation. But none of these things were the
essence of Populism. At bottom, Populism was, quite simply, an
expression of self-respect. It was not an individual trait, but a collective one, surfacing as the shared hope of millions organized by the
Alliance into its cooperative crusade. This individual and collective
striving generated the movement culture that was Populism. 13
Eventually, the protest movement turned to politics. Formulating an
extensive program for social change in the United States , the People's Party
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in its 1892 Omaha platform called for nationalization of the railroads, telegraph and telephone systems, a graduated income tax, restrictions of land
ownership by corporations, and a national paper currency. The Populists
presented themselves as speakers for the working class. In language better
known in the writings of Marx and Lenin, they declared, "Wealth belongs
to him who creates it, and every dollar taken from industry without an
equivalent is robbery. 'If any will not work, neither shall he eat.' "
Radical as these specific proposals were for the time, the more striking
characteristic of the Populist platform was its comprehensive, collective,
and moralistic character. The preamble to the platform depicted a nation
requiring not simply new programs but fundamental redemption:
We meet in the midst of a nation brought to the verge of moral, political, and material ruin. Corruption dominates the ballot-box, the Legislatures, the Congress, and touches even the ermine of the bench.
The people are demoralized .... The newspapers are largely subsidized or muzzled, public opinion silenced, business prostrated,
homes covered with mortgages, labor impoverished , and the land
concentrating in the hand of capitalists .... The fruits of the toil of
millions are boldly stolen to build up colossal fortunes for a few,
unprecedented in the history of mankind .. . . From the same prolific
womb of governmental injustice we breed the two great classestramps and millionaires.
We declare that this Republic can only endure as a free government
while built upon the love of the whole people for each other and for
the nation; that it cannot be pinned together by bayonets; and that the
civil war is over and that every passion and resentment which grew
out of it must die with it, and that we must be in fact, as we are in
name, one united brotherhood of freemen. 14
The Populists were a true community, but in contrast to Lenin's party, it
was built on a mass, not an elite, base. It pursued an ideological program,
but the full character of populism went beyond program to a deeply personal, expressive experience. "The cooperative ethos was the animating
spirit of the popular movement they created-it literally gave hundreds of
thousands of impoverished people what Martin Luther King would later
call a 'sense of somebodiness .' " 15 It was a "passionate moment in American history," resulting in "the most massive organizing drive by any citi-
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zen institution of nineteenth-century America .... The Alliance's five-year
campaign carried lecturers into forty-three states and territories and touched
two million American farm families." 16
The People's Party crested in 1892 when it won close to one-tenth of the
national vote for president and carried five states. In 1896, its most prominent issue, the unlimited coinage of silver to increase the money supply,
was co-opted by the Democrats, led by William Jennings Bryan. The
Populists then faced a critical decision, whether to endorse Bryan to further
this one goal or to maintain their independence and their fuller and more
radical program. The choice was not only about political strategy; it was
also a choice of whether to maintain the model of a political party as an
ideological community.
At bottom, the third party's internal struggle was a contest between a
cooperating group of political office-seekers on the one hand and the
Populist movement on the other. The politicians had short-run objectives- winning the next election. In contrast, the agrarian movement,
both as shaped by the Alliance organizers who had recruited the party's mass base of partisans and as shaped by the recruits themselves,
had long-term goals, fashioned during the years of cooperative struggle and expressed politically in the planks of the Omaha Platform.
While the movement itself had a mass following , the only popular
support that the office-seekers could muster within the third party
itself was centered in those regions of the country which the cooperative crusade had never been able to penetrate successfully . ... In
general, therefore, the contest between Populism and its shadow form
in 1896 arrayed the politics of a people's movement against conventional electoral politics. 17
In this instance, conventional politics won. While maintaining most of
its previous positions, the People's Party declared the currency question
" the great and pressing issue of the pending campaign." On this ground it
downplayed its radicalism, endorsed Bryan for president, and quickly
passed from the political scene. The Populists did have a long-term influence, moving the Democrats toward the left of the economic spectrum, but
the cost of that influence was the party's death.
Another collective community in American politics was the Progressive
party of 1912, led by former president Theodore Roosevelt. Like the Popu-
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lists, this third party was a reaction to the development of industrial capitalism in the United States. Its focus, however, was different, emphasizing
not the problems of agriculture but the needs of a national, manufacturing,
and increasingly urban economy.
The affective fervor of the Progressives made it virtually a religious
movement. As one of its leaders described the party's national convention:
The Progressive party, under Roosevelt, was going to free the United
States not only from political and economic but from spiritual night.
It was to rout Taft's Republican hosts, but this was merely a prelude
to routing all the hosts of darkness .... In the innocence of our hearts
we believed that all that was required to reach the holy city of our
dreams was to huddle ourselves and our aspirations under one great
umbrella and to advance, saint and sinner, patriot and politician, with
arms entwined and voices raised in song .. .. Through them all a sort
of rage for righteousness presently began to surge. Soon the convention was keyed to the pitch of crusade. A religious fervor took possession of it. "Onward Christian Soldiers" and the "Doxology"
tolled in the Coliseum as solemnly as in a cathedral. 18
The Progressives matched this fervor by an extensive program of social
reform , including inheritance and income taxation , urban depopulation,
national health care, national regulation of corporations, and agricultural
cooperatives. More important than any specific proposals was its belief in
a discoverable, common public good beyond particular interests. "To this
end the party appeals to the Nation on the broadest possible basis; it attacks
no class; it obliterates sectionalism; it refuses to recognize sex distinction
in the rights of citizenship. It is the clean , free instrument of all the peopleof honest business, big and little; of the farmer and the wage-earner; of
every liberty-loving man and woman." 19
The movement sought a collective goal, the moral no less than the economic reform of the nation. For this grand end, grand means were needed .
The core of the Progressive program was not so much the specifics of
industrial legislation but major changes in political procedures, such as the
direct primary, initiative, campaign finance, and even popular referenda
on court decisions . Social progress would be gained "by the exposure of
evils through the spreading of information and the exhortation of the citi-
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zenry; by using the possibilities inherent in the ballot to find new and vigorous popular leaders; in short, by a revivification of democracy." 20
Underlying the emphasis on political reform were two other quite different beliefs in collective action. The first was the religious spirit that
animated progressivism, "an all-consuming urge to purge the world of sin .
. . . [They] believed it was their Christian duty to right the wrongs created
by the processes of industrialization." Joined to this evangelical fervor was
a more modem belief in objective scientific knowledge , a new faith "that
knowledge of natural laws would make it possible to devise and apply solutions to improve the human condition." 21
The new party made a strong debut in presidential politics, coming in
second in the election of 1912 with 27 percent of the vote and carrying six
states with eighty-eight electoral votes. As with the Populists, however, the
demands of more practical politics defeated the ideological appeal. As
World War I approached America, Roosevelt deserted the Progressives to
reunite the Republican party. The Progressive party itself had submerged
by the 1916 election; still, it made a strong impact on the administration of
Wilson, as a revived party in 1924, and as a continuing attitude toward
politics and parties.

IDE OLOGY A ND PARTIES

Party as an ideological community is not only a theoretical model; it has
also been tested by experience. At first glance, the model would seem
deficient. The Leninist party achieved apparent great success, not only in
its revolution against tsarist Russia but in the extension of Communist rule
to China and Eastern Europe. Yet in longer historical perspective, that success now seems hollow , as the citizens of Eastern Europe have decisively
rejected Communist regimes in free elections and Chinese dissent has been
forcibly repressed. Leninism has been repudiated even in its historical
heartland, as the Soviet Union has disappeared, replaced by newly independent and decidedly non-Communist states.
Behind these failures of Communist parties is a change in their character,
their transformation from ideological communities to other forms, to governing caucuses or bureaucratic organizations. Milovan Djilas used Marxist
theory itself to explain the emergence of a "new class" from the Communist party, " made up of those who have special privileges and economic
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preference because of the administrative monopoly they hold." Lenin's
ideological community had become a materialistic oligarchy:
Membership in the Communist Party before the Revolution meant
sacrifice. Being a professional revolutionary was one of the highest
honors. Now that the party has consolidated its power, party membership means that one belongs to a privileged class. And at the core
of the party are the all-powerful exploiters and masters. 22
The loss of vigorous ideological commitment is a more general problem
of political parties, not simply the manifestation of a fatal flaw in communism. Michels had deplored this transformation of the German Social Democrats, and his theory would predict similar decay among similar parties .
The same pattern is evident among American third-party movements,
whose histories are patterned stories of rapid political rises and even more
rapid declines. The Populists, for example, made an impressive start in
presidential politics in 1892, voluntarily subordinated their program to the
Democrats in 1896, and declined to insignificance by the end of the century.
These patterns may be rooted in human psychology. Parties as ideological communities demand much from their members, emotionally as well
as intellectually. It is certainly difficult for people to maintain a long-term
commitment to abstract ideologies rather than to personal interests, just as
it is difficult to maintain for long the expressive fervor of these parties.
After a time, narrower, more personal, more immediate, and calmer attitudes and allegiances come to dominate. Romantic ardor gives way to
reflective affection or even to calculation.
To explain the transformation of parties structured as ideological communities, we need to examine the structure of incentives provided by organizations generally, including parties . These incentives can be classified
along two dimensions. The first dimension is their tangible or intangible
nature. On this dimension, incentives may be material and tangible, such
as a patronage job, or psychological and intangible, such as representation
of ethnic groups on a party's ticket. The second dimension is the divisible
or collective nature of the incentive . A divisible incentive, such as a partyleadership position, can be given as a reward to some people and denied as
a punishment to others . A collective benefit, such as the party's governmental program, is inherently available to all persons in the organization,
regardless of their individual efforts or merit.
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In an ideological community, leaders constantly face the problem of
inducing effort toward the achievement of "collective goods," those benefits that accrue to persons with or without their individual effort. If the
party wins an election, for example, all members will share in the psychological elation and perhaps reap some satisfaction from new public policies,
regardless of their personal involvement. There is a constant temptation in
these circumstances for members, busy with their own lives, to slacken
their own efforts, to "let George do it." 23 Seeking to avoid the decay of
ideological fervor, Leninist parties engage in periodic purges, just as religious movements rekindle their energies through evangelical revivals.
Given these problems, analysts have been skeptical of the role of ideological incentives in American political parties, doubting either the existence or the workability of these incentives . Considerable scholarship now
exists, however, to indicate that ideology is an important factor within
American parties. Such incentives may be necessary under modern conditions in the United States; despite some problems, the parties seem able
to endure under these conditions.
The traditional view of American parties has been that they are without

ideological or programmatic commitment in both the front and rear
ranks .... They are vast, gaudy, friendly umbrellas under which all
Americans, whoever and whatever and however-minded they may
be, are invited to stand for the sake of being counted in the next election .... The parties, moderate and tolerant and self-contradictory to
a fault , are interested in the votes of men , not in their principles, and
they care not at all whether the votes they gather are bestowed with
passion or indifference-so long as they are bestowed and counted.
Moreover, in this view, the lack of party principle is desirable. In their very
lack of principle, "the parties have been the peacemakers of the American
community, the unwitting but forceful suppressors of the 'civil war potential' we carry always in the bowels of our diverse nation." 24
In the 1960s American politics became more conflictful, and the major
parties came under the increased influence of ideological activists. This
development induced two different criticisms. The first was itself ideological, particularly directed toward the enhanced role of left-leaning liberals
in the Democratic party. One neoconservative pointedly criticized what she
saw as the "contemptuous elite" of the anti-Vietnam War movement:
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"There was contempt for the nineteen-year-old boys who were carrying
guns in the war or in the Guard . It was understood that they were uneducated, and somewhat crude. There was contempt for America. " 25 The second critique, more relevant here, was that ideological parties, whether Left
or Right, would be less effective. If each of the parties presented a cohesive
appeal, conflict would increase between them, threatening the stability of
the overall political system. If only one party were ideological, its narrowed
base would doom it to defeat.
An inherent tension exists between the goals of winning elections and
achieving preferred public policy, paralleled by conflict between professional party leaders and ideological purists:
What professional party leaders ordinarily care about most is getting
their candidates into office and keeping them there. Other considerations are usually secondary .. .. When parties are purist, activists
control candidates. The purpose of such parties is to espouse policies
of which party activists approve. If they do that and win, so much the
better for them; if the price of purism is defeat, so much the worse
for the candidate. If a choice has to be made by purist activists, purism
outside office is better than power in government. 26
Examining ideological local Democratic parties- which he disdained as
"amateurs" -James Wilson found them handicapped . Seeking the participation of their members inevitably and fatally creates "the need of amateur
leaders continually to commit themselves on issues and to follow the logic
of their position beyond the point where it can any longer be the basis for
the formulation of public policy." These parties are led to extreme and
unpopular positions, to refusals to compromise, to the rejection of coalitions with potential allies, and then inevitably to electoral defeats and the
frustration of their own policy goals. 27
Despite these critiques, accumulated research over the past three decades reveals a very different picture of American parties. Even in the calmer
times of the 1950s, national convention delegates of the major parties were
quite distinct from each other ideologically. Republicans were clearly conservative and Democrats leaned toward liberalism. Similarities in ideology
did exist, but not among the party leaders; rather, the similarities existed
among the mass electorate, where Republican and Democratic voters
shared many beliefs. 28
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This early evidence has been confirmed repeatedly. Among their leaderships, American parties, contrary to conventional wisdom, often are
"advocacy parties. " The parties do not repress ideological conflicts among
the electorate; on the contrary, they muffle their own beliefs to win the
support of a less ideological electorate.
The ideological distinctiveness of the parties has been demonstrated at
local, state, and national levels. A large survey of state convention delegates in eleven diverse states invariably showed "the consistent liberalism
of the Democrats and the consistent conservatism of the Republicans."
Even more striking are comparisons across states. Democrats were liberal
not only in comparison to their party counterparts in the same state but were
ideologically akin throughout the nation. Even the most conservative Democrats in any state were still more liberal than the most liberal Republicans
in any state. 29
Similar conclusions follow from a long-term study of party activists
attending national party conventions over the past two decades. In 1980,
for example, only an insignificant 2 percent of Republicans called themselves liberals , closely matched by the 6 percent of Democrats who called
themselves conservatives. Over time, the general tendency has been for the
differences between these party leaderships to increase over a wide range
of issues, including foreign and defense policy, the environment, abortion,
and national economic and welfare programs . 30
Although the parties have become more ideological, they are not necessarily less effective. Party activists hold their principles strongly but also
support their party. There is a "strong commitment to party among all
cadres of contemporary party elites-and certainly little indication of the
loss of party regularity assumed by many political scientists. Judged in this
light, the postreform party system is in robust health ." 3 1 With longer experience, activists are less likely to insist on "standing firm for position even
if it means resigning from the party" and show increasingly strong commitment to the party. The so-called amateurs' " enthusiasm for ideological
purity at the expense of party was apparently short-lived." 32
A similar preference is seen among state-party activists when they must
choose between electoral success and ideological purity. Being human,
partisans like to believe they can have it both ways and that the candidates
closer to their favored program are also preferred by the voters. When
forced to make a choice, however, party activists of all ideological persua-
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sions choose electability over purity. 33 Ideology does not necessarily doom
parties to failure if it is balanced by electoral pragmatism.
Ideological incentives do cause problems. Persons recruited into a political party for ideological reasons are apt to be unrepresentative, either of
the voters in general or even of the party's own mass base. Particularly in
contemporary parties of the Left, an ideological emphasis is more likely to
result in domination of the party by middle-class intellectuals than by manual workers. 34 Furthermore, this emphasis may harm the party by restricting the maneuverability of party leaders in choosing optimal policy
positions in their search for votes. 35
At the same time, ideological incentives offer some advantages for a
party, even in a limited utilitarian sense. They provide, at the least, a basis
for attracting members. " A party must have a principle; for though it may
live without a principle for years, it loses its usefulness , and finds its
enlisted men, little by little, deserting." Ideology is therefore an important
element in the quest for electoral victory, making a party without principles
"unfortunate, not vicious." 36 Furthermore, ideological incentives have
particular merits. Because ideology is collective, not individual, party leaders do not necessarily disappoint some members when they reward others,
as they inevitably do with divisible rewards. Because ideology is intangible, it is economically cheap and may not even need to be achieved to be
effective. A promise of a job must be redeemed; the promise of a better
society can be reiterated regularly and still inspire the members ' devotion.
Although American parties are certainly not ideological communities ,
these incentives are becoming increasingly important to them. A significant
transformation in contemporary political parties is evidenced in a greater
emphasis on public goods, as ideology becomes a more common incentive
for party activity. Parties still provide material rewards , but these are no
longer commonly those of patronage or office. Rather, material rewards
are given to those outside the parties , such as financial contributors, or to
those technical experts who provide services inside the party organization.
Policy causes motivate many of the individual contributors to the parties
as well as some political action committees. Their ideological commitments stimulate the financial contributions that in tum pay for advertising,
polling, campaigning experts, and policy analysts. Some contributors to
the parties, of course, hope to be nominated as a foreign ambassador or to
gain favor for their special legislative interest. A large proportion, however,
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contribute to Democrats or Republicans to advance their notion of the public good, to promote not their own interests but those of unborn fetuses or
the homeless poor.
Ideological incentives are also needed to stimulate person-to-person
campaigning. Neither the material nor the ethnic appeals of the traditional
machine will sustain political parties at the local level. There, the passionate
advocates of religious orthodoxy or nuclear disarmament are more likely to
be knocking on doors than the fabled but absent party precinct captains.
Parties no longer can choose between a professional emphasis on electoral
success and an "amateur" emphasis on ideological purism. Both are
needed today if either is to be achieved.

IDEOLOGY AND DEMOCRACY

The model of a political party as an ideological community is attractive. It
combines such laudable objectives as a devotion to principle, a commitment to others, and a search for the public good. In reading the history of
the Populists, for example, we inveitably feel sympathy for their distressed
constituents and admiration for their efforts toward social justice and broadened participation.
Yet Lenin also intrudes. The ideological party, in its Communist variety,
has achieved not social justice but repression, not equality but a domineering bureaucracy. Beyond the historical connection between Leninist party
doctrine and Leninist authoritarian practice, there also is a possible logical
connection. The very fervor and collective focus of this model may also
induce a disregard for individual interests and liberties.
In the model of an ideological community, the party relies primarily on
intangible and collective incentives. Persons will give their time, energy,
even their lives to the party, not for personal and material gain but in order
to serve the larger cause and to express social solidarity with their party
brothers and sisters. To be sure, such human idealism is real and recurrent,
but it is an uncertain base for continued political action. Leaders must constantly inspire their followers, working against the common tendencies of
self-interest, parochialism, "trade-union consciousness," or simple
fatigue .
An ideological party always faces the possibility that it will lose its zeal,
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that its followers will no longer stand at Armageddon but stray into more
comfortable green pastures. A common response in such organizations is
to develop alternative and more personal incentives. If commitment to the
party program flags, offer the members group discounts on airline fares; if
solidarity with the working class weakens, create workers' recreational
clubs. Such techniques may maintain the level of membership but at the
cost of ideological concern. As Michels unhappily observes: "A bowling
club remains a bowling club even if it assumes the pompous name of 'Sons
of Preedom Bowling Club.' " 37
Other means serve to maintain ideological zeal. One is to limit participation to those who remain true to the faith, a technique well developed
among Communist parties. Power can be closely held by those of proven
orthodoxy, and regular sessions of "criticism and self-criticism" can be
built into the party calendar. Periodic purges, exemplified by Stalin in the
Soviet Union or by Mao Tse-Tung's "cultural revolution," will keep party
members on their toes. To understate the point, these alternatives are dangerous to democracy. As participation is sharply restricted, leadership
grows ever less accessible. A major leader of the Russian Revolution, Leon
Trotsky, foresaw this precise development as he wrestled with Lenin and
Stalin for control of the Communist party: "The organization of the Party
takes the place of the Party itself; the Central Committee takes the place of
the organization; and finally the dictator takes the place of the Central
Committee. " 38
As American experience has shown, ideological causes need not necessarily decay into dictatorships. From the Populists and the Progressives,
to progressive trade unions, to the contemporary blacks' and women's
movements, groups can maintain their commitments to democratic participation. The problem, however, is that the participants may well lose their
ideological commitments and substitute more limited goals . The Populists'
collective goal of social transformation was replaced by the narrow , selfinterested objective of the free coinage of silver; Progressive Theodore
Roosevelt's insistent call for national renewal became a timid plea for
Republican party unity.
The ideological party ultimately may face choices between ideology and
democracy. The party can resolve this dilemma by giving up ideology to
maintain membership, by maintaining purity while membership decays, or
by forcefully insisting that its ideology represents the true interests of a
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populace infected by " false consciousness." The dilemma still remains,
whether resolved by the autocracy practiced by Lenin or the "embourgeoisment" scorned by Michels .
The ideological community faces a second and related problem. Ideological commitment is necessarily based on a faith in the truth of the ideology. The true believer, possessing truth, equates dissent with error and
finds it temperamentally difficult to accept opposition . The ideal of a liberal
democratic community, however, is that discussion should be unrestrained,
that no opinion should be repressed. John Stuart Mill presented the classic
argument:
The peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it
is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation;
those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold
it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of
exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great
a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth , produced by its collision with error. 39
Democracies do not always sustain Mill's tolerant spirit. Elections are
important instruments of majority will but in themselves do not provide
assured attention to the concerns of isolated minorities. Indeed mass elections raise the possibility of majority tyranny, as posed by Tocqueville:
''When an individual or a party is wronged in the United States, to whom
can he apply for redress? If to public opinion, public opinion constitutes
the majority; if to the legislature, it represents the majority, and implicitly
obeys it; if to the executive power, it is appointed by the majority, and serves
as a passive tool in its hands." 40 Even in relatively open societies such as
the United States or Great Britain, most people are not willing to fully
tolerate some groups, regardless of their commitment to abstract principles
of free speech. 41
Accepting dissenting minorities is still more difficult within ideological
communities. The expressive character of these communities induces hostility toward the outsider, not acceptance, for emotional fervor is more easily sustained by attacks on a defined enemy than by devotion to a bill of
rights. That hostility was obvious in Lenin's tirades against his political
opponents , and it can also be seen, usually less virulently, even in American
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third parties. Some Populist support was accompanied by racist hostility
toward blacks, and nativism affected some Progressives.
The character of the ideological community is more likely to be orthodox
than tolerant, but a truly democratic society rejects orthodoxy. In an
extreme form, the model of the political party as an ideological community
becomes a church, expelling dissenters as heretics. As it moderates its
orthodoxy, the ideological party again faces the possibility of a loss of
purpose other than electoral victory.
"What shall it profit a man," the sage asked, "if he shall gain the whole
world and lose his own soul?" Contemporary parties require an ideological
purpose if they are to gain support; they must save their souls if they would
win the world of power. At the same time, the search for salvation by an
ideological community can distort the parties as instruments of electoral
politics. There is no moral profit for parties that save their souls but corrupt
the world of democracy.

FIVE
PASSIONATE INTERESTS:
THE URBAN PARTY MACHINE

Sitting at a shoeshine stand in Manhattan in the early twentieth century, a
self-educated political philosopher offered a fervent defense of American
political parties: " First, this great and glorious country was built up by
political parties; second, parties can't hold together if their workers don't
get offices when they win; third, if the parties go to pieces, the government
they built up must go to pieces; fourth, then there'll be hell to pay."' George
Washington Plunkitt, the shoe-stand philosopher, was a district leader of
Tammany Hall, probably the most notorious of the great urban machines .
His discourses, recorded by a bemused reporter, provide a description of
this variety of American political parties , partly serious and partly tonguein-cheek, partly engaging and partly outrageous, partly accurate and partly
deceiving.

C HA RA CTER A ND FUN CT IO N S OF
THE URB A N MACHINE

Although Plunkitt praised the machine, others condemned it, particularly
for the corruption inevitably associated with it. Indeed, research literature
on the subject is commonly found in library catalogs under the heading,
"Politics-Corruption." Moral condemnation frequently led to political
reform movements, which passed through a discouraging life cycle of
indignant victory, civic reform , and early defeat by the resuscitated supporters of the spoils system.
This regular revival of the machine suggests that its strength cannot be
attributed simply to blatant corruption or to electoral fraud. After all , when
out of power, the machine had access neither to the city treasury nor to the
unstuffed ballot boxes. Nevertheless, machine rule has frequently dominated political life in American cities , particularly in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries . The longevity and the widespread success of
party machines require explanation , not simple disdain.
To understand the machines, we must first acknowledge that their development was not an accident but an adaptation to the conditions of American
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cities. When machines were in their prime, cities were burgeoning in population, providing great opportunities for economic enterprise, and attracting millions of immigrants and migrants from the hinterland; but adequate
governmental means to cope with the consequent enormous political and
economic strains were lacking. 2
The machine's dominance was not inevitable-central governmental
planning was one possible alternative. Yet if not inevitable, in a period in
which the dominant liberal ideology restricted governmental activism, the
machine was an available, convenient, and workable system. Even a severe
critic recognized this virtue of the machine and its leaders:
The depredations committed by the boss are made up for, to a certain
extent, by a better, more responsible administration .... State legislatures, which vote laws, at the bidding of the boss , to swell the
resources of patronage, also vote good laws-laws of public utility .
. . . Thus, the boss acts as a disciplining force; he exerts it on the
whole political community for good as well as for evil. 3
In its own terms, the machine was interested only in power, jobs, and
profit. To accomplish these manifest goals , however, using the terms of
social science, the machine performed vital "latent functions," unintentionally meeting essential societal needs. 4 Cutting through the red tape created by overlapping governmental jurisdictions and multiple checks and
balances, the machine fostered the building of urban infrastructure, manufacturing, and commerce. Those doing business with the city- utilities,
construction companies, suppliers-considered payments to the machines
as part of their costs, which were recovered in profitable contracts. For a
special category of business, the machine provided a different kind of help;
in an age of official puritanism, it protected services that were illegal but
still desired, such as liquor, gambling, and prostitution.
The machine also accomplished social as well as economic functions. It
achieved the political socialization of new arrivals, making them citizens
and voters. It created electoral coalitions among diverse and contentious
groups. It softened the harshness of capitalist development by providing a
modicum of social welfare for the poor. It provided an alternative mechanism of social mobility for those skilled in the arts of politics, particularly
for low-status ethnic groups. In promoting these ends, the spoilsmen forged
a rough union of mass democracy and urban growth, doing so inadvertently
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and often without good intentions. The financial costs were great and ultimately would be paid by the poor, in the coin of limited and inefficient
governmental services, high costs, and regressive taxation.
Nevertheless, the work of government did get done: Subways were built
to carry the urban work force between new jobs and modest tenements,
even as construction costs were inflated by corruption and high profits;
children were provided at least minimal literacy, and neighborhood crime
was kept in check, even if schoolteachers and policemen were appointed
on the basis of personal friendships instead of merit.

THE MACHINE AS A PARTY ORGANIZATION

The machine constitutes a distinctive form of political party but shares some
characteristics with other models. Concentrating on gaining benefits for its
activists, it has an elite focus; in this respect, it resembles a party bureaucracy. The machine's benefits are essentially discrete individual advantages
for the party's workers, most notably the patronage of public office, making
the party goals coalitional rather than collective. Based on this criterion,
the machine is like a team of office seekers.
Yet machines are different from bureaucracies or office-seeking teams,
the critical distinction being in their mode of activity. They are expressive
and emotion-laden organizations, not coldly rational power seekers.
Machines arouse loyalties and antipathies, a distinctive characteristic, even
as they pursue their coalitional goals and develop their elite organizational
structures.
The common view of machines regards them as hierarchical organizations, bent on private gain, emphasizing instrumental activities. They are
typically portrayed simply as earlier and more colorful versions of contemporary campaign consultants. This view is only partially correct. Although
the machine did stress coalitional goals, its internal organization was less
cohesive than is generally assumed, and its operational mode is more appropriately seen as expressive rather than as instrumental.
The word "machine" itself suggests a highly disciplined and centralized
organization. The descriptive literature identifies these organizations with
their imperial "bosses," the legendary names of Tweed, Pendergast, Ruef,
Hague, Curley, and Daley. 5 ln Philadelphia, identified by Lincoln Steffens
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as "a very perfect machine," the hierarchy stretched across all formal governmental barriers:
Matthew S. Quay ... is the proprietor of Pennsylvania and the real
rulerof Philadelphia, just as William Penn, the Great Proprietor, was .
. . . The organization that rules Philadelphia is ... not a mere municipal machine, but a city, State, and national organization. The people
of Philadelphia are Republicans in a Republican city in a Republican
state in a Republican nation, and they are bound ring on ring on ring .
. . . All these bear down upon Philadelphia to keep it in control of
Quay's boss and his little ring. This is the ideal of party organization,
and, possibly, is the end toward which our democratic republic is
tending. 6
On closer examination, however, these parties seem less hierarchical
than suggested by the images of machines and bosses. Their histories are
replete with internal conflicts, intrigue, and palace coups. The machine
was intensely personal and local, with loyalties tied to individuals, not to
the common organization. Rather than a modem bureaucracy, it more
closely resembled opportunistic feudalism. Each ward chieftain had his
band of followers. The leader of the party held power not by command but
by dint of his ability to maintain alliances among these barons. As the
fortunes of political war changed, these bands would shift their allegiances
as faithlessly as the dukes in Shakespeare's histories. Although some bosses
did maintain their power for considerable periods, all of them knew the
truth of the playwright's warning, " Uneasy lies the head that wears the
crown." Their unease was even greater when they depended on material
rewards for their power. In such machines, once these prizes were lost, the
boss also lost the source of his authority.
Explanations of the machines' success typically emphasize these material rewards. Even Plunkitt finds such incentives essential to these parties,
including patronage jobs and the "honest graft" that politicians gained
from inside information. The same emphasis is evident in more academic
writings, for example, in the fundamental work of Banfield and Wilson,
who unqualifiedly define a machine as "a party organization that depends
crucially upon inducements that are both specific and material . ... A
political machine is a business organization in a particular field of business-getting votes and winning elections." 7
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Illustrations of this emphasis on material incentives, on the instrumental
party mode, abound in the rich vocabulary of American politics. We can
read about the machine's "boodle," the exploits of the "gas house gang,"
the reformers' denunciation of party "tyranny." Machine leaders are universally described as inevitably materialistic and despotic. "As with every
autocrat, absolute power makes him lose his head sooner or later; he
becomes willful, arrogant, and tyrannical; he exceeds all bounds in the
effrontery with which he and his men use the public resources for their own
benefit. " 8 But this emphasis is not fully appropriate. Machines certainly
have employed material appeals, but this alone cannot explain their strength
and longevity. Empirical research leads to a reconsideration of their mode
of operation.
Plunkitt was convinced that "when parties can't get offices they'll bust.
They ain't far from the bustin' point now, with all this civil service business
keepin' most of the good things from them." His reformist adversaries agreed,
although they did not share his further concern, that civil service reform led to
the death of patriotism:
How are you goin' to keep up patriotism if this thing goes on? You
can't do it. Let me tell you that patriotism has been dying out fast for
the last twenty years. Before then when a party won, its workers got
everything in sight. .. . The boys and men don't get excited any more
when they see a United States flag or hear "The Star-Spangled Banner.'' And why should they? What is there in it for them ? 9

In assessing the importance of material incentives, however, it is significant
that machines were able to resist the alleged damage of civil service reform.
Notable leaders of Tammany itself, such as Richard Crocker and Charles
Murphy, came to power after, not before, civil service reform, as did the
great Chicago organizations of Nash, Kelly, and Daley and smaller
machines elsewhere.
The survival of machines, despite civil service reform, can be partially
explained by the parties' ability to manipulate and to limit the scope of the
reform legislation. In Chicago, for example, "temporary" jobs were
exempted from merit systems, and a large proportion of municipal jobs
were then classified as temporary, even when held by the same individuals
for decades. The ability of the machines to use these stratagems, however,
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suggests that they had deeper sources of strength than the jobs on the public
payroll. 10
Consider then the simple numbers involved. Even in their heyday,
machines did not provide public jobs for all their members. Gosnell and his
students did the most thorough investigations, examining Chicago, reputedly the strongest of these party organizations. Even in this most
"advanced" specimen of the species, patronage positions were not available for about one-half of the ward leaders, the elite officers of the party,
or for more than one-third of the precinct leaders, its street-level troops. 11
Fewer direct material rewards could be expected in organizations weaker
than the Chicago leviathan, yet machines still dominated urban politics. In
all cities, rather than having unlimited rewards to distribute, "party bosses
had to husband scarce resources. The demands of ethnic groups and the
working class for jobs and services nearly always exceeded the machine's
available supply." 12
Even though limited in supply, patronage conceivably could strengthen
machines if the scarce resource were employed to advance their goals
through internal party discipline. In legend, we hear of the allocation of
appointments and promotions through a political merit system, as workers
competed to carry their precincts, were repaid with low-level jobs, and then
advanced on the public-payroll ladder as they achieved more victories for
the party. The party then would indeed be a business, using corporatemanagement standards of job efficiency-measured by electoral, not
bureaucratic performance-and matching rewards-the spoils of patronage-to this performance.
In fact, complex social systems, including corporate businesses, do not
fit the model of a pure goal-oriented organization. 13 Maintaining social
relationships among the members of the organization often becomes more
important than its manifest external goals . Personal considerations can displace the impersonal standards of achievement. Traditional practices are
maintained long after they have become irrelevant to the original task, and
the organization itself may be perpetuated even after it has accomplished
its intended mission. These realities are evident to anyone who has seen
co-workers "covering" for a well-liked but ineffective colleague or wondered why the military still maintained horse cavalry after tanks were
invented. The same "inefficiencies" have been found in empirical studies
of party machines' use of material rewards.
Even in the original allocation of jobs, the standards used do not fit a
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model of efficient politics. With the causes of political success themselves
unclear, the reasons for the division of spoils among the winners cannot be
closely compared to the relative achievements of the would-be winners.
Instead, personal and ethnic criteria, unrelated to electoral results, are
applied. 14 Another material reward , the provision of public services among
constituents, also has been found to be unconnected to political effort.
Bringing in the votes, even in the vaunted Chicago machine, apparently
has little relationship to bringing home the bacon of fire protection, parks,
and similar amenities . 15
Once hired, patronage appointees are often politically inactive; indeed,
they may drop any political activity in order to protect themselves from the
retribution of future winners . Jobs do not stimulate work for the party, then,
but actually become a disincentive. 16 Furthermore, advancement and retention do not necessarily depend on political performance back in the precincts. And even in the most mundane patronage appointments, some
standards related to the appointive position must be taken into account.
Illustratively, a former " reform" leader of Tarnrnany Hall recounts his
successful insistence that persons appointed as "hole inspectors ," supervising utility work in the city streets, at least be able to see. 17
Morale among the patronage workers also must be considered . They are
likely to view themselves as entitled to their positions because of their original effort for the party. Disciplining these people when their political activity lessens may cause discontent and disruption among the employees, with
the result that the patronage system becomes slack. 18
Rather than being dependent on material rewards, the political machine
should be understood as relying substantially, although not exclusively, on
affective appeals. This reliance is evident even beneath Plunkitt's cynical
veneer, when he applauds the "magnificent men" of the " grand Tammany
organization" or praises the "heroism" of party workers at a Fourth of July
ceremony: "five thousand men sittin' in the hottest place on earth for four long
hours, with parched lips and gnawin' stomachs, and knowin' all the time that
the delights of the oasis in the desert were only two flights downstairs.' ' 19

MACHINE S A ND VOTER S

Materialism cannot explain the internal operation of the machine; still less
can it explain its broad electoral popularity, which allowed it to survive

PASS ION ATE INTERESTS

77

periodic defeats, fissures, and reforms. Even if patronage had been sufficient to satisfy the competing claims of all the precinct activists, certainly
no public payroll could have sustained the poor and immigrant populations
that repeatedly returned machines to office, even without benefit of ballot
fraud.
To be sure, there were some material rewards available to loyal voterssometimes a job with the gas company if not with the police, or a lowered
tax assessment, or the proverbial turkey at Thanksgiving and basket of coal
at Christmas. In later periods, machines even turned "reform" to their
advantage, finding new jobs for their activists in the regulatory state established with the civil service and new benefits for their constituents in the
welfare state created by the New Deal. 20
Yet even in these extended forms, the machine's material rewards for most
of its constituents were usually quite small. It denigrates the poor to believe
that they could be bought so cheaply. The true appeal of the machine was not
the paltry handouts it provided but the hand it extended. Its strength was best
stated by Martin Lomasny of Boston, speaking to Lincoln Steffens: "I think .
. . that there's got to be in every ward somebody that any bloke can come tono matter what he's done-and get help. Help you understand; none of your
law and your justice, but help." 21
The work of the machine was that of good neighbors, concerned with
the lives and deaths of their friends. Plunkitt again is illustrative, responding to the plight of a family burned out of its home:
I don't refer them to the Charity Organization Society, which would
investigate their case in a month or two and decide they were worthy
of help about the time they are dead from starvation. I just get quarters
for them, buy clothes for them if their clothes were burned up, and
fix them up till they get things runnin' again.
That work was not morally pure, for there was always an explicit or implied
contract in which help was extended in exchange for votes. "It's philanthropy," Plunkitt admits, "but it's politics too-mighty good politics. Who
can tell how many votes one of these fires bring me? The poor are the most
grateful people in the world, and let me tell you, they have more friends in
their neighborhoods than the rich have in theirs. " 22 Yet even this contractual relationship carried a certain dignity, for in the contract, the machine
politician did not give the voter charity. He made an exchange between two
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persons, each with resources, the politician providing the favor, the voter
providing the ballot.
A particular affective appeal of the machine was ethnicity. It is almost
impossible to describe this kind of party organization without adding an
adjective such as "Irish" or "Italian" or, recently, "black." But ethnicity
is an appeal to the emotions, not to rational calculation; the rewards it provides are not those of material goods but those of social solidarity.
These were the rewards, reaching across ethnic barriers, that Henry
Jones Ford saw in the "surprising amount of intimacy and association
between people of different nationalities.'' He painted a somewhat patronizing, perhaps racist, scene of the assimilationist effects of political
patronage:
In the district headquarters of a party organization, one may perchance see an Irish ward captain patting on the back some Italian ward
worker who can barely speak intelligible English, but whose pride
and zeal in the success of his efforts to bring his compatriots "in line
with the party" are blazoned upon his face. American politics seems
able to digest and assimilate any race of the Aryan stock, but it fails
with the negro race. 23
In its electoral efforts, the machine consciously used ethnic appeals.
Sometimes these appeals promoted social integration, as in the creation of
"balanced tickets," including candidates of different ethnic groups. At
other times, the machine would play on and exacerbate group differences.
Grievances from the Old World, such as those of the English and the Irish,
were fought again in the mobilization of Irish immigrants against New
England yankees. New World conflicts were added: Irish against Italians
(each group, in urban legend, believing the other had the "o" at the wrong
end of their names), and later, whites against blacks.
The importance of these appeals has also been shown by empirical examination of the voting support-ethnic, not economic-of the urban machines.
There is very little correlation between class position and support of machine
candidates in local elections during the period of machine dominance, but there
is a high relationship between ethnicity and the machine vote. 24
Ethnicity defined the boundaries of the urban electorate. Contrary to the
prevailing ideology of a homogenized America, the machine went "beyond
the melting pot," recognizing the emerging reality of a more diverse
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nation. 25 Its activists literally spoke the languages of the immigrant populations and participated in the critical events of their life cycles-births,
weddings, and funerals-becoming identified not only with individual voters but with their communities. "By their substantive and symbolic activities," even to the present, machine politicians "persuade the voters that
they are concerned about the local community and that they are acting to
advance its interests .' ' 26
In attacking the machine, reformers could make a good and rational case
regarding its corruption and even its social inequities, but they rarely could
overcome these emotional ties. As a result, most reform administrations
would be turned out of office after a single term . The notable exceptionssuch as Fiorello LaGuardia in New York and Brand Whitlock in Toledowere reformers who themselves adopted similar ethnic appeals. 27
Ironically, these same strong affective appeals of ethnicity undermined
the machines. As immigrant groups succeeded each other in America's
cities, most machines could not adapt to their changing constituencies. The
Irish machines that had once fostered quick naturalization and political
mobilization of immigrants came to depend on a limited electorate of their
kindred and to resist the assimilation of newer immigrants from the more
distant parts of Europe or from the American South. While keeping a firm
grip on the major proportion of offices and patronage for themselves, Irish
machine leaders attempted to hold off the new groups by providing smaller
spoils and symbolic rewards. "In the short run, the Irish monopoly of power
preserved the machine. In the long run, the failure to share power with
later-arriving ethnic groups eroded the organization's electoral base. " 28
A rational organization, of course, would circulate its leadership to
appeal to the new ethnic groups, but it happened only rarely. Irish politicians were not succeeded by Italian politicians; they were defeated as the
Italians in tum have been defeated by the blacks. 29 The solidary claims of
ethnicity proved stronger to the machine than the instrumentalist claims of
electoral rationality.

THE MACHINE'S VISION

The goals of the machine were different from its mode of appeal. Its objectives were essentially materialist and individualist, combined for political
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purposes into a coalitional program. Analyses of the machine correctly
emphasize these materialistic goals; they err in seeing the goals as also
being the source of its deeper, more affective appeal.
Broad social programs were simply outside the understanding of the
machine politician. "The political structure is not based upon people in
general," William Whyte explained. "The politician has obligations to
particular people, and he maintains his organization by discharging acertain number of these obligations.'' He might provide recreational facilities,
for example, but this social amenity would only be a by-product of distinct
individualist objectives, such as the graft to be skimmed from the construction of a park or a favor to individual constituents. In a crowded Boston
neighborhood, for instance, a protective fence was not placed around a
baseball diamond until an identifiable group of voters made the local leader
aware of the direct political benefits. 30
Individual needs were not aggregated to the social level. The machine
would provide immediate, even generous, help to the family that suffered
a tenement fire or to the widow whose breadwinner was killed in a factory
accident. Y~t it rarely had the vision to prevent these disasters by sponsoring
legislation to require fire-resistant construction or safer factories . Indeed,
such legislation would not clearly benefit the machine because there would
then be fewer victimized families and widows and therefore fewer grateful
voters .
More generally, the maladies of urban life in the period of the machines
were class problems, common disabilities of the poor. The machine, however, found it difficult to conceive of society as composed of social classes
or to mobilize voters along class lines. One part of the difficulty stemmed
from its unspoken capitalist alliances, solidified with payoffs and deals. As
Steffens stressed, machines depended on at least the sufferance, and usually the active support, of the businessman:
He does not neglect, he is busy with politics, oh very busy and very
businesslike. I found him buying boodlers in St. Louis, defending grafters in Minneapolis, originating corruption in Pittsburg, deploring
reformers in Chicago, and beating good government with corruption
funds in New York. 3 1
Sharing individualist, acquisitive goals, the machine and the local robber
barons were natural allies .
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Beyond simple corruption, the machine showed only a limited ability to
articulate the common interests of its constituent groups. The most obvious
feature of the machine coalition was its foundation in ethnic groups, but
this characteristic could be divisive. Beneath this surface competition were
the common needs of the urban working class, as Bridges has shown, and
the machine potentially constituted a class response to capitalist development. 32 Yet if the purpose of politics was seen as winning the spoils for the
Irish over the Italians, any synthesizing vision of expanding jobs for both
segments of the working class was impossible.
This limited view made the machines antagonistic toward class-based
organizations and also vulnerable in competition with them. Machines
directly attacked working-class parties, sometimes violently, and offered
few economic, rather than ethnic, appeals in their campaigns. Labor unions
were seen as rivals, not as potential allies, and were often targets of machine
repression , most notably by Frank Hague in Jersey City. Even as prominent
a politician as New York's Al Smith would find himself repudiated by his
machine colleagues when he adopted a broader class perspective.
Ultimately, the limited vision of the machine and its consequent vulnerability became evident as it declined with the onset of the New Deal and
the development of the welfare state. Decline came, in one sense, from
simple market competition. The demand for welfare became overwhelming with the collapse of the economy and the social deprivations of the
Great Depression. As a local, " retail" supplier of relief, the machine could
not compete with the federal government's ' ' wholesale'' supply of housing,
jobs, and income subsidies. In some cities, such as New York, the federal
government deliberately used its control of the "welfare market" to weaken
the machine.
This competition, however, is not a complete explanation of the
machine's decline. In some areas, the machine was able to form an alliance
with the new federal agencies, becoming, as it were, the local distributor
of the national government's wholesale resources. In Chicago, this literally
became the precinct captains' role, when they personally delivered welfare
checks. 33 Thus the Chicago machine attempted to put new money into old
wallets, to transform a collective benefit into particularized, individual benefits. Adjusting to the new governmental competition, however, required more
than convenient alliances. It demanded that the machine abandon its core
strengths and find appeals broader than those of friendship, neighborhood, and
ethnic group. In effect, its survival required that it commit suicide.
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The long-term weakening of the machine was a subtle process, resulting
from the substitution of class for ethnic relationships and of objective standards for personal ones. 34 Federal aid was given to poor people as a category
and to those who met stated criteria. Old-age pensions, for example, were
established through the social security system for all the elderly, not just
the Irish widows befriended by the precinct captain. If direct governmental
aid no longer carried with it the captain's warmth of human concern, it also
no longer carried with it the burden of political obligation .
To be sure, political intervention could still be helpful, particularly in
prodding the bureaucracy. In the role of advocate or ombudsman, however,
the machine politician had less power of his own. A cycle of impotence
ensued: The bureaucracy became more autonomous and more efficient; the
machine politician lost influence within government; voters had less reason
to seek his help; and the power of bureaucracy grew further. The machine's
passing was marked, but with little notice of the irony, when modem urban
administrations established "little city halls" to provide residents with
neighborhood help in dealing with the government. The bureaucracy not
only had defeated the machine; it had replaced it with its own imitation.
In its stress on coalitional goals, the machine carried the seeds of its own
destruction. As it replaced the earlier elites, it also lost their communitarian
or "mutualist" view of politics and instead saw voters as individuals or as
members of small and distinct groups, competing in a "militant" politics. 35
It could not envision them as members of a social collective, such as the
poor or the working class . When other agencies could meet these individualist goals better, the machine had no broader or more inspiring ideals.
Similarly, it saw businessmen only as profiteers. When business abandoned
declining urban enterprises, it could not join with them to enrich the city
rather than the corporation .
The problems of the machine were ultimately problems of internal contradictions in its practice and in its thought: an elite focus versus a mass
base; individualistic, coalitional goals versus social, collective needs; ethnic particularism versus class needs. The same problems still limit the possibility of a revival of the urban machine.
In contemporary American politics, machines are treated like animals in
a museum: rare, preserved for scholarly examination, but possibly capable
of resurrection. If there is to be a revival of urban machines, it will surely
be based on black and other minorities, the growing population groups in
the nation's cities. Blacks have come to power in virtually every major city,

PASSIONATE INTERESTS

83

even where they were not a majority of the population, such as in Los
Angeles and New York.
Machine parties might be expected in these cities, for the needs that the
machines once met are again evident among the nonwhite population. Opportunities for economic profit are available, business still wants favorable treatment, the poor and disadvantaged require social welfare, patronage jobs can
provide a living, personal consideration is always in short supply. The newer
urbanites have taken the places of the old, with similar needs and with even
more reason to respond to the affective appeals of ethnicity.
Other requisites for the machine's success, however, are less evident.
Fewer resouces are available to any putative machjne. Civil service, the
growth of employees' uruons, judicial restraints, and bureaucratic insulation make fewer jobs available. Economic wealth has shifted away from
the cities so that businesses must be persuaded to invest in cities rather than
strong-armed into political contributions. As government has become
larger and more technical, parties have lost many of their functions to
professional experts, such as social workers, and have been restricted by
bureaucratic procedures, such as closed bidding on construction contracts .
New machines, even if feasible , still face the old internal contradictions.
Providing patronage jobs for blacks or Hispanics may correct a historic
injustice, but it does not constitute a program of social improvement. Ethnic
mobilization of "people of color" does not solve the problems of the poor
who are white any more than mobilization of the Irish solved the problems
of the poor who were Italian, Jewish, and Negro. Machine protection of
drug dealers in minority ghettos helps their residents as little as earlier
protection of bootleggers helped white tenement dwellers.
Broad programs of urban redevelopment still require collective action
and extensive popular support, not a simple redistribution of limited benefits to active but myopic precinct captains . Effective black machines will
not only have to be as efficient as their white predecessors; they will also
need to be smarter.

MAC HINE S AND THE DEMOCRATIC FUTURE

The machine form of party organization paralleled a particular kind of
democracy, evidencing coalitional goals, an autonomous leadership, and
extensive participation. The machine made some contributions to democ-
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racy, but it was an incomplete democracy. Coalitional goals limited the
possibility of collective action and the emergence of programs to deal with
common problems of the poor or the working class, or, today, of the racially
disadvantaged. Contemporary cities cannot serve their populations by individual relief but require concerted programs toward some vision of the
common good.
The machine's failure ultimately resulted from the absence of such philosophic vision. It saw voters essentially as acquisitive individuals; it could not
consider them in the more abstract role of citizen. The patriotism Plunkitt
praised was not truly a commitment to the nation and to its common good but
only to the private advantages that might be gained. Thus Plunkitt could not
even understand, much less answer, John Kennedy's famous challenge, "Ask
not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country."
Participation under the machine was widespread, but for most voters, it was
still limited to a periodic endorsement of its ethnic leaders. Although the
machine offered opportunities for entry and advancement to lower-status
groups, it did so only for a few people. Even for these party workers, their
extensive activity was not only morally dubious , it was politically corrosive.
In these respects, contemporary urban politics shows little improvement.
The greatest defect of the machine was not its corruption; it was most
deficient in its training in citizenship. The machine did teach the rudimentary means of democratic politics, bringing its constituents to the polls,
"assisting" them in casting a ballot, helping them to organize. It also
aroused the emotional loyalties that democratic participation requires. But
it was inherently unable to teach the broader meaning of citizenship, the
involvement of self in a larger social enterprise.
In the cities of the machine, public life became no more than a bigger
and better-endowed arena for private satisfaction. These urban areas contrasted starkly with an earlier city, classical Athens . There, Pericles
boasted , " Each individual is interested not only in his own affairs but in the
affairs of the state as well"; there, he could realistically urge his audience
"that you should fix your eyes every day on the greatness of Athens as she
really is, and should fall in love with her." 36 Without this love beyond the
self, the machines inevitably perished. Without it, whatever the leadership,
democracy itself cannot long survive.

SIX
INTERESTS AND PASSIONS: PARTY AS
RATIONAL TEAM AND PERSONAL FACTION

By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves
of any action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to
augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question. . . .
When matters of such importance as pain and pleasure are at stake, ... who is
there who does not calculate? Men calculate, some with less exactness, indeed,
some with more: but all men calculate.
-Jeremy Bentham 1
Thus politicians in our model never seek office as a means of carrying out
particular policies; their only goal is to reap the rewards of holding office per se.
They treat policies purely as a means to the attainment of their private ends,
which they can reach only by being elected.
- Anthony Downs 2

All political parties seek power, and all democratic parties seek to win elections. The model of parties as rational teams of office seekers is notable for
its particular stress on the winning of elections; it seeks to explain party
behavior with this single premise. Among the models examined in this
book, it posits a particularly close relationship between the patty and the
mass electorate. Both groups are assumed to have a similar motivation, the
advancement of their particular interests.
The concept of party as a rational team is a principal model of American
politics. It provides insight into party functioning while stimulating
research. At the same time, as a deductive model, it cannot be expected to
explain all American political realities. Its purpose is to establish a small
number of abstract assumptions and hypotheses that can then be used to
better explain the more complicated empirical world. Furthermore, a
deductive model should not be viewed as a moral statement. The assumption of self-interest of the office-seeking model is not a normative endorsement of self-interested behavior; it is meant to be only an explanation of
how politics operates. The model, however, does raise difficult questions
about the nature and purpose of democracy.
The political party of the rational team model has certain distinctive
characteristics. Its focus is the mass electorate, whose preferences deter-

86

CH A PTER SIX

mine the actions of an accessible elite; this ma<;s focus distinguishes the
team model from that of a bureaucratic organization. Considerations of the
internal character of the party are largely disregarded. In his theory, Downs
sets aside any consideration of the internal interactions of party activists by
positing that they tacitly "agree on all their goals."
The party team, furthermore, has no independent ideology, in contrast
to a governing caucus or an ideological community, since its purpose is
simply the winning of office. In its emphasis on coalitional goals, it resembles the urban machine; it is distinct, however, in that the machine's expressive mode is different from this model's instrumental mode.

THE CONCEPT OF A PA RT Y TEAM

The basic premises of this model are found in the political theory of utilitarianism, as developed by such nineteenth-century British writers as Jeremy Bentham. Essentially, the utilitarian theory sees humans as seeking
individual satisfactions: "Nature has placed mankind under the governance
of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point
out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do." 3 Bentham argues that rational individuals , in considering any action, calculate
four aspects of the pleasures and pains of each alternative: intensity, duration, certainty, and remoteness. When the calculations are completed, a
rational individual will choose that course of action which provides him
with the highest net gain in intense, long-lasting, certain, and immediate
pleasure. Government, in determining public policy, Bentham urges,
should employ similar calculations while adding one other consideration,
the number of persons who would be pleased or pained by any action. It
would then choose those policies that produce "the greatest happiness of
the greatest number." 4
Anthony Downs, in originating the model of political parties as rational
teams of office seekers, applies utilitarian theory to political parties. To
develop his model, Downs begins by assuming a perfectly informed voter.
Under these admittedly unrealistic conditions,
Each citizen casts his vote for the party he believes will provide him
with more benefits than any other. ... Since one of the competing
parties is already in power, its performance in [the current time] period
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gives him the best possible idea of what it will do in the future ....
As a result, the most important part of a voter's decision is the size of
his current party differential, i.e., the difference between the [benefits] he actually received in [the current] period and the one he would
have received if the opposition had been in power. 5
These voter calculations, as we shall discuss more fully in chapter 7, are
affected by such factors as events, candidates, party loyalty, and particular
policy issues. Our present interest is in the political parties, which have
their own goal, winning office. To achieve this goal, and assuming they
have full knowledge of the political situation, parties engage in another
calculation of voters' pleasures and pains:
Because the government in our model wishes to maximize political
support, it carries out those acts of spending which gain the most votes
by means of those acts of financing which lose the fewest votes ....
Under these radically oversimplified conditions, the government subjects each decision to a hypothetical poll and always chooses the alternative which the majority of voters prefer. 6
A principal characteristic of this model of party is its responsiveness to
the electorate. The party team is defined as a unified group who "act solely
in order to attain the income, prestige, and power which come from being
in office. " 7 ln the real world , as Downs recognizes, there are other motives.
In their search for power, parties also take on certain principles , but they
acquire principles almost accidentally, as necessary means to the end of
electoral victory. In these parties, "leaders are anxiously scanning the horizon hoping for a breeze to fill their sails." Voters gain influence in this
system because the winning party, "organized to get office and to manage
government, absorbs popular principles and fights valiantly for their
realization." 8
The parties operate in a political market, trying to win "customers," just
as corporations do in selling their goods. In the simplified situation of complete information, the parties will just follow majority will on all issues ,
and their policies will be quite similar; however, this situation is neither true
nor interesting . In the real world , both voters and parties have uncertain
and incomplete information: Voters cannot gain enough information to cast
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a fully rational vote, and parties cannot always know the voters'
preferences.
Recognizing the voters' uncertainties, the parties employ various strategies. They will stress party loyalty empty of policy content, hoping to
make gains on the basis of "brand name loyalty." They will appeal to
"passionate minorities," those who hold a minority view on a particular
issue of public policy but cast their vote only on this single issue. They will
give special attention to vocal interest groups that claim to speak for significant numbers of voters. Parties will also be responsive to financial contributors, who can provide the resources to reach and convince uncertain
voters . Another strategy is to cloud the party's position in a vague ideology
to attract voters of all varieties. "Ambiguity thus increases the number of
voters to whom a party may appeal. This fact encourages parties in a twoparty system to be as equivocal as possible about their stands on each controversial issue. " 9
These strategies, born of the inevitability of uncertainty, have two paradoxical results. First, they stimulate differences in the policy positions of
the parties, a prerequisite of democratic choice among alternatives.
Because the parties cannot be sure of the voters ' true preferences, they will
take risks , accepting the claims of opinion minorities and of interest groups.
They may win power in this way, but it is logically possible that this process
could result in a government that represents the minority opinion on each
particular issue. How then can this government claim the democratic legitimacy of majority rule?
The second paradox results from inherent tension between the interests
of the parties and those of the voters. The parties' interest often is in avoiding commitment on policy issues in order to win votes. They can do so by
creating ambiguity on issues, using vague ideologies, or relying on appeals
of personality. The voters' interest is in clear policy alternatives so that they
can increase their benefits from government. Thus the political parties, the
apparent instruments of democratic opinion , can actually frustrate the will
of the democratic electorate.
Schlesinger has extended the Downsian model. Although sharing
Downs's emphasis on the party as an office-seeking organization, he elaborates on the organizational characteristics of this form of political party.
Schlesinger compares parties to other organizations, particularly to corporations and government bureaucracies. Parties do share a market orientation
with corporations (although their market is political rather than economic),
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but they are distinctive in two other dimensions. Parties deal with public
rather than with private goods. In this respect, they are different from corporations but akin to bureaucracies. Parties also provide only indirect compensation for most of their members (such as the joy of victory or preferred
public policies) rather than direct payments (such as salaries). In this
respect they are different from both corporations and bureaucracies. 10
As comprehensive explanations, the models of party as rational team
developed by Downs and Schlesinger provide great insight into the characteristics of American parties. They enable us to understand changes in
the parties that are occurring as the result of shifts in partisan competition,
political incentives, and the character of party identification. Yet these
models present problems, both in their internal coherence and in their implications for democratic theory.

THE RATIONAL PARTY IN THE
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENT

A traditional description of American political parties depicts them as
"loose, supple, interest-directed, principle-shunning, coalition-forming ,"
characterized by "the decentralization of authority in the organization of
these parties in the country at large" and evidencing an "absence of effective discipline in the organization of these parties within the government." 11 Though accepting the description, critics have also denounced
American parties for precisely these characteristics.
The model of the rational party team informs us that these characteristics
do not result from perverse choices of willful party leaders. Rather, given
the particular institutional frameworks of American politics, these traits are
the logical results of the parties' search for power, that is, of their basic
nature. The absence of commitment to ideological principle follows from
the first axiom of the model that defines the party as a seeker after office.
Similarly, the interest coalitions embraced within the party can be understood as the result of party efforts to assemble a winning majority in conditions of uncertainty.
Decentralization, Schattschneider writes, "constitutes the most important single fact concerning the American parties. He who knows this
fact, and knows nothing else, knows more about American parties than he
who knows everything except this fact." 12 The traditionally decentralized
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nature of American parties results from the characteristics of their political
"market.'' For the sake of simplicity, Downs posits a single national political official who makes all policy decisions. In the American system, the
reality is that many offices will be the objects of political ambition.
Parties in the United States are necessarily incohesive. They seek to elect
not only a president but thousands of officials: municipal council members,
state legislators and governors, members of Congress-not to mention
county and school boards, judges, and state administrators. Not only are
there many offices but, crucially, they are politically independent of one
another in important respects. They are elected on different calendars, at
different times, from different constituencies. Each of these positions can
constitute an "office nucleus" for party competition. 13
Furthermore, the constitutional system designedly creates clashing
interests between those who hold power in different offices. Politicians
cannot be trusted, we presume; to keep them under control, they should be
made to fight one another. They are elected separately, holding their power
for fixed terms, and therefore are free to fight, uninhibited by any immediate threat of losing office. "Checks and balances" is the polite language
for this incitement to conflict. The Constitution embodies "this policy of
supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives ...
where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such
a manner as that each may be a check on the other-that the private interest
of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights." 14
In these conditions, if parties are to be considered as teams, they are of
a distinct variety. They are different from a model football squad, with
each player fulfilling a specific assignment, following the orders of the
quarterback or the coach, with points awarded only for collective effort.
They sometimes resemble baseball teams, where individuals can achieve
recognition and considerable rewards, but championship play requires
cooperative effort. Increasingly, American parties are more like swimming
clubs, where members typically compete as individuals and only occasionally in relays, where each competitor swims her own race, and where the
team's points are simply the arithmetic sum of these individual
accomplishments.
Decentralization is the rational party team's response to American conditions. It allows politicians to pursue their presumed self-interest in winning office while adjusting to the local conditions of the political market.
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Strategies can be altered to promote victory for a particular office in a particular area, for example, by recruiting Mormon candidates in Utah or by
emphasizing mass-media campaigning in the enormous California
constituency.
Personal style will also vary, not randomly, but in ways that meet political needs. Given their perceptions of different constituencies, "Congressman A seeks out person-to-person relationships, but does not encourage
issue-oriented meetings, Congressman D seeks out issue-oriented meetings, but does not encourage person-to-person relationships .... Representatives C and E both claim that handshaking is the best way to win votes.
Yet Congressman C struggles to meet 'the folks' one on one, whereas Congressman E often chooses presentational techniques that avoid face-to-face
relationships with other~:· i s
Beyond campaign techniques, decentralization allows and encourages
diversity in policy positions rather than the united positions assumed by
Downs. As Turner put it in the distant 1950s, "Only a Democrat who
rejects a part of the Fair Deal can carry Kansas, and only a Republican who
moderates the Republican platform can carry Massachusetts." 16
Each individual politician acts as utilitarian theory posits, seeking electoral victory. Consistent with the theory, that goal dominates any possible
concern for achieving an overall party program. In Congress, the basic rule
followed by representatives is "vote your district.'' Consequently, party
unity in government must be constructed from the individual ambitions of
officeholders. Sometimes, such ambition promotes loyalty to party, locally
reinforced by ideological activists voting in party primaries; at other times,
local and party loyalties clash. Legislators do in fact usually vote the same
way as their fellow partisans, but they do so only after they are convinced
that their votes are either unimportant to voters in their own districts or in
keeping with local opinion. 17
Emphasis on individual candidates is another characteristic of American
politics fostered by decentralization. Although this feature is slighted in
Downs's policy-oriented model, it is not inconsistent. Since basically the
model is one of individual behavior, the actions of individual candidates
are explicable on these same premises .
Candidates, according to utilitarian theory, will always follow those
political rules that increase their chances of winning office. Their strategies
will depend on how they can maximize their opportunities within the struc-
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tures of politics and on their expectations of voter behavior. To win votes,
a candidate minimally requires nomination, money, and campaign
organization.
In earlier American politics, these prerequisites were supplied largely
through the formal party organization. Nominations, even for president,
were made at party conclaves through negotiation among the organization's
leaders. Money was supplied by donations to and expenditures by the party
organization. Campaigning was conducted by party loyalists emphasizing
local, interpersonal contacts. Candidates sought their own goals by learning
a simple genealogy. "An effective political party needs five things: offices,
jobs, money, workers, and votes. Offices beget jobs and money; jobs and
money beget workers; workers beget votes; and votes beget offices." 18
Contemporary opportunities are essentially independent of party structures. Nominations are largely made by direct primaries, allowing candidates unmediated access to the voters. This legal heritage of the Progressive
period is probably the most important single factor in the weakening of
party control over nominations, but its effect is not inevitable, for parties
have sometimes been able to dominate primaries. 19
The full effect of the primaries comes from parallel changes in voters'
attitudes, their lessened loyalty to party leaders, and their increased receptivity to the candidates' characteristics other than their records of party
service. New means of communication with voters, particularly television
and other mass media, allow candidates to emphasize these different
characteristics.
Essential to any candidate's strategy is money, and some trends in American politics have increased this need. Campaigning through the mass
media is more expensive than campaigning by personal contact, as "capital-intensive" politics replaces "labor-intensive" politics. Moreover, the
financial costs of campaigning are more overt. When politics was conducted through parties, some of the costs were hidden, as patronage
appointees were in effect paid from the public treasury for their campaign
work or as special interests bribed legislators. Today, campaign services
must be paid for in hard and reported currency, and bribes are probably less
common.
Money to pay the greater and more direct costs of campaigning also
follows a different route, going directly to candidates rather than through
parties. The new financial path facilitates the independence of office seekers from their putative party "teammates." The true impact of political
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action committees (PACs) has been in their reinforcement of this independence. Although PACs also contribute to the political parties, both the law
and these committees' interest in gaining influence encourage direct contributions to the candidates . In a reinforcing cycle of partisan incohesion,
office begets power independent of the party, power begets money, money
begets votes, and votes beget more independent power.
This trend is commonly referred to as ''candidate-centered'' campaigning, but the label is somewhat misleading. Democratic elections are frequently focused on the traits and qualities of individual candidates, whether
they seek the distinctive office of a president or lead a party seeking a
parliamentary majority. Even in periods of greater party dominance in the
United States, campaigns still centered on the qualities of an "Old Hickory" Jackson or an "Honest Abe" Lincoln. Campaign biographies illustrate this emphasis on individual personalities. 20 The more novel aspect of
modem campaigning is that the candidates' organizations are more central
to the actual work of politics, such as raising the money and developing the
messages sent to voters.
The changing structure of the candidates' opportunities depends on and affects-corresponding changes in voter behavior. Candidates place
less emphasis on their party label and party service because voters are less
responsive to partisanship as a cue in making their electoral decisions. In
the nineteenth century, party loyalty was very strong, and a candidate's
party label was virtually all a voter asked about before casting his ballot.
This was the time, to Jensen , of " military" political parties:
The parties were army-like organizations, tightly knit, disciplined,
united. All the voters, save for a few stragglers and mercenaries,
belonged to one or the other army, and the challenge of the campaign
was the mobilization of the full party strength at the polls on election
day. To heighten the morale of the troops, the generals employed
brass-band parades, with banners, badges, torches and uniforms.
Chanting sloganized battle cries, waving placards and flags, the rank
and file marched for hours before smiling, waving politicians, who
invariably thought the men would appreciate a two-hour speech . 2 1
Contemporary political parties draw less loyalty, even less interest, and
that same lack of passion is evident in actual behavior. Voters defect from
their traditional party, split tickets, producing inconsistent results in any
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given election, and change their party vote from one election to another,
causing great volatility in the vote.
Other cues have taken the place of partisanship. As early as the end of
the nineteenth century, a new "merchandising" style of politics emerged.
Moving closer to the behavior expected in the rational team model, "the
platforms and slogans of the parties became less of an army-style device to
encourage morale and more of an intellectual appeal to the needs and wants
of the voters supplemented by direct, tangible benefits like pensions." 22
Contemporary campaigning carries this trend forward to the end of the
twentieth century, with the particularistic appeals to voters now made by
individual candidates. Instead of partisanship, candidates will emphasize
personal traits. Especially important in contemporary politics is the cue of
incumbency. In Congress, members have become virtually tenured, with
less turnover than in the hereditary House of Lords in Great Britain or in
the erstwhile "totalitarian" Soviet Politburo of the 1980s.
Reelection of incumbents affects party organization, since secure legislators have less reason to cooperate with other members of the party team.
Legislators reinforce their positions by providing discrete benefits to voters,
such as services for individual constituents or legislation for favored contributors. 23 The crucial advantage held by incumbents, particularly in the
House, is in the information that voters have. The electorate usually knows
something about current officeholders but not as much about challengers.
In a world of limited interest and uncertain knowledge about politics,
incumbency provides sufficient information to direct the voting decision. 24
The impact of incumbency illustrates how the party as an office-seeking
team is affected by the direction and strength of partisanship. When partisanship is high, the parties will be only imperfect competitors. Each party
is assured of a certain proportion of votes and need compete only for the
remainder. Futhermore, if one party is dominant among committed voters,
there is no true competition; it is assured of victory, and its opposition faces
certain defeat.
The srrength of party commitment is another dimension of partisanship,
different from its direction of pro-Democratic or pro-Republican. Lesser
commitment, along with increased interparty competition, will affect the
organization and campaign style of the parties. When commitment to party
is high, the party need pay little attention to persuading voters; only the
reinforcement and turnout efforts of "military" parties are necessary.
When commitment lessens, the proportion of self-declared Independents
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or weak partisans will grow. Parties then must work harder for votes and
will therefore increase their persuasive or "merchandising" efforts.
Other effects are likely within the party organization. One possibility is that
the parties divide, as vulnerable office seekers look for protective cover, avoid
controversial policy stands, and neglect larger interests of their party or their
governmental institution. In fostering their own interests, members of Congress, for example, "tend their own constituency relations and even attack
Congress from time to time to reenforce their customized political support at
home." 25 As politicians search for shifting majorities among the electorate,
they may find it more difficult to hold their party team together.
Some countervailing trends occur, with increased competition bringing
party teammates closer. Legislators show more cooperation in campaigning
and display greater cohesion in roll-call voting, and leaders have a fuller role
in both policy-making and electioneering. As office seekers face stronger
opposition, they also need more friends . "Candidates need all the help they
can get; they are finding that the best place to get it is from their fellow partisans." 26 Fuller cooperation does not make the party leaders an integrated team,
however; they are closer allies but not yet true mates.
THE PA RTY AS PERSO NAL FACTION

The American political party has become less like a team and more like a
collection of personal coalitions. These candidate organizations are generally instrumental in character and can be described simply as small-scale
rational teams. In fewer cases, candidate coalitions begin to resemble a
different party model, that of the personal faction, where passions displace
interests. In that model, candidates are not only atthe centerofa campaign ,
they also exemplify the expressive mode. Some contemporary candidates,
Jesse Jackson for example, do arouse such passionate backing.
The hallmark of the personal faction is its emotional loyalty to its leader.
The leader expresses some policy orientations, but these are not the crucial
elements of his (almost always masculine) appeal, which is based more on his
personal characteristics, the way in which the leader appears to embody the
hopes, and more often the fears and resentments, of the followers. In the true
meaning of the word, the leaderof a personal faction has "charisma," the "gift
of grace," which legitimizes his power and his program. 27 Because of this
personal legitimacy, the leader can change a program without endangering his
power. The more extreme examples of personal factions are the totalitarian
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party movements developed by such figures as Hitler, Mussolini, and the successive Perons. In these parties, "leadership" itself becomes the principle, the
basis for expressive and submissive participation.
Although these parties present collective programs, they are little more
than nationalistic slogans, such as Mussolini's call for an Italian "place in
the sun" or Hitler's genocidal war against the Jews. The real program is
personal power, built on compensations to diverse groups in a shifting coalition, such as Hitler's rewards of construction contracts to industrialists,
employment for the working class, weapons for the military, and psychological solace for defeat in World War I. 28
Personal factions also exist in democracies, indeed can be found
within almost any large democratic political party. Because politics inevitably involves passions as well as interests, organizations will sometimes center on the magnetic candidate or party leader, with lesser
concern for instrumental rewards. The loyalists who gather around the
Kennedy family within the Democratic party or those who followed
Barry Goldwater or Ronald Reagan in the political wilderness expressed
their love of a person more than their commitment to a program. Such
devotion is appealing but politically deficient, as can be seen in comparing the personal faction to party as a rational team. Loyalty, like love,
can be blind and can lead the devout to electoral defeat. Chicago machine
Democrats revealed the problem when they fervently chanted Richard
Daley's praises, even as his machine decayed from within. Kennedy
loyalists have sometimes seemed to prefer a return to the Camelot of the
1960s over Democratic party victory.
The personal faction limits the opportunity for democratic control.
Devotion may allow the leader so much discretion that the electorate has
no meaningful influence over public policy. Even more inevitably, a party
faction lacks continuity. An office-seeking team inherently must assume
the responsibility for the actions of its party teammates, and this continuity
allows the electorate to employ rational criteria in voting . Personal factions,
in contrast, are only personal and make it difficult for the electorate to hold
their leaders accountable on any long-term basis.
DEMO CRACY A ND T HE RATIONA L PARTY TEAM

The rational party model provides considerable insight into the workings
of parties in democracy, even amid doubts about its empirical validity.
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Inevitably, the model also raises normative issues, as does the related philosophical theory of utilitarianism. These theories are completely individualistic, seeing each voter as an abstract and isolated rational actor.
Bentham wrote, "One man is worth just the same as another man" and
calculated utility by the dictum, "Everybody to count for one, nobody for
more than one." 29 Beyond individuals, there is no general interest. "The
community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual persons who
are considered as constituting as it were its members. The interest of the
community then is, what?-the sum of the interests of the several members
who compose it. " 30
Similarly, the voting calculations hypothesized by Downs are isolated
measurements of individual benefits and costs. This simplifying assumption reflects democratic ideology in one respect, because it presumes complete equality among persons. In fact, however, this premise violates the
reality that people are not isolated individuals but live within social groups
and communities and reflect these social characteristics in their voting as
much as in the other aspects of their lives.
The individualistic premise is also morally dubious, for it seems to
encourage egotism and a lack of concern for our fellow humans. If life
consists only of individual pleasures and pains, we cannot justify a concern for others' pleasures and pains. To avoid this problem, we can
define altruism as a source of individual pleasure and social misery as a
source of individual pain. This philosophical solution, however, is only
a definitional device; if individualism includes everything, it precisely
means nothing.
John Stuart Mill, in his revision of Bentham, attempted to include
altruistic behavior within utilitarian theory. The standard to be applied, Mill
declared, "is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned. As
between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him
to be strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. " 3 1
In his amendment of utilitarianism, however, Mill loses the simplicityor oversimplicity-of Bentham's observational rules, substituting normative standards of behavior. As Warnock points out, "Although it may well
be that Mill's altruistic principle of utility is a good principle to use, there
is nothing to suggest that every one uses it nor that it is the only possible
principle." 32
Downs also recognizes the problem of limiting voters' utility to their narrow
personal interests and attempts to include social perspectives in his model. In
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deciding whether to vote at all, he suggests, a rational citizen may cast a vote
for no other reason than "a sense of social responsibility," which can be
encompassed in the utilitarian calculus as a long-term benefit derived from
"the desire to see democracy work." 33 Futhermore, he concedes, "Men are
not always selfish, even in politics. They frequently do what appears to be
individually irrational because they believe it is socially rational-i.e., it benefits others even though it harms them personally." 34
There are logical problems in this analysis because it broadens the definition
of benefits to include potentially any motivation. Social responsibility can be
invoked as inducing citizens to take the trouble to vote, despite their individualistic interest in limiting their costs in time and acquiring information. This
explanation ultimately becomes no more than a self-verifying truism: People
vote because they find some reason to vote. 35 Once present at the polls, following this logic, citizens can be seen as rational even when they vote against their
individual interests. They might ignore their desires to limit their financial costs
and support redistribution of their personal income to the poor, or they might
even support suicidal wars, voting against their interest in preserving their lives.
More generally, if actions defined by the model as irrational can be made
rational simply by definition, the entire notion of rationality becomes a
tautology.
The problem with utilitarianism is deeper than these questions of definition.
The core purpose of government is to deal with social problems, whether
defined as narrowly as protecting private rights (as in Locke) or as broadly as
achieving the good society (as in Plato). Concentrating on individual pains and
pleasures, however defined, does not necessarily achieve these purposes. For
example, environmental quality or public health eventually does affect all persons. The control of air pollution or the prevention of infectious disease, however, requires governmental actions even though the individual beneficiaries
of these actions cannot be specifically identified.
Democratic government is even more complicated because all citizens are
involved, at least in some minimal fashion, in dealing with these problems. In
casting votes, they are affecting not only their own lives but those of others
and are therefore morally implicated in the fate of others. At its best, democracy makes people more aware of this implication. By stressing distinct and
selfish interests, however, utilitarianism undermines these common interests. 36
A consistent pursuit of utilitarian, individual goals can also harm the rational
party itself. The members of the party team win office on the basis of their
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satisfaction of popular policy demands. Yet if they pursue their individualistic
goals, they will be less likely to cooperate, less successful in solving problems,
and ultimately less likely to win office.
Divisiveness within an office-seeking party is especially likely in a time of
weakened partisanship, such as the contemporary period in American politics.
Ultimately, such divided parties will harm not only their own electoral prospects but their nation. Unsure of votes and of office, with voter revolts a constant threat, they will find it difficult to maintain a steady, consistent course of
governmental policy. Yet democracies particularly require consistent leadership, writes Tocqueville, for "a democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and
work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles." 37 Without steady leadership, democratic opinion may justify Walter Lippmann's mournful description
as "too late with too little, or too long with too much, too pacifist in peace and
too bellicose in war, too neutralist or appeasing in negotiation or too
intransigent.'' 38
These effects would be exaggerated if a rational party focused only on winning office, but fortunately political parties do not care only about success.
That democracies have not fallen apart is to some extent the result of a steadiness and a sensibility in public opinion. 39 It is also the result of the deliberate
actions of party politicians, who have not simply sought victory but who, at
least on occasion, have been concerned with the feelings and fates of their
teammates and with the interests of their nation. These programmatic
emphases have increased within American parties, as party leaders "do not
merely act in their own self interest" but also "take positions because they
believe it is the appropriate decision to make based on their party and group
ties." 40
Without concern for issues as more than strategies, a political party is not
only empty; it is also eventually futile and self-defeating. Leadership is required
as well as gain, and the combination is not impossible. Weber provides this
basic lesson for politicians:
Certainly all historical experience confirms the truth-that man
would not have attained the possible unless time and again he had
reached out for the impossible. But to do that a man must be a leader,
and not only a leader but a hero as well, in a very sober sense of the
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word. And even those who are neither leaders nor heroes must arm
themselves with that steadfastness of heart which can brave even the
crumbling of all hopes ... . Only he who in the face of all this can
say "In spite of all!" has the calling for politics. 41

SEVEN
PARTY CONCEPTS AND VOTING BEHAVIOR

I seen my opportunities and I took them.
- George Washington Plunkitt'
The role of the people is to produce a government . .. [in] free competition
among would-be leaders for the vote of the electorate.
- Joseph Schumpeter2

Diversity marks our analysis of eight different concepts of political parties.
These parties do share one basic similarity, the desire to win elections, to take
their opportunities, to acquire power in the competitive struggle at the ballot
box. Since party victory at the polls requires voter support, the political validity
of these concepts must be tested against the realities of electoral behavior.
Different parties will expect voters to behave in different ways. The
relationships of the party models to four features of voter behavior are
considered in this chapter. The first feature is turnout, the mobilization of
voters; the other three are explanations of voters ' decisions: partisanship,
issue preferences, and candidate characteristics . 3 We will first examine the
expectations of voter behavior implicit in the voter models, using historical
examples of each model in practice, and then compare these expectations
to the empirical realities of contemporary American electoral behavior.

PART IE S AND VOT ERS

Needing voters, parties work to influence their participation and perceptions. Like an army in a military campaign, a party in a political campaign
will be most likely to win if it can choose the terms of combat. It tries to
bring its supporters to the polls, tries to present its candidates as credible
and attractive, tries to get voters to concentrate on its preferred issues , and
tries to get voters to evaluate it favorably-seeing its past record in a good
light and believing its promises for the future.
Much of party campaign strategy is directed toward shaping these voter
perceptions . Illustratively, in the 1988 presidential contest Michael
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Dukakis might well have been elected if he could have focused the voters'
attention on the economic issues of unemployment and the budget deficit,
issues on which he held a decided advantage over George Bush. The
Republican candidate won not because he prevailed in a debate on those
issues but because he successfully focused the campaign on other issues,
specifically on defense, crime, and individual taxation. 4
More generally, parties will emphasize those factors that serve their own
cause. Having been the majority party in voter identification for the past
fifty years, Democrats will stress partisanship in their campaigns. Countering, Republicans will emphasize policy preferences and individual performance . The summary appeals of the candidates in the 1980 television
debate between Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan exemplify Democratic
and Republican arguments:
Carter: I think this debate ... typifies ... the basic historical differences between the Democratic Party and the Republican Party ....
These commitments that the Democratic Party has historically made
to the working families of this nation, have been extremely important.
... So, it is good for the American people to remember that there is
a sharp basic historical difference between Governor Reagan and me
on these crucial issues-also, between the two parties that we
represent.
Reagan: Next Tuesday is Election Day .... I think when you make
that decision, it might be well if you would ask yourself, are you better
off than you were four years ago? Is it easier for you to go and buy
things in the stores than it was four years ago? Is there more or less
unemployment in the country than there was four years ago? Is America as respected throughout the world as it was? Do you feel that our
security is as safe, that we're as strong as we were four years ago? 5

In choosing their strategies, however, parties do not have unlimited discretion. Incumbent candidates will be judged primarily by their performance, not their promises, as nonincumbents will be assessed by the
reverse standards. 6 Candidates may try to draw favorable images of themselves, but their experience in public office and their past positions are
readily available for publicity and possible exploitation by their opposition.
Parties also cannot fully determine the substantive content of election campaigns. Certain issues force themselves into politics regardless of the parties'
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Table 7.1. Party Concepts and Voting Variables
Party Concept
Bureaucracy
Governing caucus
Cause advocate
Ideological community
Social movement
Urban machine
Office-seeking team
Personal faction

Mobilization
Low
Low
High
High
High
Moderate
Moderate
High

Relative Impact Expected of
Party
Issues
High
Moderate
Low
High
Moderate
High
Low
Low

Low
High
High
Moderate
High
Low
High
Moderate

Candidates
Moderate
Low
Moderate
Low
Low
High
Moderate
High

wishes, particularly those based on real-world events, such as economic conditions and war. Current national conditions are always part of the evidence
voters use, so parties must devote considerable attention in their campaigns
and platforms to praising or belittling the record of the incumbents.
Furthermore, campaign strategies are limited by the conceptual frameworks within which parties operate. All parties must give some attention to
each of the four features of mobilization, partisanship, issues, and candidates, but their relative emphases will vary by party type. A social movement must emphasize its vision of the world, even if electorally unpopular,
or risk losing its soul, as happened to the American Populists. In contrast,
a bureaucratic organization that becomes committed to certain issues may
find itself without the tactical flexibility it requires for victory.

VOTING AND PARTY CONCEPTS

The party concepts developed in earlier chapters correspond to expectations
of voter behavior. Particular kinds of parties are most likely to thrive when
the influences on the voters fit the pattern expected in that party model. In
Table 7 .1, I make a rough match between these models and the expected
impact of each of the electoral variables upon voting behavior.
Each party model is matched with a unique ranking of the voting influences.
As abstractions from reality, these influences should be understood in relative,
not absolute, terms. These comparisons can be made, first, of the expected
relative importance of the different voting influences to each hypothetical
party, the horizontal rows of the table. Comparisons can also be made of the
relative importance of the different voting influences among the party con-

I 04

CH A PTE R SEVE N

cepts, the vertical columns of the table. Partisanship, for example, will be taken
into account by all varieties of parties, but it will not be of equal priority to
each. To the ideological community, given its expressive character, the emotional ties to party will be a particularly important appeal. For the ideal rational
office-seeking team, in contrast, the policy inducements offered to utilitarian
voters are relatively more important. The voting patterns implied in each model
can now be briefly developed. Although abstract, they are not imaginary. Each
of the party models, in fact, has been practiced at some time or another in the
course of American elections.
The first model, party as bureaucratic organization, assumes voters have
a high degree of party loyalty. This type of party is structured to exploit the
partisanship of its own membership, but its established routines make it
more difficult for it to mobilize new populations. The bureaucratic party
uses candidate appeals to supplement its efforts, and issues are subordinated to technique. Van Buren showed the strength of a party bureaucracy
in the 1832 presidential election. In his campaign for Jackson, this innovative party leader applied
the arts of management ... on a more extensive scale and on a larger
stage. He formed committees throughout the Union to sweep up
adherents for Jackson and stir the electorate by speaking and writing,
in public meetings and private gatherings, glorifying Jackson, replying to the attacks of his opponents, fiercely assailing Adams' administration by a series of concerted movements. The staff required for
the performance of this task, and a picked one, was ready to handthe "politicians." ... The committees supplied them with the material, popular sentiment offered them a moral base of operations .7
With its emphasis on "measures, not men," to take another model, the
governing caucus gives even less attention to individual candidates. It
hopes for party influence on the vote, but a moderate influence, based on
principles. With its view of the electorate as passive spectators, the governing caucus will not stress mobilization.
An earlier presidential election, that of 1800, is illustrative, conducted
by parties operating literally as governing caucuses . Republicans met in the
national Congress to select Jefferson as their presidential candidate and
Aaron Burr as their vice-presidential choice. Although not called a platform, "a clearly defined party program was formulated and repeatedly
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presented to the electorate." The national party elite also stimulated-and
helped to finance-state and local caucuses and campaign organizations.
A major effort was made to alter the means of choosing presidential electors, to give the Republicans the advantage of legislative selection on a
"winner-take-all" system.
The Republicans, a governing caucus party, successfully contested the
election, only to find its new party discipline so strong that Jefferson and
Burr were tied in electoral votes for president, requiring selection by the
House and ultimately resulting in the Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution. Writing of the contest of 1800, the leading student of the period
concludes, '' more than any Presidential election that had preceded or would
follow for at least a generation, it was a party contest for control of the
national administration and for determining the direction and management
of national policy." 8
Cause advocates differ from the governing caucus in their efforts to take
their programs more directly to the electorate, often because they have been
rebuffed within their own party. Consequently, they emphasize partisanship less and issues more and sometimes link their campaign to a prominent
candidate. Splinter third parties are illustrative, such as the Free Soil candidacy of Van Buren in 1844. Currently, on the state level, the "Right to
Life" party in New York particularly attempts to influence Republican policy on the issue of abortion.
The ideological community and social movement parties are quite different from these first three party models . They are similar to one another
in their efforts to change the political world, mobilizing new voters and
giving little emphasis to individual leaders. Both regard broad policy issues
as important, but the ideological community also stresses firm attachment
to the expressive party.
In the United States, ideological communities have been most evident
among Marxian parties, which have resembled devout churches as much
as electoral organizations. The U.S. Communists , for example, have combined a rhetorical call for mass mobilization with demands for intense devotion from party members . The party's appeal is vividly portrayed by
novelist Richard Wright:
It was not the economics of Communism, nor the great power of trade
unions, nor the excitement of underground politics that claimed me;
my attention was caught by the similarity of the experiences of work-
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ers in other lands, by the possibility of uniting scattered but kindred
peoples into a whole. It seemed to me that here at last, in the realm
of revolutionary expression, Negro experience could find a home, a
functioning value and role. Out of the magazines I read came a passionate call for the experiences of the disinherited, and there were
none of the lame lispings of the missionary in it. It did not say: "Be
like us and we will like you, maybe." It said: "If you possess enough
courage to speak out what you are, you will find that you are not
alone." It urged life to believe in life. 9
The Populists exemplify American social movement parties. As Goodwyn describes their character:
This culture was, in the most fundamental meaning of the word, "ideological": it encouraged individuals to have significant aspirations in
their own lives, it generated a plan of purpose and a method of mass
recruitment, it created its own symbols of politics and democracy in
place of inherited hierarchical symbols, and it armed its participants
against being intimidated by the corporate culture. The vision and
hope embedded in the cooperative crusade held the agrarian ranks
together while these things took place and created the autonomous
political outlook that was Populism. 10
The urban machine is a unique party type. It partially mobilizes the
electorate, directing its attention to likely supporters, and encourages a
strong sense of party loyalty. It cares little about particular issues, but
employs the sense of attachment to particular candidates and leaders.
Plunkitt colorfully describes this personal attachment:
The politicians who make a lastin' success in politics are the men who
are always loyal to their friends, even up to the gate of State prison,
if necessary; men who keep their promises and never lie .... When
the voters elect a man leader, they make a sort of a contract with him.
They say, although it ain't written out: "We've put you here to look
out for our interests .... Be faithful to us, and we'll be faithful to
you." 11
The next party model, the rational team of office seekers, emphasizes
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voting on the basis of issues, with partisanship significant more as an
expression of past issue preferences than in its own right. Particularly conscious of electoral strategy, it may also employ voter mobilization and candidate appeals.
American parties often resemble office-seeking teams. One of many
examples is the Democratic party of 1932, which nominated and elected
Franklin Roosevelt. FDR first established a strong party ticket through an
alliance with Texan John Gamer. His subsequent campaign was a model
of the rational party, assembling its coalition, promising benefits , and
exploiting personal attributes:
From the beginning of the campaign to the end, Roosevelt kept the
initiative, harrying and attacking President Hoover from both the left
and the right. His speeches were relatively brief, interesting and dramatic to millions of radio listeners. Ordinarily each dealt with only a
single subject. Roosevelt engaged in innumerable meetings with politicians .... And there were countless motor cavalcades and whistlestop gatherings where crowds roared their pleasure at seeing a smiling, confident Roosevelt.
The Democratic campaign of 1932 did deal with significant policy
issues, in keeping with the office-seeking model. These issues represented
not a coherent ideology, however, but criticisms of the Hoover record and
vague promises of future benefits. The Roosevelt team won, but
the speeches so often veered either right or left and contained so many
generalities that to contemporaries it would have been hard to have
predicted from them what the New Deal might be. . . . He had
received a strong popular mandate and was to make vigorous use of
it, but just what that use was to be, beyond the assumption by government of larger responsibilities for the economic welfare of the
nation, only the future disclosed. 12
The personal faction, the last party model, depends on the individual
appeal of candidates and attempts to mobilize new voters on their behalf.
Issues are important as they are reflected by these candidates, but party
loyalty is an impediment to their ambitions. In the 1968 presidential election, Alabama governor George Wallace created a new party that consti-
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tuted a personal faction . Wallace embodied the resentments of those voters,
largely working-class whites, who felt displaced by modernistic trends in
the nation, including the civil rights movement, the bureaucratic state, the
growth of the service economy, and moral relativism. Asking votersespecially white southern Democrats-to forsake traditional party loyalists, he attempted to mobilize a new coalition of the powerless and the
discontented. 13 The personal quality of this coalition was demonstrated
when it collapsed after Wallace abandoned the new party, returning to the
Democrats in 1972.

AMERICAN VOTER S

Each party model has been partially evident at some point in American
history, yet none has been fully and permanently achieved. The extensive
empirical literature on American voting behavior delineates this incomplete
realization.
Mobilization of American voters is limited , contrary to the expectations
of most of the party models . Only about half of the adult population can be
certain to vote in a presidential contest, and the proportion is even lower in
congressional, state, and local elections. This turnout at the polls is considerably below that of other democracies, where 75-95 percent of the country
votes (although these statistical comparisons are somewhat misleading).
Furthermore, ballot participation in the United States has decreased in
recent decades. 14
Low turnout in the United States cannot be explained by individual psychological factors alone, such as a lack of knowledge or interest in politics.
Although feelings of alienation and inefficacy do reduce voting, their effect
is actually quite limited; close to a majority of those claiming to be alienated
still vote. 15 The alleged absence of choice between the parties also has no
significant effect, for participation is the same among those who do or do
not see a difference between Republicans and Democrats.
Political rather than psychological explanations are basic. In requiring personal registration, the American electoral system creates a double burden for
voters, unique in the world. Simplification of voting procedures could itself
raise turnout by close to 10 percentage points, according to an authoritative
analysis. Turning the task of registration over to government, as is common in
other democracies, would bring U.S. voting levels close to those of other
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nations. 16 These legal obstacles have been reinforced by partisan trends, partially accounting for the recent decline in voter participation. Weakened party
commitment makes voters less likely to come to the polls, and weakened parties are less likely to bring them. 17 For these reasons, the parties operate i11 an
environment unfavorable to electoral mobilization.
We next tum to the factors that affect the ballot itself, once voters come
to the polls . 18 Partisanship is the first because it is the single most important
influence on voter behavior. Its impact is consistent with the expectations
of most of the party models, which imply either a moderate or even a high
influence. In making their choices, voters have a "standing decision" to
support their own party, a relationship that has remained consistently evident over the years. 19 Simply put, most persons who consider themselves
Democrats will vote for the Democratic candidate for any office, and most
Republicans will vote for the Republican nominee.
This party loyalty sometimes has been seen as the reflection of voters'
family traditions or their demographic characteristics. In this view, children
become Democrats or Republicans much as they usually follow their parents' religion or food tastes . To the limited extent that they act independently, partisanship only mirrors their social class, or religion, or residence ,
so that "a person thinks, politically, as he is socially." 20
In reality, partisanship has a more substantial, and a more political, base.
Although younger generations tend to maintain the partisan traditions of
their parents, the inheritance is considerably attenuated. 21 Particular groups
tend to support one party over another, but there are considerable numbers
of opposing partisans within every social category. For example, although
American union members are more likely to be Democrats than Republicans, the marginal difference is only about 20 percent. 22
Political views reflect voters' social environment but are more than
merely its mirror. Tradition and demography themselves encapsulate political experiences. Since children inherit the social history of their parents, it
is sensible, not irrational, that they also inherit the political "faith of the
fathers" -and mothers. When children face different circumstances or perceive new party characteristics, however, they may well come to hold different loyalties. Note the insightful testimony of a traditional Irish
Democrat, now an ideologically conservative Republican:

In Washington the older Republicans, the ones over forty-five,
looked the way a Hollywood screenwriter would have a Republican
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look: Wadsworth Washington ID, a man of pinstripes, parentage and
pedigree. An older Democrat is a guy named Vito who talks with his
hands and wears a lumpy grey suit-he looks like a walking, talking
toaster-and represents the wards of Newark.
But with the young it was all changing-and the cliches hadn't
caught up! Up on the Hill or at the White House the young roughlooking guy from a state school is probably either a Republican or a
conservative, and the snooty sniffy guy with a Thank You for Not
Smoking sign on his tidy little desk is a Democrat. 23
Partisanship can be understood as a quick cue, readily available to the
voter, a summary of past issue preferences and past loyalties, a means of
simplifying the potentially overwhelming complexities of casting a ballot.
It identifies a person's loyalties to groups and mates, not only to parties.
"Party, for Americans, seems to involve a stable alliance with some people, a shared stance in relation to the state and to the political past. Party,
in this sense, presumes we know who we are with; it does not imply that
we necessarily agree on what/or." 24
Party identification in these terms is not simply an emotional attachment
(although of course it is also that) but a loyalty based on satisfaction with
past results and past associations. This identification is something like the
loyalty people feel to their baseball teams or their spouses-held over a
long period of sickness and health, sometimes violated in a short dalliance.
and subject to permanent change when the original reasons for fidelity
disappear.
Voters may, and do, change their basic loyalties, and usually for reasons
that are clearly political. 25 The Republican party that fought the Civil War
becomes resistant to civil rights, and blacks reverse their traditional partisanship to become the most faithful of Democrats. The Democratic party
that elected John Kennedy as president becomes committed to abortion
rights, and conservative Catholics leave their historical political home.
When a significant number of individuals have changed their loyalties,
gradually or suddenly, the total system has undergone a party
realignment. 26
In contemporary times , party loyalty has become both less extensive and
less intensive, making partisanship a less definitive influence on the vote.
A considerable proportion of the electorate claims to be Independent, identifying with neither of the major parties. Most of these voters do admit to
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"leaning" toward one or the other of the parties, however, and their behavior is similar to that of avowed partisans.
More significant than change in the extent of partisanship is its decreased
intensity. Most Americans continue to identify with the major parties and
vote in accord with their professed identifications. Yet they hold these loyalties lightly-more like that of occasional sports fans than of die-hard
enthusiasts, more like that of persons in trial "relationships" than of committed spouses. Comparing attitudes toward the Republicans and Democrats over recent decades, Wattenberg found that the "major change that
has taken place in the public's evaluations of the parties has been that people
feel neutral rather than negative." In place of former passions, "the electorate just no longer has much to say when asked what they like and dislike
about the two parties. " 27
With voters willing to subordinate, even change, their party loyalty,
partisanship is a real but loose restraint, a tie that still holds but is "frayed,"
not a fast knot. 28 Other factors become more likely to influence the vote,
particularly issue preferences and candidate characteristics. These factors
are gaining in their electoral impact, contrary to the implicit expectations
of most of the party models.
Issues have both direct and indirect effects on the vote. The indirect
effect is their impact on party identification itself, because party loyalties,
and changes in these loyalties, can be traced back to some original basis in
political issues. As Fiorina aptly resolves a scholarly dispute on these different factors, "Controversies about issue voting versus party identification
miss the point: the ' issues' are in party identification." 29 Issues, or voters'
policy preferences, also have a direct influence of their own on election
results. Much of government is obscure to voters, and they often lack the
interest or the information to make considered judgments on detailed programs. Within these limitations, however, voters do have preferences and
use their ballots to express them.
One overall indicator of these direct effects is the voters' evaluation of
the parties' capability in handling " the most important problem facing the
nation." Over 90 percent will vote for the party they consider more capable-a suggestion of the connection between issue preferences and the election results. 30 To be sure, this relationship may reflect only a verbal
rationalization of a preference actually based on partisanship. 3 1 Still , we
can see the effects of issues (and other influences) independent of partisanship. In all recent presidential elections, for example, a majority of those
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Republicans and Democrats dissatisfied with their own party's record
crossed party lines to vote for the opposition. Although such discontent is
not common, a significant proportion of voters disdain the uncomplaining
response , "my party, right or wrong. "
What are issues to voters? They are not the same as ideologies, coherent
worldviews that lead to consistent attitudes on all particular issues.
Although some voters do evidence such coherence or "attitudinal constraint," and the proportion may be increasing, most Americans do not fall
neatly into such philosophical categories as " liberal" and " conservative. "32 Political cognition occurs in a variety of ways. Voters use different
means to sort out their ideas, some systems resembling ideology and others
being less comprehensive. 33
Voters are concerned with particular items, not worldviews; with inflation and unemployment, not with the merits of capitalism; with U.S. policy
toward Russia or Iraq, not with imperialism; with minority employment or
abortion , not with theories of social order. At this level , the electorate has
been shown to be " moved by concern about central and relevant questions
of public policy, of governmental performance, and of executive
personality." 34
These issues not only account for party identification and changes in that
identification. On their own, they have substantial influence, leading to the
conclusion that "voting decisions are largely motivated by evaluations of
where the parties are located on different issues relative to the person's
stated position and to a much lesser extent by party identifications unless
people are indifferent between the parties on the issues." 35
Some of the criteria voters employ are retrospective , evaluations of the
past, such as the record of the party holding control of the White House .
For this reason, as conventional political wisdom has it, elections often tum
on the level of economic prosperity. Other criteria are prospective, preferences about the future course of government. The two kinds of issues,
retrospective and prospective, are analytically separate but combined in
reality. Knowing the actions that parties have taken in the past, such as their
records on economic prosperity and abortion, voters then use that information to judge parties' probabie actions in the future.
These "future expectations count and count very heavily among contemporary American voters. " 36 Voters use a simple rule: They choose
which of the two parties is on their own side of current issues even if they
do not share the same intensity on these issues. 37 An advocate of " right-to-
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choice," for example, will cast her ballot for a like-minded candidate,
whether or not that candidate is more or less passionate on the issue.
Candidates are the third and most obvious type of influence on the vote.
If nothing else, an election always involves a choice among individuals and
always results in some man or woman winning power. Indeed, popular
accounts sometimes present elections as only a horse race, no more than a
contest among candidates.
Voters are rightly concerned with evaluating individual candidates. A
party record, however appealing, is no guarantee that its nominees will
carry on its traditions. Attractive issue positions, to be redeemed, require
competent, honest, and effective officeholders. Given the complexities of
government, the citizenry must entrust its welfare to its leaders, and therefore it must closely examine their trustworthiness. 38
In considering candidates, voters focus primarily on relevant characteristics. Although there is much speculation about the impact of "candidate
images," the voters are not so simpleminded. For the most part, they do
not evaluate candidates on "uninformed idiosyncratic responses based on
superficial criteria," usually vaguely termed "personality." Instead, voters, and the candidates themselves, emphasize "competence, integrity, and
reliability, because they believe these are relevant to the conduct of the
office." 39
Candidates are also evaluated in terms of issues, both their retrospective
performance and their future policy promises, elements that predominate
in candidate evaluations . Three of five voters now judge the candidates on
the basis of their ideology, their positions on individual issues, or the group
benefits they promise. This is a decided change since the 1950s when three
out of four voters evaluated candidates on no more than their party labels
or their individual images. 40

CHANGING VOTERS AND CHANGING PARTIE S

Voters in the United States are affected by all the electoral influences, but
their relative importance is now changing . Mobilization of the citizenry is
limited, already low by international standards and possibly declining even
further. Partisanship has been relatively high, but it is now decreasing in its
independent influence. Historically, the impact of issues was low but has

I 14

CHAPTER SEVE N

grown more significant in recent years. Candidate characteristics, a moderate influence on their own in the past, are corning to have greater weight.
These changes in their total impact constitute a significant transformation of the American electorate, making its behavior less stable and more
affected by the events, issues, and politicians of the day. Although partisanship still influences voting greatly, it is a partisanship more consonant
with voter policy attitudes than in the past and based less on simple tradition. Issue preferences also affect the vote directly and are an important
element in the evaluation of individual candidates. Overall, a decided
increase has occurred in the impact of policy considerations in the vote,
whether expressed as party image, issue preferences, or candidate
evaluations. 41
The American patterns of voting and contemporary changes have important implications for our party concepts. One basic point is that the character
of the American electorate prevents the full realization in practice of any
of the party models. Voting in the United States today evidences low mobilization, moderate partisanship, and high impacts of issues and candidate
characteristics. A glance back to Table 7 .1 shows that this pattern does not
fit any of the party models in all respects .
The comparison also shows that the voting pattern does conform to some
aspect of virtually every party concept, with the exception of the ideological
community model. More specifically, although the fit is not precise, American electoral behavior is particularly consonant with the rather different
models of parties as governing caucuses and as office-seeking teams. 42
These similarities suggest the possible direction of American parties.
Ultimately, these parties may fit a new concept of political parties, which
we may tentatively call "leadership coalitions." These parties would be
centered on and largely directed by the principal public officeholders
elected under the party label. In this respect, they would be similar to the
office-seeking team but less cohesive. These leaders, given their public
responsibilities, will give the parties a clearer policy orientation; they would
thereby resemble the governing caucus but with coalitional rather than collective goals. The emerging parties would also share some characteristics
of the other models, such as the organizational bureaucracy (but with a
mass rather than an elite focus), the social movement (but with coalitional
rather than collective goals), and the personal faction (but employing the
instrumental rather than the expressive mode).
Current developments in American politics provide some tentative evi-
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dence for the emergence of this new kind of party. These include the
increased power of legislative leaders in party fund-raising and campaigning, the impact of incumbency on the vote, and the greater cohesion of
party members in legislative voting. 43 These are indicators of new party
strength but a strength centered on the party's representatives in office, not
on its organizational workers. Visible, with high sensitivity to public opinion and in control of vital electoral resources, they may come to define the
meaning of American political parties . 44
The implications of this development for democratic practice can now
be only speculative. Parties directed by their visible leadership can facilitate
the public's understanding of the choices it faces at the ballot box. Yet such
parties may be only collections of individuals, without policy coherence or
continuing responsibility for governmental programs.
Future American political parties may be a modem form of the Jeffersonian governing caucus, different in its deeper reach within the electorate.
Alternatively, they may be simply the campaigning arms of governmental
place-holders and place-seekers. For democracy, the important and unresolved issue is whether citizens will be more than voters. A competitive
struggle of elites is certainly a form of popular rule. Yet, in itself, it is hardly
a robust exercise of "the consent of the governed ."

EIGHT
THE REFORM OF POLITICAL PARTIES

The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task
of modem legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the
necessary and ordinary operations of the government.
- James Madison'

Taking their cue from Madison, Americans have made the regulation of political parties one of the principal tasks of political legislation. In his theory this
founding father distrusted parties, yet in his practice he organized the first
modem party, the Jeffersonian Republicans. Following Madison, Americans
are loyal to their particular parties but do not like them as institutions.
This contradictory attitude may itself account for the frequent concern
for party reform, which, Ranney suggests, "has always seemed to many a
welcome escape from dilemmas arising from the fundamental ambivalence
that has always characterized the attitudes of most Americans toward political parties and political action." 2 Perhaps because voters do not like parties, the United States has devoted a lot of attention to their reform and even
to their obliteration.
Reform, however, comprises a multitude of programs, improvements,
and sins. Party reformers have favored both greater party control over nominations and leadership selection through direct, popular primaries; increasing financial resources of the parties and limiting their receipts and
expenditures; strong party discipline on policy issues and legislative independence; centralized party authority and control at the local grass roots.
The reform programs have varied because they have been based implicitly on different models of political parties. Seeing parties from distinct
viewpoints, observers have also evaluated them quite differently. When
Edmund Burke, for example, praised political parties, he had in mind the
Whigs of his day, who attempted to become a governing caucus, controlling the British House of Commons to achieve a governmental program. A
century later, American middle-class mugwump reformers would condemn political parties, exemplified by the urban machine. The differing
evaluations followed from the contrasting stances from which Burke and
the mugwumps viewed the parties.
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Table 8. 1. Reform Perspectives of Party Concepts (illustrative m etho d
of selecting president ial no m inees)
Goals of Politics:
Are/Should Be
Collective

Mobilization of Citizens: ls/Should Be
Individualist
Majoritarian

Progressive
Anti- Machine
Cause advocates
(national primary)

Coalitional

Nonpartisanship
Personal faction
(candidate coalition)

Party Government
Governing caucus
Ideological community
Social movement
(membership choice)
Party Efficiency
Party bureaucracy
Office-seeking team
(party convention)

Our discussion of party concepts may illuminate these differences in
reform perspectives. In Table 8.1, these concepts are reclassified along two
dichotomous dimensions, providing four perspectives on party reform.
Both of these dimensions combine descriptions- what politics is said to be
about-with normative statements-what politics ought to be.
The first (horizontal) dimension deals with the mobilization of the citizenry. Politics can be seen as individualist, where decisions are or should
be made by relatively autonomous persons. Alternatively, politics can be
structured toward common action and majoritarian decisions. Generally,
reformers who fear parties and wish to restrict their power emphasize individualism, and those who favor party strengthening emphasize more power
for democratic majorities .
The second (vertical) dimension is the familiar difference between collective and coalitional goals. Individualists may expect that disaggregated individuals can be brought together on behalf of a common public interest or may
simply foresee dispersed coalitions. The difference is also evident among
advocates of stronger political parties. Like Burke and Woodrow Wilson, they
may look to the achievement of a broad program in the public interest, or, in
contrast, they may seek reform only in order to make the parties more effective
in promoting the diverse goals of their coalition members.
The combination of these two dimensions results in four perspectives
on party reform, labeled in the table, and four quite different programs of
specific changes. These different perspectives, illustratively, imply alternative methods for the selection of presidential candidates, as specified in
the parentheses within each cell of the table.

I 18

CHAPTER EIGHT

From the progressive perspective, a party nominee should be chosen by
a national primary open to all voters . Individuals would have direct personal input, leading to a collective national decision. This proposal is
actually favored by most Americans in opinion polls. 3
Another mode of individualist selection, commonly evident today, is
through coalitions assembled to support a popular aspirant. Although these
coalitions formally operate within a party structure, they are akin to nonpartisan groups. "Rather than depending upon alliances with and commitments from state party organizations ... candidates for the Presidency are
increasingly obliged to mount their search for delegates by building their
own personal organizations state by state. " 4
The party government perspective envisages majoritarian action toward the
achievement of collective goals. The party's presidential candidate would be
selected by the membership, meeting in party caucuses or, alternatively,
through a mass plebiscite, as used by the Liberal Democratic party of Great
Britain. A focus on party efficiency implies presidential selection through bargaining among party representatives; this was the traditional method, conducted in "smoke-filled rooms" at the quadrennial party conventions.

PROGRESSIVE REFORM

These perspectives differ in their theoretical bases as well as in their policy
implications. To some individuals, reform has meant limiting, even eliminating, political parties. Such was the thrust of the Progressive movement
in the United States, which led to the most extensive constraints on American political parties.
The general purpose of these reforms was to remove impediments that
allegedly obstructed voter control of government and public policy. Wherever possible, direct democracy was to replace institutions of representation . In place oflegislative bills, citizens would initiate their own laws and
decide on their passage through popular referendums. Officials would be
kept on a short leash , subject to frequent election on a long ballot and to
recall by a dissatisfied electorate.
As the most conspicuous banier between the citizenry and the government,
parties were a particular target of the Progressives. They were subject to
detailed codes of conduct, their finances regulated , their patronage limited
through civil service, and their structure prescribed by law. They were treated
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not as private associations but as "public utilities," to be regulated in the public
interest. 5 Along with the new powers of the initiative, referendum, and recall,
the taming of political parties would allow the general public interest to escape
corruption by special interests and political chicanery.
The most important and enduring Progressive influence on American
political parties has been the direct primary, the selection of party nominees
through public elections open either to all voters or to those who made a
nominal, costless declaration. This Progressive reform was devised as a
reaction to the strong urban machines of the day, a sort of "alternate universe." Its origin is openly acknowledged in the rhetoric of its most prominent political patron, Robert LaFollette:
The direct primary will lower party responsibility. In its stead it establishes individual responsibility. It does lessen allegiance to party and
increase individual independence, both as to the public official and
as to the private citizen. It takes away the power of the party leader
or boss and places the responsibility for control upon the individual. 6
Ostrogorski, the Progressives' intellectual forefather, believed that
enfeebling existing parties would free the individual citizen, and
will allow, and will even compel him to take a less passive part in the
government, to discharge his civic duties in a more conscious way.
. . . The citizen will be enabled and obliged to make up his mind on
each of the great questions that will divide public opinion. By joining
one of the parties which will be formed on this occasion, he will know
exactly what he wants, what is the issue, to what he gives his adhesion, where he is going, and how far he will go. 7
Individual reflection would result , Progressives believed, in the realization of the common interest. In their optimism, they insisted that the true
public interest could be located, under the proper circumstances. With
Madison the theoretician, they argued that "the public good is disregarded
in the conflicts of rival parties" as factions oppose "the permanent and
aggregate interests of the community." 8 Unlike Madison's theory and practice, their solution was not to set multiple factions against each other but to
remove the impediments of parties and special interests. Debating public
principles, right-thinking individuals would then do right.
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The direct primary is the principal institutional cause of the American
parties' incohesion, or in another view, their openness. It is that rare reform
that accomplished its intended aim, the substitution of individualist political
action for that of cohesive party majorities. The institutionalization of primaries has meant that "organizational leaders and activists often can do no
more than exert influence over nominations .... It bolsters individual representation of a kind always encouraged by the electoral separation of legislative and executive branches. Elected officials are expected to respond
to their constituencies and not merely to parties whose labels they carry." 9
The individualist focus of progressivism continues to the present and
forms the theoretical basis of a series of decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court, dealing with another aspect of parties, political patronage. Virtually
outlawing the use of patronage for appointive positions, the Court in 1990
prohibited party tests even in hirings and promotions. Although giving little
attention to parties directly, Justice William Brennan asserted, with scant
evidence, that "political parties are nurtured by other, less intrusive and
equally effective means" and that they "have already survived the substantial decline in patronage employment practices in this century." 10
Speaking for a 5-4 majority, Brennan instead based his decision on the
individualistic First Amendment, which bars the government "from wielding its power to interfere with its employees' freedom to believe and associate, or to not believe and not associate." Rewarding party workers, or
assuring that loyalists staffed government jobs, was found to be insufficient
grounds for patronage, which, according to the Court majority, "decidedly
impairs the elective process by discouraging free political expression by
public employees." 11
In dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia presented a fulsome endorsement of political parties generally and of patronage particularly. He began with the wry
observation that the judicial ban on patronage "will be enforced by a corps of
judges (the members of this Court included) who overwhelmingly owe their
office to its violation. Something must be wrong here," declared Scalia, "and
I suggest it is the Court." 12 More supportive of patronage than most political
scientists, Scalia argued that it protects government from "the demands of
small and cohesive interest groups," stimulates most of "the local political
activity supporting parties," enforces party discipline and furthers party success, promotes the " social and political integration of excluded groups," and
facilitates moderate and effective public policy. Without patronage, parties
might survive, he warned, not as "the forges upon which many of the essential
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compromises of American politics are hammered out" but as no more than
"convenient vehicles for the conducting of national presidential elections." 13
His minority opinion is an articulate, but rare, official defense of parties against
dominant progressive thought.

NON PARTISANSHIP

A second variety of reform, nonpartisanship, is even more hostile to political parties. Progressives usually accept parties as inevitable even if evil,
but nonpartisan advocates seek to eliminate them completely. Agreeing
with progressives that individual decisions should be foremost in politics,
they are less certain that the process will result in a clearly collective policy.
The most common form of nonpartisanship is essentially an abandonment of politics in favor of expert, technical rule, its rhetorical premise
being that " there is no Republican or Democratic way to clean the streets."
Policy questions can be resolved by objective standards and implemented
by expert administrators. These views have been most evident in municipal
government, resulting in nonpartisan elections and the establishment of
city-manager governments in place of elected chief administrators in the
vast majority of local jurisdictions. 14
A similar concept of government as impartial administration underlies
legislation limiting partisan activity by civil servants or prohibiting major
public officials from holding party offices. 15 Such prohibitions actually
violate the logic of Rutan in its emphasis on the individual political freedom of officeholders. Still, nonpartisanship has considerable support
among American voters, with substantial proportions now close to a majority ready to abandon party labels even for state or national elections. 16
The emphasis of nonpartisanship on efficiency disguises but does not
eliminate political conflict. In reality, there can be party differences even
on apparently mundane administrative matters. Whose streets are cleaned,
or whether money is spent on streets or on schools, or who controls the
sanitation department are political questions, not matters of scientific determination. More generally, winners and losers are different under nonpartisanship, which tends-especially when combined with at-large electoral
systems-to favor the interests of those with higher income and social status. 17 In such circumstances, there is a "lessened responsiveness of cities
to the enduring conflicts of political life." 18
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In practice, nonpartisanship substitutes a more personal politics for party
competition. Ford predicts this development in his attack on such reforms,
and his comments, although directed specifically at primaries, are even
more apposite to nonpartisanship. These reforms would certainly transform
politics, he argues, but not in the direction its proponents hoped. Instead,
parties would change, in our terms, from bureaucracies to personal
factions:
The direct primary may take advantage and opportunity from one set
of politicians and confer them upon another set, but politicians there
will always be so long as there is politics. The only thing that is open
to control is the sort of politicians we shall have .... Its pretense of
giving power to the people is a mockery. The reality is that it scrambles power among faction chiefs and their bands, while the people are
despoiled and oppressed .... The practical effect will be to substitute
for existing boss rule a far more corrupt, degraded and imperious sort
of boss rule. 19
The overall effect of nonpartisan reform has been to shift responsibility for
political action from coalitions assembled within parties to individual leaders.
Under nonpartisanship, politics comes to resemble the "bastard feudalism" of
the late Middle Ages, when personal allegiance to a powerful baron became
the road to power, and the party becomes no more than "a political kingdom
to be disputed by private armies owing their allegiance not to some local
machine, but to a nationally puissant family or individual. " 20
The nonpartisan variety of reform has also been evident in legislation on
campaign finance , such as the 1974 federal election law. The basic thrust
of this legislation has been to provide money for individual candidates
rather than for parties. Federal funds subsidize the campaigns of presidential hopefuls and then pay all the expenses of those who capture the Republican and Democratic designations. The expectation, and the reality, is that
most contributions will go to candidates and not to parties, and the parties
themselves are restricted in the support they can give to candidates running
under their banner.
The law does provide some limited support for parties, since the cost of
their national conventions is paid by the government and larger personal
contributions are allowed to parties than to individual candidates. Moreover, the national parties have found loopholes in the law that magnify their
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financial impact. Still, the basic thrust of the finance laws has been to
emphasize personal politics rather than partisan politics . 2 1
This individualist character was underlined by the Supreme Court when
it reviewed the federal election finance laws. 22 Candidates could not be
restricted in spending their own money, nor could interest groups supporting a candidate if they operated "independently." Given the high costs of
politics, the Court declared , "A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign
necessarily reduces the quantity of expression'' and therefore unconstitutionally establishes "substantial ... restraints on the quantity and diversity
of political speech. " 23
Turning from contributions to expenditures, the Court ruled that candidates could not be compelled to limit their spending, even though such
limitations might make an election contest more equal. A ceiling on
expenditures could only be accomplished if voluntarily accepted by a candidate in exchange for federal funds . In contrast, limits on political party
spending were not challenged.
The logical inference from the Court's decision is that corruption is a
selective disease. Parties are so liable to infection that they must be quarantined. Individual candidates, on the other hand, can be immunized . They
can spend freely , or they can be bribed by governmental election funds to
restrict their expenditures , all without risk to the health of the electoral
process. As long as contributions from any one donor are limited, they will
not cause an epidemic of political illness. In the nonpartisan diagnosis,
parties carry disease, but money itself is free of germs.

PARTY GOVERNMENT

The most debated reforms, at least among academics, have been those
directed toward achieving party government. In the United States, the most
prominent of these proposals, dating from 1950, is based on the governing
caucus model, as discussed in chapter 3. 24 Other models share its perspective in seeking to make parties the vehicles of cohesive majorities promoting a common policy program .
To achieve some approximation of party government, its advocates have
urged greater emphasis on policy declarations within the party, tighter party
discipline in Congress , and greater membership involvement. The party
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government model is supported by large proportions of party leaders. Its
advocates include a majority of Republican national convention delegates,
national committee members, and county chairs and about one-third of the
corresponding Democratic groups. 25
Many of the specific changes urged by these advocates have been
achieved in the forty years of American intellectual discussion of the party
government model. The parties show considerable ideological agreement
now among their activists and increased coherence in congressional voting,
and this trend toward greater programmatic unity is mirrored among their
mass voting supporters. The Democratic party for a time also experimented
with midterm conferences, devoted to the elaboration of party programs.
Within Congress, active party caucuses now debate party programs, the
traditional seniority system has been modified, and a modicum of discipline
has been applied to assure loyalty to party programs by committee chairs.
The parties' membership bases also have been broadened. Tens of millions
of individuals now participate in choosing the party's presidential nominee,
millions contribute money, tens of thousands come to open party caucuses.
However, party government does not exist today in the United States.
Major policy innovations do occur but not because one of the parties develops a program, receives popular endorsement for its proposal, and then
enacts its platform. Instead, the nation now has a "kind of government by
ad-hoc coalition that has left many politicians in both parties confused about
when to clash and when to cooperate," resulting in "a muddling of the
traditional distinctions between Democrats and Republicans." 26
The difficulties in achieving party government are partly institutional,
rooted in the Constitution. The separation of powers, federalism, fixed
terms of election, and the ultimate dependence of legislators on constituency approval have always deterred realization of the party government
model. These fundamental limits have been reinforced by what John White
calls "the allure of divided government," the voters' preference for opposing party control of the presidency and the Congress. No longer an aberration, partisan division has become characteristic of American politics. 27
A deeper problem with the party government model is theoretical, for
its advocates have been unclear in their ultimate aims. There is some truth
in the criticism that these advocates have really hoped that the American
system of separated institutions might be replaced by a Westminster, British-style parliamentary system. 28 Some party government advocates have
urged this change, some have championed partial steps toward this goal,
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such as cotenninous tenns for Congress and the president, and some have
expressed "admiration" for British-style government though admitting it
is not feasible in the United States. 29 Without a clear objective, the case for
party government has weakened intellectually.
Furthennore the advocates of party government are uncertain of their
basic concept of party. The classic report of the American Political Science
Association , for example, urged a programmatic emphasis characteristic
of a governing caucus, active local parties reminiscent of an ideological
community, and party centralization more akin to a party bureaucracy. 30
Efforts toward party government are particularly confused in regard to the
roles of the mass membership and of the mass electorate within the party.
The critical arguments among those taking the party government perspective are implicitly based on different theories of representation, best
analyzed by Pitkin. 31 Party leadership has very different meanings, depending on the basis of power within the party. In a theory of "descriptive
representation," leaders are expected to be no more than a mirror of party
members, simply reflecting their descriptive characteristics or their candidate preferences . Such representation is more suitable to the progressive or
the nonpartisan perspectives on party refonn.
In more vigorous modes of representation, leaders will also act on behalf
of party members, either as accountable agents of rank-and-file views or
as trustees authorized to function in their place. These different concepts
of representation are closely related to the different concepts of party and
lead to different proposals for party change.
Seeing the party as a social movement implies descriptive representation , based on the party's mass support. This premise leads to demographic
quotas within party bodies, with power allocated among such groups as
women , racial minorities, or young people in proportion to their numbers
in the electorate. The same premise underlies proportional representation
of candidate preferences in the national conventions.
Seeing the party as an ideological community implies representation as
agency, with leaders obligated to support the distinctive policy program of
the party. This aim can be accomplished best through open party assemblies
that will attract issue enthusiasts. Seeing the party as a governing caucus
implies representation as authorization, pennitting discretion in policy
choices by leaders. This goal leads to enhanced power for those in formal
positions of party and public office.
Recent party reforms have demonstrated these conceptual confusions
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and uncertain aims. In the same documents, reformers have favored both
greater power for the party center and more power for local party caucuses,
both greater control over leadership by party activists and selection of leadership in primaries open to all voters who effortlessly ask for the party's
nominating ballot, both representation within the party for designated
demographic groups and representation on the basis of candidate
preferences. 32
As Ranney recounted the debates in the first Democratic party reform
commission, "We contended that requiring representation of biological
characteristics was at odds with the commission's other objectives of open
access and representation of preferences. The party could provide for a fair
fight or it could provide for a guaranteed result, we said, but it could not
provide for both. " 33 Indeed, the only consistency in these reform programs
has been hostility to state party groups, if not to all regular organizations.
Party government reform is difficult enough to achieve in American conditions; it will be impossible without theoretical clarity and without attention to the parties themselves.

PARTY EFFICIENCY

A fourth group of party reformers seeks to make the parties stronger and
more efficient electoral competitors. Their doctrine could be termed one
of party responsibility, in two senses: The parties should be responsible for
their own internal affairs; given such autonomy, they can be held responsible by the electorate for their conduct of government. These changes
would make parties more akin to our models of the party bureacracy and
the office-seeking team.
Although the terms are often confused, party responsibility reform is
less ambitious than party government reform since it does not insist that the
parties have coherent policy programs or pursue collective goals. The party
is seen as a coalition, often self-interested, but one that can still be an
instrument for popular control through the electorate's judgements on its
past record and future promises. In this perspective, a party's most important contribution is in "establishing accountability to the enduring values
of a democratic society in elites that gain power in systems of mass
persuasion. " 34
Reform toward party efficiency has first taken a route toward deregula-
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tion, or removing legal restrictions on the parties. As we have seen, control
of parties was part of the Progressive movement. This effort was supplemented by court decisions, which upheld legislative restrictions and added
judicial limits on the conduct of party primaries. Recent landmark decisions
by the U.S. Supreme Court have reversed the course of regulation.
Primaries came before the Court in challenges to the exclusion of blacks
from southern Democratic parties during the era of legal segregation. For
some years, the Court concentrated on the connections between party
action and state action. At first, it found racial exclusion from primaries
unconstitutional, because the parties were acting as "the organs of the State
itself, the repositories of official power" and therefore were subject to the
restaints of the Fourteenth Amendment. 35
State laws regulating primaries were then amended to leave participation
in primaries and racial discrimination to the discretion of the parties themselves. The Court briefly accepted this legal maneuver. Recognizing the
party as a private association the Court underlined "the right of the party
to exist, to define its membership, and to adopt such policies as to it shall
seem wise." 36
Soon after, the Court shifted ground. No longer viewing parties as state
agencies, it still found the "white primary" unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment, the guarantee of racial equality in elections. Because
primaries are an intrinsic element in the electoral process, wrote the Court,
they are subject to the constitutional "right to participate in the choice of
elected officials without restriction by any state because of race ." Moreover, a state cannot even pemtit "a private organization to practice racial
discrimjnation in the election. Constitutional rights would be of little value
if they could be thus indirectly denied." 37
As Kester summarizes, these decisions provide " no support for any
loose generalizations that action by a political party is 'state action' ... but
rather [focus] on identifying what is an 'election' in which article I and the
fifteenth amendment confer a federal constitutional right to vote." 38 Ultimately, this series of cases, although preventing racial discrimination in a
public election, left parties considerable freedom in other, nonracial,
respects.
These associational rights of political parties have recently won strong
endorsement from the Court. As the parties changed their nominating procedures in the 1970s, a series of court cases increased their power, even in
opposition to state law. The parties were allowed to set their own convention
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rules, to unseat delegates who had been duly elected under state statutes,
and contrary to state law, to mandate either the selection of delegates in
closed caucuses or to open their primaries to self-declared Independents. 39
The most expansive Court endorsement of party freedom came in 1989
in a successful challenge to California's detailed legislation on political
parties. The Court struck down the state's ban on party endorsement of
candidates in primaries and overturned extensive state regulation that '' limits a political party's discretion in how to organize itself, conduct its affairs,
and select its leaders." These regulations were found to "violate the free
speech and associational rights of political parties and their members guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. " 40
The second aspect of party efficiency reform is to strengthen the parties
directly, a process of party renewal to make them more efficient bureaucracies and more capable office-seeking teams. The national parties have
become well-developed institutions , symbolized by the construction of permanent headquarters in Washington .41 Using their now considerable funds,
the parties also provide extensive services to candidates. In the Democratic
party, the nominating process has been repeatedly "re-reformed" to
increase the role of party leaders and elected officials. 42
Recent amendments to the federal campaign-finance laws are modest
steps in this strengthening process allowing larger contributions to parties
than to candidates, freeing state parties to spend money on behalf of federal
candidates, and increasing the federal subsidy to parties implicit in payment
of the cost of national nominating conventions. The parties have also
increased their financial impact. The national party committees now
receive legally unlimited but controversial "soft money" contributions for
their organizational or noncampaign activities. 4 3 They also act as conduits
for contributions by political action committees, which they "bundle"
together and then forward to favored candidates.
Further steps toward greater party efficiency were suggested by a selfappointed Commission on National Elections, in preparation for the 1988
presidential election. On the premise that election reform "should begin by
seeking to strengthen the role of the political parties, '' the group urged that
parties become more central in the national contest, particularly by taking
over the management of televised debates between the presidential candidates , replacing the previous sponsors, the nonpartisan League of Women
Voters .44
Although the national parties did sponsor one of the two television
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debates in 1988, the action was itself controversial and provided little reason to believe that further steps toward strengthened parties would gain
wide support. Indeed the commission itself, though favorable to stronger
parties, shied away from more thoroughgoing proposals, such as redirecting campaign contributions from candidates to parties, direct subsidies to
the parties, or restrictions on presidential primaries .
The same reluctance is evident in congressional debates on amendment
of campaign-finance statutes. Although there is widespread agreement that
present laws carry the potential for corruption , proposed revisions have
centered on limiting the financial impact of political action committees and
restrictions on "soft money." The emphasis has been on aiding individual
congressional candidates rather than on increasing the parties' role.
Support of the parties would require either major relaxation of the limits
on party contributions or direct public subsidies. Each course has its proponents, but Democrats would probably benefit more from public subsidies
and Republicans from greater party autonomy in campaign finance. The
partisan conflict has led to stalemate, not party renewal.
Such hesitancy illustrates the obstacles challenging even marginal steps
toward party renewal. Timid change, however, will not alter fundamental problems. The current deficiencies of American parties, Reiter convincingly
argues , result from long-term trends and hostilities, originating in Progressive
legislation and the direct primary and then reinforced by irreversible innovations in technology and campaign methods. 45 Recent changes in party rules
and legislation have probably magnified the effects of these more fundamental
causes, as some contend. 46 Other commentators dispute this conclusion,
seeing the parties as recently strengthened through mobilization of new groups
and organizational development. 47
To the extent that party flaccidity is due to deliberate design or to unintended
consequences of rules and legislation, these effects can be reversed by new
party and legislative decisions. Such actions are already under way, as we have
seen in judicial decisions, finance legislation, and modification of national
nominating procedures. The character of American parties, however, ultimately depends on the values Americans apply to politics.
PARTY REFORM AND DEMOCRATIC VA LUE S

Strong or weak parties reflect not so much the nation's view of parties alone
but its more basic attitudes toward politics and government. In reforming
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parties, we must first ask what we expect from government. The answers
will probably lead us to emphasize one or another of the perspectives on
party reform.
In setting reform goals for government, we could make a fundamental
choice for rapid and programmatically coherent action. Reform would then
be viewed from the perspective of party government. Alternatively, we
may prefer consensual action, slower but more consistent over time. In this
case, the individualist programs of the progressive or the nonpartisan perspectives are more appropriate. The party efficiency perspective, depending on circumstances, permits both alternatives.
We must also ask what we expect for ourselves and from others. If we
want to maximize our individual preferences, parties may be a hindrance;
individuals can express their particular ideas better when they are less constrained by the opinions and pressures of others. If the facts of modem life
make self-sufficiency impossible, we may still strive for personal influence
through individual contacts with officials or in the unmediated politics of
direct democracy. These are the goals of reform from the progressive and
nonpartisan perspectives.
These political values may be psychologically satisfying to each individual but at the same time frustrating because little effective action can be
achieved. From the reform perspectives of party government and party
efficiency, the force of majoritarian action can unite individuals into effective combinations. Coalitional or collective goals then replace personal
access to government, as increased power is bought in the coin of individual
preferences. Substituting for the Anti-Federalists' "rough fellowship of the
deliberative community, " these parties "draw us toward public goals even
when interest and ideology pull in opposite directions." 48
These conflicts in values are congenital to Americans, who live under a
Constitution designed to create a government both strong and trammeled.
In the debate on party reform, these same ambivalences are evident. Americans want parties to offer distinctive choices, yet they disdain partisan
conflict. They cherish their individual expression yet seek effective collective action from their partisan officials. They want to divorce government
from politics but demand that parties take a stand and act on the issues.
Americans view parties both ambiguously and ambivalently. Sometimes
they are evaluated and accepted as instruments of democracy but are also
criticized and regulated when they become too efficient in their pursuit of
power. At other times they are expected to be expressive models of internal
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democracy, and then they are disparaged when they fall short of this standard. Especially troublesome is the possible conflict between these goals,
the possibility that parties can be either efficient or democratic but not both.
The nation has been loath to agree with Schattschneider that "democracy
is not to be found in the parties but between the parties." 49
To explore these questions more fully, we must relate parties to more
general democratic theory. As the review of perspectives on party reform
suggests, democratic goals are not necessarily consistent; indeed, they may
be inherently contradictory but still attractive. To understand American
democracy, we will need to join in Whitman's American boast,
Do I contradict myself?
Very well then I contradict myself,
(I am large, I contain multitudes.) 50

NINE
COMMON IMPULSES: POLITICAL PARTIES
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

In politics, as in life, the desired best can be the enemy of the attainable
good. Political parties are not ideal groups, but for democracy they are
" good enough ."
Parties have been shunned by political theorists , even by some advocates
of democracy. They are seen as threats to the overriding needs of the nation
or to vital group interests or as entities capable of undermining the will of
a united populace. Yet parties continue to exist and even occasionally to
earn praise for their necessary role in promoting the practice, if not always
in satisfying the ideals, of democracy.
Parties are defended, and defensible, because they provide an effective
way to balance conflicting philosophical values, to deal with political realities, to close the gap between society 's reach and its grasp. American
parties combine two different strains of democratic political theory, liberal
and communitarian, I argue, and contribute to partial realization of
democratic values. Current trends in American politics underline these contributions, leading to my concluding recommendations for party reconstruction in the United States.

THE UN C ERTA IN Pl_AC E O F PA RT IE S

Opposition to political parties is long-standing. In eighteenth-century England , Henry Bolingbroke attacked the emerging parliamentary caucuses,
arguing against these advocates of special interests, and for the power of a
" patriot king ," who would unselfishly pursue the national good:
Instead of abetting the divisions of his people, he will endeavour to
unite them, and to be himself the centre of their union: instead of
putting himself at the head of one party in order to govern his people,
he will put himself at the head of his people in order to govern, or
more properly to subdue, all parties.'
Despite such opposition , parties did develop, particularly vigorously in
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the United States, but attacks also expanded. By the late nineteenth century,
Ostrogorski expressed a common opinion of reformers that parties, selfishly and inevitably, neglected the common good, for "it is as idle as it is
absurd to entrust, even in part, the custody of the general interest to private
interests . . . . There is no possible condominium in the public sphere." 2
The progressive and nonpartisan perspectives on party reform convey
this hostile tradition. The antiparty attitude continues among contemporary
Americans, who are prone to agree that "our system of government would
work a lot more efficiently if we could get rid of conflicts between the
parties altogether" and that " the parties more often than not create conflicts
where none really exists. " 3
Suspicion of parties comes from three very different sources: statist,
democratist, and liberal. Daadler points to two of these grounds. The first
is a statist tradition in which " the state was widely regarded as an instrument
of a higher moral order. Its sovereignty was to be protected from the
encroachment of special interest." Second is a "democratist" tradition, as
in "Rousseau's desire to safeguard the direct expression of popular will
from representation and interference" by partial associations. 4
The statist tradition opposes not only competitive political parties but
democracy itself. Pursuing the ideal public good, statists disdain the
"petty" interests incorporated within parties. To achieve the public good
requires the wisdom and vision of leaders with special, inculcated traits
rather than persons who will follow the inherently limited wishes of a mass
populace. To achieve justice, Plato's goal, a king must also be a philosopher, instructed over decades, who works reluctantly to achieve the public's
needs while disregarding its mistaken wants.
In a less benevolent form , statism is also expressed by totalitarian leaders. Using their monopolistic political party to arouse popular feeling, they
disdain the competition between parties as evidence of bourgeois decadence. In Mussolini's words, " Fascism conceives of the State as an absolute, in comparison with which all individuals or groups are relative, only
to be conceived of in their relation to the State." 5 Instead of election through
parties, the popular will is expressed by the leader, such as Hitler, who
personally embodies the will of the nation, or by the party, as in a Leninist
government.
The democratist tradition also sees parties as deficient, but for a different
reason . The statist critics believe parties allow too much popular control
over government; the extreme democrats see parties as too restrictive of the
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citizenry. Only direct rule by the people, and their personal involvement in
all principal decisions, is legitimate. Progressive devices such as the referendum and initiative are modem manifestations of this belief. The theoretical foundation is best expressed by Rousseau: "Sovereignty, being
nothing less than the exercise of the general will, can never be alienated
and ... the Sovereign, who is no less than a collective being, cannot be
represented except by himself." 6
Legitimate democratic government to Rousseau is literally self-government, best demonstrated in cities and small states . Without such direct
participation government is illegitimate, for "every law that the people has
not ratified in person is null and void-is, in fact , not a law." Parties are
also illegitimate, for they usurp the people's inalienable power; therefore,
"The people of England regards itself as free: but it is grossly mistaken: it
is free only during the election of members of parliament." 7
A third source of opposition flows from a liberal tradition, which sees
strong parties as threats to vital social interests. Madison, though admitting
that factions were inevitable in a free society, still complained that "the
public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties, and that measures
are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of
the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing
majority." 8 Madison developed his quintessential American political theory to control and enfeeble factions and parties, the dangerous expressions
of political power.
In the spirit of Madison, even the most successful American politicians,
the presidents, have been embarrassed by parties and prone to wish them
gone. George Washington set the tone in his Farewell Address, denouncing
the "baneful effects of the Spirit of Party, " which "make the public administration the mirror of the ill-concerted and incongruous projects of faction ,
rather than the organ of consistent and wholesome plans digested by common councils, and modified by mutual interests. " 9
Presidential inaugural addresses, perhaps the most important civic ritual
of the United States, maintain Washington's antipartisanship. Fresh from a
partisan triumph, the new chief executive will proclaim with John Kennedy
that "we observe today not a victory of party, but a celebration of freedom"
or with George Bush declare, "The American people await action. They
didn' t send us here to bicker. They ask us to rise above the merely partisan." 10 Only Woodrow Wilson drew the obvious connection between his
party and his new power as president.
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In their actions as well as in their speeches, presidents have disdained
parties. Jefferson, the first elected partisan, worked "to obliterate the traces
of party and consolidate the nation." Franklin Roosevelt, the triumphant
leader of a new Democratic majority, made overtures to his 1940 Republican opponent to form a new movement. Dwight Eisenhower speculated
on the possibility of consolidating Republicans and Democrats into a common moderate party. 11
Defenders of political parties, fewer in number, are often apologetic.
Bryce did not praise parties but found them acceptable means to manage
and pacify the newly enfranchised democratic masses. The justification for
parties is that voters tend to be "so indifferent, or so ignorant, that it is
necessary to rouse them, to drill them, to bring them up to vote." Still, he
worried, party activity "carries the community still further from the democratic ideal .... If it is impossible to arrest the development of party
organizations, what can be done to check their incidental evils?" 12
Similarly, Ford found parties necessary because the "mass of the people
will quite properly hold that they have more important things to attend to
than electioneering. They will leave that to those to whom it offers
rewards." Politics was properly left to specialists, who were given responsibility and then held accountable. 13 lnterestingly, Ostrogorski drew a similar connection between the deficiencies of voters and the strength of
parties, which "raised political indifferentism to the level of a virtue. " 14

POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRATIC PRACTICE

The role of parties in democracy appears to be only grudgingly conceded.
If voters would simply fit the prescriptions of the "democratic ideal," parties could be discarded. They are humanity's punishment for preferring the
apples of personal interests to the Eden of benevolent leadership in a harmonious community. To appreciate parties more positively, we need to
examine the differing concepts of democracy.
We have considered three dimensions of democratic theory: autonomous
or accessible leadership, collective or coalitional voter goals, and limited
or extensive participation. Each of these dimensions must be examined
when constructing democracy, yet each carries a dilemma. Autonomy
allows leadership to pursue a vision of the public good, but that leadership
may sacrifice its populace to its vision. Keeping leaders accessible limits
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that danger but introduces the opposite problem, that leaders may be so
subject to public opinion that they neglect long-term problems for immediate popularity. In such a case, officials "do not develop the will to lead,
nor a firm sense of responsibility for leadership." 15
Democratic politics attempts to reconcile the needs of any society for
effective government with a distinctive objective, popular determination
of the leaders and policies of government. To some political thinkers, the
two goals have seemed inherently incompatible. Choosing leaders by popular ballot was akin to asking a blind man to select colors, said George
Mason. 16 Asking the common herd to select policy was as foolish, Plato
believed, as asking rude sailors rather than expert pilots to steer a ship safely
through a stormy sea. But without popular control , leaders may steer their
ship onto an inhospitable beach that they regard as the site of a personal
utopia. As Mill warns, "Rulers and ruling classes are under a necessity of
considering the interests of those who have the suffrage; but of those who
are excluded, it is in their option whether they will do so or not." 17
Another dilemma concerns the goals of voters . Some goals in politics
are truly collective-clean air, for example-and an effective democracy
must go beyond the particular interests involved in pure coalitional politics.
Individuals, however, are more prone to consider their individual goals and
those of their coalition partners and to leave others to worry about collective
goods . 18 Furthermore, even the most evident collective goals cannot be
achieved without costs to some people more than to others . A society that
neglects these individual interests in pursuit of collective goods will harm
some people-displaced workers in polluting industries, for example.
Although highly valued in democracy, participation also presents problems. To arouse extensive participation, emotions must be enlisted, but
these emotions may be turned toward intolerance and violence. Even when
these dangers are avoided, an emphasis on participation faces the enduring
problem that because of the multiple demands on citizens , many of which
are more pressing than politics, participation is likely to be sporadic, at least
partially uninformed, and unrepresentative in character. In practice,
democracy will evidence only limited participation. In the conditions of
modem mass society, that course is often a rational choice for individuals
facing numerous demands on their limited time.
Through political parties, democracies may achieve reasonable balances
between the dichotomies of these three dimensions. Parties make leaders
accessible to the mass citizenry; elections provide the formal means , but
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accessibility is realized only when parties organize competition at the polls.
At the same time, because party loyalty assures them of a regular basis of
support, leaders have a measure of discretion in the determination of public
policy. Parties are a principal component of social pluralism that "supports
liberal democracy by providing social bases of free and open competition
for leadership, widespread participation in the selection of leaders, restraint
in the application of pressures on leaders, and self-government in wide
areas of social life.'' 19
Parties may also meld collective and coalitional goals. By combining
the interests of individuals, they aggregate particular wants into more general programs; when sufficiently generalized, the programmatic cause of
the party may displace these particular interests. The effects are illustrated
by Burke's promotion of party as a unified principled group or by Van
Buren's subordination of personal goals to party interests. As Tocqueville
suggests, "As soon as a man begins to treat of public affairs in public, he
begins to perceive that he is not so independent of his fellow-men as he had
at first imagined . . .. The electoral system brings a multitude of citizens
permanently together, who would otherwise always have remained
unknown to each other." 20
Parties deal especially with the problems of democratic participation.
For their own electoral purposes they encourage mass participation, but
they also guide it. Mass involvement is directed toward specific purposes,
most obviously party victory. At the same time, participants learn something about the claims and needs of other party allegiants and about the
complexities of public policy.

POLITIC A L PA RTIE S A ND DEMOCRATIC VA LUE S

These dimensions of political parties imply different political values. Any
model of a political party encapsulates a combination of individual and
social preferences. On an individual level , Dahl has suggested "three criteria for authority." 2 1 Ideally, individuals would want government to maximize their personal choice, maximize competence in the conduct of public
affairs, and maximize economy in the use of their own limited resources,
such as time. These criteria parallel our own dimensions, respectively, of
voters' goals, leadership, and participation.
The problem, Dahl shows , is that these goals of government cannot be
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maximized simultaneously so long as there are contending groups in society. If individuals continually work to achieve their personal choice from
government or to locate competent leaders, they do so at the cost of economy of time. If competent leaders can be found, they may make decisions
different from a particular voter's preferences. In dealing with real governments, citizens must accept some compromise in combining these goals.
Political parties affect the achievement of these various goals. Applying
Dahl's criteria, parties clearly promote economy by providing simple cues
for voters. Indeed, critics such as Ostrogorski complain that parties provide
these cues too readily, allowing voters to neglect their duty as citizens.
Achieving competence is less certain through political parties, depending on whether the recruitment standards used by parties match those
needed in government. Traditional presidential nominating procedures, for
example, were once said to exclude "great men," just as modem reforms
in the system are said to handicap effective presidential government. 22
Achieving personal choice, the third criterion, is also uncertain through
parties. By uniting with others, some voters may gain some of their preferences but at the cost of surrendering or compromising other objectives.
Beyond individual preferences, a political system also incorporates more
general social values. Democratic political theorists, Alan Ware shows,
have emphasized three values, which he terms "interest optimalization, the
exercise of control, and civic orientation. " 23
According to the first value, democracy should strive for public policies
demanded by the populace, in Bentham's words, seeking "the greatest
happiness of the greate8t number." A second justification for democracy is
that it enables the citizenry to control their government and even "to
remove or alter the legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary
to the trust reposed in them. " 24 The third democratic value is more expansive, stressing personal development. To John Stuart Mill, democratic
institutions are desirable insofar as "they tend to foster in the members of
the community the various desirable qualities ... moral, intellectual, and
active. " 25
These goals are not necessarily contradictory, yet they are not easily
reconciled. The first goal deals with substantive results, the second focuses
on procedure, the third on individual psychology. Moreover, no necessary
relationship exists among them. Achieving the optimal resolution of interests, for example, does not necessarily imply either the exercise of control
or the development of a civic orientation, unless we assume tautologically
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Table 9.1. Party Concepts and Priorities of Democratic Values
Preference for
Civic Orientation
Higher preference
Lower preference

Relative Preference for
Interest Optimization
Social movement
Ideological commun it y
Governing caucus
Cause advocate
Office-seeking team

Exercise of Control
Urban machine
Personal faction
Bureaucractic organization

that decisions made by democratic controllers or participants are inevitably
correct. Indeed, much of political philosophy, beginning with Plato, argues
that democratic decisions are likely to be wrong and that democratic participation is to be feared, not welcomed.
Furthermore, the goals of exercising control and civic orientation are
quite different and may even be contradictory in some instances . To further
civic development, for example, we might enlarge the size of legislative
chambers. The result would be that the exercise of control would be less
effective, as the size of the body becomes unwieldy, most individuals will
be unable to speak, and action will be virtually impossible.
In exercising control, the electorate intervenes, but only in limited ways
and on specified occasions: "There is government for the people; there is
no government by the people." 26 In contrast, an electorate with a true civic
orientation will participate broadly and regularly, fitting Tocqueville's
description of the nineteenth-century American: "He takes a lesson in the
form of government from governing . The great work of society is ever
going on before his eyes and, as it were, under his hands." 27
Parties may promote some but not necessarily all of these democratic
objectives. Each of the different party models developed in this book
emphasizes some of these values and gives lesser attention to others . The
relative importance of each of the three values in the various party models
is suggested in Table 9. 1.
Two kinds of comparison are included in the table. In the horizontal
rows, the relative importance of the values of interest optimization and the
exercise of control are compared. In the vertical columns, the comparison
is of eitherof these to the third value, civic orientation. (The results of these
latter comparisons are identical.) Illustratively, the concept of party as a
social movement connotes a theory of democracy as the achievement of
particular policy interests rather than the exercise of control. This concept
gives a still greater priority to the development of the citizenry, however.
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There is some relationship, although incomplete, between these values
and the previous dimensions of democracy. On the dimension of leadership, democracy is somewhat more likely to be defined as the exercise of
control among the models that see leadership as autonomous rather than as
accessible. On the dimension of voter goals, interest optimization is
stressed among the models that seek collective rather than coalitional goals .
On the dimension of participation, civic orientation is more likely to be
emphasized among the models that pursue extensive rather than limited
participation.
Each of the party models promotes some values of democracy but slights
others. Party bureaucracies and personal factions allow voters to control
the composition of the government but disdain or distort popular involvement. Governing caucuses, cause advocates, and office-seeking teams pursue their diverse visions of the public good, satisfying some interests but
also neglecting civic development.
Ideological communities and social movements, in contrast, do involve
their members in politics but are subject to rapid decay or manipulative
domination. Urban machines enlist the emotional loyalties of their members in a larger cause but usually at the cost of loss of control over either
leaders or policies. No perfect party exists, either in reality or even as a
prescriptive model.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY

These party concepts are ultimately tied to the most general arguments in
democratic theory. In that long tradition, theorists often divide into two
camps. On one side are the partisans of liberal democratic theory; emphasizing the human tendency to pursue self-interest, they suspect the uses of
power and stress the consequent need to protect individuals against threats
from other persons and from government. The other camp is the locus of
communitarian democratic theory. More hopeful that humanity will
respond favorably to moral training, these writers are more concerned with
individual development. For these purposes they look more approvingly
both on governmental programs and on extensive public participation to
promote personal growth. Mansbridge insightfully describes these two traditions as "adversary democracy" and "unitary democracy." 28 Mill
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bridges the two groups, seeking both to limit power and to promote human
development.
The first tradition is found in Hobbes, Locke, and, particularly in the
United States, in Madison. Because of humans' self-interest, government
is both necessary (particularly to Hobbes) and worrisome (especially to
Locke). Madison summarizes the problem: "If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external
nor internal controls on government would be necessary." His solution is
to use self-interest to promote the public good. "Ambition must be made
to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the
constitutional rights of the place. " 29
The American liberal tradition stresses the democratic value of the exercise of control; achieving the other values depends on limitations of the
political process . Interest optimization will be served better if government
is not subject to intense popular demands, and personal development will
flourish better if government is restrained.
The communitarian tradition derives from the ancient Greeks and from
Rousseau and is best expressed in America by the Anti-Federalists. The
principal democratic value is civic orientation. The exercise of control is
seen by these theorists as only an enfeebled form of popular rule. Optimizing interests is expected to result from extensive participation, but participation itself is the most important goal.
These traditions are also evident in party concepts. Madison, in the tenth
Federalist, is exemplary of the liberal tradition, with its emphasis on
autonomous leadership and limited popular participation. Wise government consists of the management of factions, whose origins are "sown in
the nature of man." That control requires a delegation of power to a" chosen
body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their
country" and a limitation on the power of the electorate, prone "to sacrifice
the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. " 30
Madison's own emphasis is on the ambiguous collective goal of the public good, paralleling the concept of party as a governing caucus. His theory,
however, can easily accommodate other party models involving coalitional
goals, such as the party as bureaucracy or the more accessible leadership
of the party as office-seeking team.
The communitarian tradition is also evident in the party concepts , stressing collective goals, accessible leadership, and extensive participation.
Although Rousseau clearly opposed political parties, he effectively
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advances these ideals, presenting a philosophy of politics similar to the
model of party as a social movement. In Rousseau's view, politics should
seek the collective general will, not particular interests, so that "when in
the popular assembly a law is proposed, what the people is asked is not
exactly whether it approves or rejects the proposal, but whether it is in
conformity with the general will, which is their will." Leaders are accessible, with no authority other than to execute the policy decisions of the
sovereign community. Civic development and full participation are the
essence of good government, for "as soon as public service ceases to be
the chief business of the citizens and they would rather serve with their
money than with their persons , the State is not far from its fall. ' ' 3 1
American parties have combined elements of both theoretical traditions,
liberal and communitarian. They are composites, but not because of great
theoretical commitments; they are the results more of experience than of
reason. Typically originating in opposition to government, they share the
liberal distrust of power. Arousing mass support, they reflect the communitarian faith in the "plain people." Seeking spoils and profit, they embody
liberal individualism. Capturing the power of government, they implement
visions of community welfare.
These parties have promoted each of the three democratic values yet
have failed to achieve them fully. Their greatest success has been in actualizing the exercise of control over leadership, bringing peaceful and regular
changes in the government. They have contributed, along with other institutions, to the satisfaction of policy interests, fostering considerable correspondence between popular preferences and public policy. 32
This activity has been particularly evident when parties acted as governing caucuses (e.g. , Wilson's New Freedom), as cohesive office-seeking
teams (Roosevelt's New Deal), or as social movements (the antislavery
Republican party). They have brought friendship as well as interests into
politics, through urban machines and even personal factions, providing a
necessary though incomplete emotional basis for the development of civic
orientation.
The achievements of the American parties, however assessed, have been
neither complete nor costless. Effective government requires power and
therefore limits egalitarian civic participation. Similarly, the exercise of
control inherently requires that there be identifiable political specialistsa party-who can be held accountable by the controlling public . And these
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persons, like all specialists, must be rewarded and will use their specialists'
techniques for their own purposes.
Political control thus requires the vulgarity of officeseekers and the
messiness of political competition. "The psycho-technics of party management and party advertising, slogans and marching tunes, are not accessories," Schumpeter emphasizes, "they are the essence of politics," for
"democracy is the rule of the politician. " 33

POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE
AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC FUTURE

If political parties have contributed to American democracy over the past
two hundred years, their future service is uncertain. Trends both in American society generally and in the parties specifically raise problems, now
widely recognized, that can be overcome only by deliberate action.
Difficulties exist in furthering each of the three values of democracy.
The most problematic is the development of civic consciousness, which is
also the most demanding standard of democracy. Civic consciousness has
been nurtured traditionally in small communities, in close groups such as
the family, and in interpersonal associations such as neighborhoods and
unions. Face-to-face political associations, to Tocqueville, provided "large
free schools, where all the members of the community go to learn the
general theory of association" and the personal habits and techniques of
democratic self-government. 34
America continues to have a rich variety of voluntary associations, yet
decline in this private order underlying public life has also been evident. It
is marked by family instability, the spread of crime threatening neighborhood peace, extensive geographical mobility, the atrophy of unions, the
replacement of community celebrations by mass-media entertainment, the
incapacity of local government, and the bureaucratization of interest
groups.
Political parties also evidence these weakened interpersonal ties. They
are reflected in diminished party loyalties, the lessened impact of partisanship on voting behavior, and the replacement of the affective ties of local
parties by the rational efficiency of national party bureaucracies.
Furthermore, optimizing group interests through democratic processes
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has become more difficult. American government still functions, to be
sure, and has been reasonably successful in meeting some problems, such
as economic growth and maintenance of American international power.
Increasingly, however, dealing with problems is disjoined from popular
decision on policy issues.
Many of the vital issues are now matters on which popular experience is
inherently limited. For example, mass electorates do have some personal
grasp of economic policy because they encounter inflation directly in the
check-out lanes or experience unemployment. In contrast, newly dominant
issues such as ecological balance or disarmament are technical, long-range,
and unconnected to the voters' immediate, daily life. The result is that such
problems must be handled by technical experts not subject to electoral control. Bureaucratic government may still be good government, but it is not
democratic government.
This problem is worsened by political trends. The decline of local parties
means that citizens know fewer political intermediaries who can explain
these new problems or whom they can trust to reflect their experiences as
decisions are made. Furthermore, close party competition at the national
level induces timidity in policy innovation, and the continued partisan division between Congress and the president makes it virtually impossible for
voters to assign clear responsibility for policy outcomes. Basic decisions,
such as the federal budget deficit, are resolved in bipartisan negotiations, a
"collusion of elites ," in which politicians reach a plausible compromise
but are then mutually safeguarded from open debate. 35
The result is a weakening of the least difficult democratic value, the
exercise of control. Policy control is particularly limited when voters cannot
hold an indentifiable group accountable for either successes or errors in
governmental programs. Yet voters still retain the ability to replace those
in government with their electoral opponents, a powerful sanction to hold
over individuals, such as a president.
American government, however, is not government by individuals; even
presidential government is truly more than the actions of the single chief
executive. Over the entire government and particularly over Congress,
replacement of individuals has no cumulative effect. It is , as Woodrow
Wilson warned, replacing only one cook instead of changing the recipe of
the policy broth. In regard to this lack of clear responsibility, Hamilton's
criticism of a diffuse government becomes newly relevant: " It often
becomes impossible, amidst mutual accusations, to determine on whom

COMMON IMPULSES

145

the blame or the punishment of a pernicious measure, or a series of pernicious measures, ought really to fall." 36
The problem is magnified by political trends that make candidates independent of the parties. Voters can occasionally remove a particular representative, but the advantages of office make most incumbents largely
invulnerable if they avoid the most obvious corrupting temptations. Even
a general mood of discontent against all incumbents, though evident in
recent years, has no clear impact on policy.
At the same time, weakened party loyalties among the electorate make
legislators more reliant on their own resources and potentially vulnerable
to attack. To safeguard their isolated power, they are likely to take the safest
course, devotedly follow public opinion, build personal factions, and limit
their vision to the next election. Leadership toward the solution of national
problems carries dangers but earns few rewards.
Countering these trends, other developments in American society and
politics could lead to fuller realization of the basic democratic values. The
American public itself has more resources for understanding politics, with
an increased level of education. Simple self-interest has made politics more
important to the population, as the number of people employed by government has increased and the potential personal benefit or harm of national
governmental action has involved most people, from old-age pensioners to
military reservists unexpectedly called to war duty to victims of unclean air
and water.
With the dominance of the mass media and the evolution of centralized
interest groups, American politics has become truly national. Even the
weakened parties have responded to these trends, with increased ideological coherence among their legislators, activists, and mass base and with the
development of effective national electioneering organizations .

THE FUTURE OF THE A MERIC A N PARTY

The emergent national politics requires more effective national parties, a
need now widely recognized . One commentator speaks for many in deploring the present state of American politics:
Governing is turned into a perpetual campaign. Moreover, it makes
government into an instrument designed to sustain an elected offi-

146

CHAPTER NINE

cial 's public popularity .... The citizenry is viewed as a mass of fluid
voters who can be appeased by appearances, occasional drama, and
clever rhetoric . ... The permanent campaign enshrines the pragmatism of the political party without the party. It appropriates the ideology of the American party-to the victor belong the spoilswithout any constituency beyond phantom public opinion. 37
Party reconstruction is the necessary alternative to this uncertain method
of governance. National leadership, to be democratic, requires not only
good presidents but widespread leadership, organized through the parties.
As Huntington argues, "It is through such a system rather than broad
appeals to public opinion that Presidents achieve the policy results they
desire. Vigorous and responsible national leadership requires a network of
petty tyrants." 38
Reconstruction of the parties must be directed toward fuller realization
of each of the democratic values, interest optimization, the exercise of control, and civic development. In the American context, no one party model
can be fully applicable. Present trends, however, are bringing the parties
too close to some models, such as cause advocates, office-seeking teams,
bureaucracies, and personal factions. The nation would benefit if the parties developed more of the characteristics of ideological communities,
social movements, governing caucuses, and even urban machines.
The purpose of change is not to make American parties fit any one model
but to move the system incrementally along the three dimensions toward
fuller participation , a greater concern for collective goals, and more autonomous leadership. The following proposed changes, none requiring Constitutional amendment, would move American parties in these directions. 39
This program recognizes the trends in voter behavior and the problems
inherent in the reforms analyzed in chapters 7 and 8. American parties will
remain groups that seek power through elections under their common label .
We cannot expect them to become models of intellectual debate or of participatory democracy; however, we can envisage the parties as leadership
coalitions with a heightened degree of policy coherence, supported by a
more active mass base. These suggested changes are unusual but not impossible to imagine or to achieve. Every one of these proposals , in fact, is
established practice either in some state in the American Union or in other
liberal democracies . So, let us begin.
- Nominations for public office should be made only by party mem-
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bers, either in closed primaries or, better, by mail ballot among persons
who have personally enrolled in the party and paid modest dues. The dues
could be collected through the income-tax checkoff to avoid any discriminatory effect on low-income voters. This procedure would make the par~
ties' prospective leaders responsible to a broad popular base, promote
coherence in the policy perspective of the parties, and provide members
with significant impact on the choice of candidates. These qualities could
also be advanced by nominating candidates in party caucuses and conventions, but Americans' distrust of parties probably makes it impossible to
recreate these past practices.
- Preceding membership decisions on nominations, party conventions
should recommend candidates for statewide or federal office, including the
president. These conventions should include a large proportion of party
leaders and public officials elected under the party label, perhaps half of
the total. At the national conventions, illustratively, the delegates would
include all governors, congressmen, and U.S. senators as well as delegates
elected from local party branches. Candidates receiving a prescribed minimum vote at the conventions (perhaps 20 percent) would then be presented
to the party members for their decision, through televised debates and
mailed leaflets. This combination would induce greater coherence in government among party candidates and give rank-and-file members a vital
role within the party, stimulating their civic consciousness.
These conventions also should debate and adopt the party platform,
developed over the preceding year by party policy commissions , which
would include a substantial number of party officeholders and the holding
of national hearings. In place of the rushed deliberations at conventions,
these commissions would promote more thorough consideration and foster
the development of consensual party programs. This mechanism would aid
both citizen control of policy and citizen development and avoid unrealistic
attempts to impose party discipline on public officials. The procedure
would also probably contribute to more unified party action within government, further simplifying popular control. Institutional change within the
congressional parties would further enhance control , through such devices
as more active party caucuses or the adoption of a formal "shadow cabinet"
by the minority party.
-Party resources, especially money, should be expanded through legislation, fostering contributions to parties but not to candidates. Appropriate
techniques might include matching income-tax checkoffs, reviving the
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income-tax deduction for party contributions, and eliminating the limits on
party contributions to candidates but retaining limits on individual and
group contributions. Following the precedent of the government's paying
for the national conventions, the federal treasury should provide a fixed,
unconditional subsidy for the interelection costs of administering the
national parties .
Legislation could also reduce the need for party fund-raising, for example, by providing the parties either free or government-paid uncensored
time on television for party political broadcasts, mailing party brochures to
all voters, and mandating the lowest commercial charges for party broadcasts and mail. These public funds should be contingent on the parties'
agreement to sponsor and hold televised debates among presidential, vicepresidential, and statewide candidates.
Increased party financing can be used to revitalize the parties' local grass
roots. As an incentive, funds collected within the party candidates' own
state could be matched in higher ratios than those from other areas of the
nation . Regulation of finances could also restrict the proportion of public
funds that could be spent on mass-media advertising, thereby encouraging
more interpersonal campaigning .
- Voter registration should become a responsibility of government,
using governmental agencies such as motor vehicle departments to enroll
residents and the postal service to register voters who change residence.
Registering to vote should carry with it the opportunity to enroll in a party
and to pay its dues. By broadening the potential electorate, greater opportunities will exist for full civic participation, including partisan activity. By
relieving parties of the burden of registration, they will be better able to
deal with issues of public policy.
-State legislation should be amended or challenged in the courts to
reduce the severe restraints on parties. The parties should be generally left
free to determine their own internal organization and membership qualifications, to decide on their campaign activities, to handle their own funds
and staffs, and to recommend patronage appointments. Legislation is
needed only to prevent financial fraud and racial or sexual discrimination
in primaries and in similar governmental activities. By freeing the parties,
their leaders will gain more responsibility and their members achieve more
control and greater civic consciousness.
- The parties can take further action toward their own renewal, particularly when they are provided with new financial resources. They might
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consider such local activities as ombudsmen services, issue forums, and
sponsorship of civic programs. At the national level, they might operate a
cable television network, distribute their message through third-class mass
mailings, and offer selective incentives such as cooperative purchasing to
potential members. Through such techniques, the parties would become
more effective agencies, facilitating popular control.
As the parties gained resources and members, they would become more
significant campaign participants. This renewal would provide incentives
for candidates to build a party, not an individual, record. With greater institutional capacity, the parties would be more likely to develop coherent policy programs. With more support from the parties, candidates could be
more secure in considering long-range national problems. By stimulating
individual financial contributions to parties, these measures would also
encourage individual local participation, increasing civic consciousness.
This program will not solve all the problems of American political parties, much less those of American government generally. Human incapacity and self-centeredness will continue. Madison's judgment still applies:
Men and women are not angels who can live without government, and
politicians are not angels who can govern without constraint.
These measures may make a start, however. Their adoption may begin
to redirect the undoubted ambitions of American politicians toward greater
concern for collective goals, begin to allow politicians to use more of their
considerable intellectual and personal skills toward meeting national problems, and begin to encourage a more robust civic consciousness among the
electorate.
Democracy, like life itself, is a process, never a complete achievement.
Michels appropriately provides our final lesson. He repeats an old tale of a
dying farmer who told his children of a treasure buried in the fields of the
family farm. After extended plowing, they found no buried gold, but their
hard work resulted in a magnificent harvest. Michels 's moral might be our
own: "Democracy is a treasure which no one will ever discover by deliberate search. But in continuing our search, in laboring indefatigably to discover the undiscoverable, we shall perform a work which will have fertile
results. " 40
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